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Introduction
1.1 Overview
Agricultural activities are characterized by a high variability of returns. The risk of 
crop-failure is determined by several factors: weather variability, natural disasters, 
and changes in market and input prices, to name a few. Smallholder farmers in 
developing countries are particularly vulnerable to these risks, which may have 
extreme consequences for their livelihoods (Cervantes-Godoy et al. 2013). A strategy 
to manage risks in agriculture starts with decisions at the farm— which crops to 
grow, land allocation, the use of inputs, technology adoption and diversification 
with other on and off-farm activities (OECD 2009). 
This thesis focuses on farmers’ decisions at farm-level to manage risks. It studies 
the individual decision-making in interaction with the institutions and government 
policies that can influence these decisions. It assesses how individual preferences 
shaped these decisions, and endeavor to show how, through understanding 
farmers’ choices, research can contribute to policy design in agriculture. It presents 
experimental and quasi-experimental evidence from coffee farming in Costa Rica. 
It starts by looking at the alternatives for eliciting risk preferences in the field 
and how the estimates of risk preferences relate to farm-level decisions. Next, it 
explores social preferences and farmer cooperation with agricultural cooperatives. 
Then, it examines the interaction between financial instruments and governmental 
support as the effect of farmers’ liability on the demand for credit with and without 
insurance. Finally, it presents evidence on the environmental impacts of organic 
certification as a farm-level strategy looking to increase premiums in-hand with 
conservation awareness.
Although each chapter is intended as a stand-alone contribution to the literature, 
they all address individual preferences and decisions at farm-level to manage risks. 
Regarding individual preferences, the emphasis is on studying risk preferences as 
farmers’ willingness to take risks, and social preferences as farmers’ willingness to 
contribute to a public good, and their relations with real-life behavior. Regarding 
farm-level decisions, emphasis is placed on investments, farm management practices, 
and formal market-based strategies, such as credit, insurance, and certification 
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schemes, that can be adopted by farmers to manage risks. Overall, this thesis 
enhances the understanding of individual preferences and decision making at the 
farm-level and its implications for policy design.
1.2 Risk preferences
Assessing risk preferences is key to understanding decisions at farm level. Farmers 
choose between options that are not necessarily certain, whose outcomes have a 
probability of success or failure. An effective risk management strategy, therefore, 
depends strongly on behavioral factors, including risk preferences (Sulewski and 
Kłoczko-Gajewska 2014). 
The concept of preferences in economics takes us to the seminal work of Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1947). In their book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, they 
presented a series of axioms which became the basis for Expected Utility Theory (EUT). 
Under EUT, risk preferences are defined as risk attitudes derived from people’s choices, 
and individuals’ choices associated with the subjective value of a statistical expectation 
of possible outcomes. Therefore, every individual shows unique preferences when 
facing decisions under risk. To better understand subjective probabilities, Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) developed their Prospect Theory, which states that outcomes of 
individual decision-making under risk are framed around a reference point. In other 
words, people tend to overweight losses with respect to a comparable gain (Levy 1996), 
and one should look not only at individual decisions at gain-ranked events but also 
relating to loss-ranked events (Wakker 2010). 
Given the subjective nature of risk preferences, it is essential that research takes 
preferences into account when assessing the impact of agricultural and development 
programs, since the adoption or success of a given policy varies with the target 
population’s risk preferences (Charness and Viceisza 2016). 
A common assumption when studying technology adoption in the agricultural context is 
the stability of risk preferences across decision contexts. In other words, risk preferences 
resulting from choices in one context are used to understand individual behavior in 
another. However, it is possible that risk preferences are not stable across contexts, 
or stable across certain specific contexts but not others (Barseghyan et al. 2018). This 
assumption has major implications for the implementation of surveys aiming to collect 
risk preferences.
Furthermore, several actions can be undertaken to reduce exposure to risk in 
agriculture. On one hand, decisions can be part of a bigger picture, with considerations 
that take into account many household aspects (i.e., broadly bracketed decisions), such 
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as requiring a loan for agricultural investment. On the other hand, other decisions are 
taken in isolation from all others (i.e., narrowly bracketed), for example, day to day 
farm management (Barseghyan et al. 2018). 
As a result, both the context in which risk preferences are measured and the type of 
decision under assessment may yield different outcomes when studying how farmers 
make decisions under risk. Chapter 2 approaches these issues by evaluating a method 
for estimating risk attitudes that can be easily implemented in the field. It shows how 
different estimates of attitudes to risk relate to different real-life farming choices and 
evaluates the survey-based method back-to-back with an incentivize risk experiment.
1.3 Social Preferences 
Individuals reveal social preferences when they care not only about resources 
allocated to themselves, but also about resources allocated to other relevant people 
(Fehr and Fischbacher 2002). Vast empirical evidence shows that social preferences 
shape a substantial fraction of people’s choices (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002; 
Fischbacher et al. 2001; Kocher et al. 2008; Martinsson et al. 2013).
Moreover, people’s social preferences have significant economic implications. 
Both the theory and the empirical evidence suggest that the interaction between 
different types of social preferences (i.e., reciprocity and selfish types) changes the 
economic incentives, with consequences for the formation of institutions (Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2002; Kosfeld et al.2009). Agricultural cooperatives are one example 
of institutions in developing countries’ rural areas. Cooperatives are considered 
an essential vehicle for development that mobilize local resources for a common 
goal that provides benefits to local farming communities (Zeuli and Radel 2005). 
Often, cooperatives play an essential role in providing farmers with information and 
training on risks, tools, and techniques that they can implement in their farms to 
reduce risk (OECD 2011).
Chapter 3 continues in line with Chapter 2 on the subject of how to measure 
preferences and how they relate to real-life choices. It focuses on conditional 
cooperation, a particular type of social preference to study farmer cooperation 
with local agricultural cooperatives. Conditional cooperators adapt their behavior 
to others in the group they belong to. In other words, if other people in the group 
cooperate, conditional cooperators do so as well. If others defect, conditional 
cooperators follow through. 
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The chapter examines cooperation in a setting where farmers are commonly 
organized in agricultural cooperatives. If the majority of farmers are conditional 
cooperators, they will bring in their coffee harvest for processing if other farmers 
in the community do so too, and vice versa. Therefore, conditional cooperation can 
enhance cooperation, but also weaken the cooperative structure if farmers do not 
bring in their harvest for processing.
1.4 Financial instruments to manage risks
Insurance uptake in developing countries has been extensively studied, but has 
remained persistently low without the use of continuous subsidies (Carter et al. 
2017). Some constraints that limit the capacity of farmers to demand insurance 
include basis risk, availability of other informal insurance mechanisms, level of 
knowledge and trust in institutions, and the insurance design, among others (Carter 
et al. 2017; Hellmuth et al. 2009; Rosenzweig 2012;). 
The lack of formal insurance, in turn, aggravates credit constraints. For example, 
in the absence of insurance markets, the borrower voluntarily withdraws from 
taking a loan, due to the risk of losing collateral (i.e., risk rationing) (Boucher et 
al. 2008; Giné and Yang 2009). Under such scenarios, the combination of credit 
with crop insurance could improve credit markets and encourage investment in the 
agricultural sector (Carter et al. 2014).
Farmers borrow money with the hope that they will be able to repay their debts 
after a successful harvest. However, droughts, floods, or extreme temperatures can 
ruin crops. To cope with losses from extreme weather events, agricultural banks and 
governments in developing countries cooperate with poor agricultural borrowers by 
restructuring loans and through debt relief programs (Carter et al. 2007; The World 
Bank 2007) . Still, governments in general and especially in developing countries 
have a limited capacity to help. In other words, government assistance is not always 
certain, and farmers are uncertain about the amount of debt for which they will be 
liable in the event of crop failure (Carter et al. 2007; Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega 
2011).
Financial instruments such as bundling credit together with insurance are a 
promising solution for risk rationing. However, they may reduce investment due to 
farmers’ limited liability (the certainty of debt relief in case of default), since limited 
liability provides implicit insurance (Giné and Yang 2009). Thus, when an insurance 
premium must be paid, this results in a lowered demand for loans. 
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Chapter 4 follows the theoretical model of Giné and Yang (2009) and focuses on 
household decisions on how much to borrow in order to invest in his farm. Credit 
is offered either with or without mandatory insurance with a premium cost, under 
three types of liability scenarios using a lab-in-the-field experiment.
1.5 Voluntary eco-certification
Initiatives that certify agricultural commodities produced in a sustainable and 
environmentally friendly way are growingly popular. For example, the number of 
organic producers has increased by more than 160,000, or over 7% since 2014, with 
more than 84% of the producers located in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Willer 
et al. 2017).
Eco-certification schemes like organic certification have the potential to improve 
commodity producers’ environmental performance (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005; 
Rice and Ward 1996). In theory, they enable consumers to differentiate among 
commodities by providing information about their environmental attributes, and 
creating the financial incentives, with price premiums, for producers to meet 
certification standards.
There is a growing body of academic literature which examines commodity 
certification. However, little is known about whether it affects producers’ 
environmental performance. Some studies are evaluating the environmental impacts 
of certification, but many rely on problematic methods that bias their results. To 
accurately identify certification impacts, an evaluation must construct a reasonable 
counterfactual outcome, that is, an estimate of what the environmental outcomes for 
certified entities would have been had they not been certified.  
Chapter 5 presents an evaluation of the environmental effects of organic coffee 
certification in central Costa Rica. Organic certification is a farm-level decision to 
eliminate the use of chemical fertilizer and pesticide, among the implementation of 
other environmentally friendly practices. On the one hand, the decision to certify 
or not the product as organic can be seen as a reflection of individual preferences 
for a sustainable environment. On the other hand, it can be seen as a farm risk 
management strategy that reduces dependence on inputs and differentiates the 
product to receive premiums on it.
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1.6 Objectives
The overarching objective of this thesis is to enhance the understanding of farm-
level decision making to manage risks. It assesses how individual preferences shape 
these decisions and endeavor to show how, through understanding farmers’ choices, 
research can contribute to policy design in agriculture. It studies farm-level decisions 
from different perspectives: regarding farm investments and inputs, decisions on 
whether or not to support local agricultural cooperatives, choices to demand credit 
with or without insurance, and decisions regarding voluntary certification schemes; 
and explores the individual decision-making in interaction with the institutions and 
government policies that can influence these decisions. 
More specifically, this thesis addresses the following research questions in four 
separate chapters:
• Chapter 2: Does context matter when estimating risk preferences via survey
methods in the field? Can a context-free survey estimate predict risk-taking 
behavior in an incentivized experiment? How do the different estimates of risk 
preferences relate to real-life farming choices?
• Chapter 3: Are farmers consistent with their choices across parts of the
experiment? Are social preferences determined in an experiment consistent 
with real-life behavior?  
• Chapter 4: What is the effect of farmers’ liability on the uptake of credit with
and without mandatory insurance?
• Chapter 5: Does eco-certification yield environmental benefits?
1.7 Methodology
An overall aim of this thesis is to enhance the understanding of how individual 
preferences shape decisions at farm-level. Although one cannot directly observe 
preferences, it is possible to make inferences about the underlying preferences by 
observing behavior in an experiment (Voors et al. 2016). Hence, we analyzed cross-
sectional survey data on household and farm characteristics combined with a series 
of behavioral experiments that allow us to make inferences about farmer preferences 
to enhance our understanding of farm-level decision making.
Experimental methods have increased in popularity in economics research (Levitt 
and List 2009; Viceisza 2016). Harrison and List (2004) describe a taxonomy 
that includes conventional lab experiments, artefactual field experiments, framed 
field experiments, and natural field experiments. Conventional lab experiments are 
commonly implemented to students, using an abstract framing and set of rules. 
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Artefactual field experiments, commonly known as lab-in-the-field experiments, are 
those implemented like conventional lab experiments but in the field, with “real 
subjects”— for example, farmers in rural areas of Costa Rica. Frame field experiments 
use both real farmers and the field context to frame the experiment; for example, in 
the context of coffee farming. Finally, in natural field experiments the “real subjects” 
participate without their knowledge  (Harrison and List 2004). 
1.7.1 Empirical strategies
This thesis used standard econometric methods to analyze the survey and data 
collected from three lab-in-the-field experiments and one quasi-experiment, all 
implemented with real subjects: coffee farmers in rural Costa Rica. 
Chapter 2 uses survey data asking a set of hypothetical willingness to take risks 
questions  (Dohmen et al. 2011) and elicited individuals’ attitudes to risk in an 
experiment with real payoffs (Sutter et al. 2013; Vieider et al. 2015).  First, by 
assessing correlations between a context-free survey estimate and context-specific 
survey estimates. Then, by testing if survey data predicts risk-taking behavior in 
an incentivized experiment. Finally, it shows how the different estimates of risk 
attitudes relate to real-life farming choices using regression analysis.
In Chapter 3, the standard public goods game is combined with the strategy method 
to identify social preferences of conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al. 2001), 
followed by testing both the internal and external validity of the typology of 
conditional cooperator among farmers that have to decide whether to cooperate with 
the coffee cooperative. To test for internal consistency, it explores if those identified 
as conditional cooperators act as such when contrasting their contributions to their 
beliefs about the contributions of others in the experiment. To test for external 
consistency, it looks at the interaction between the type of cooperator and the 
share of other farmers in the village who bring coffee to the local cooperative using 
regression analysis with interaction effects.
Chapter 4 follows the theoretical model of Giné and Yang (2009). It describes a 
lab-in-the-field experiment in the traditional setting, conducted by first gathering 
subjects in a common area to explain the instructions. Each farmer chooses how 
much to borrow in order to invest in his farm. Credit is offered either with or 
without mandatory insurance with a premium cost, under three types of liability 
scenarios: limited liability, 50%, or 100% probability of full liability (i.e. the farmer 
is liable for sure). A laboratory approach allows us to isolate the impact of limited 
liability on the demand for loans with and without mandatory insurance. 
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Finally, Chapter 5 makes use of a quasi-experiment by means of a matching 
estimator, which constructs a matched control sample of noncertified farms that 
are very similar to the certified ones in terms of observable characteristics (Dehejia 
and Wahba 2002; Ferraro et al. 2007; List et al. 2003; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 
The impact of organic certification is measured as the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) — the difference between the percentage of certified farms that 
use a given management practice and the percentage of matched noncertified farms 
that use it.
1.7.2 Study area and data collection
The empirical research was set in Costa Rican coffee farming areas (Figure 1.1). 
Although coffee is no longer the main agricultural export of the country, it remains 
a leading agricultural commodity. According to the Costa Rican Coffee Institute 
(ICAFE), there are around 41,300 coffee growers (11,180 less than in 2008), 
producing roughly over 2 million coffee bean fanegas1 annually (ICAFE 2018). The 
coffee sector is mostly composed of small-scale growers (90%), who produce less than 
100 coffee fanegas per year (ICAFE 2018). These small-scale farmers are traditionally 
organized in agricultural cooperatives. Since the 1980s, most coffee production has 
been converted to a high-yielding “technified” monocrop in which coffee is grown 
with minimal shade cover and intensive application of agrochemicals, a system that 
was pioneered in Costa Rica (Adams and Ghaly 2007; Rice and Ward 1996).
Research for this thesis took place in various places and moments in time as part 
of different research projects. Chapter 5 examines organic coffee certification in 
Turrialba, a coffee region located about 64 km east of the capital, San José. Certified 
farmers in this region belong to the Association of Organic Producers of Turrialba 
(Asociación de Productores Orgánicos de Turrialba, APOT). For reasons discussed in 
said chapter, the study focuses on coffee certification during 2003, the year that 
census data was collected in the region. In 2003 there were 36 certified farmers 
registered and 2567 uncertified farmers taking part in the census.
Data collection for Chapters 2 and 3 took place during 2014 in two other Costa Rican 
coffee regions: Tarrazú and Brunca. Households were sampled through stratified 
random sampling based on coffee plot density within three districts from each of 
the two coffee regions. Only household head farmers took part in the survey and 
experiments. The experiment was introduced as part of the survey and conducted 
with each farmer at their house. The final sample comprised 293 coffee farmers.
1  A fanega is a standard unit of volume to measure coffee in Central America, of approximately 250 kg.
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Figure 1.1 | Coffee growing regions in Costa Rica.
Source: Roblesabana Coffee (2018)
Finally, the data for Chapter 4 was collected as a follow up to the 2014 survey, 
contacting all previously surveyed farmers to conduct thirteen experimental sessions 
at local primary schools during the second and third week of October 2015. In 
total, 134 farmers participated in this last experiment (46% of the 2014 survey 
participants).
1.8 Outline
The chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 looks at the alternatives for 
collecting risk preferences data in the field. Chapter 3 tests conditional cooperation 
by looking at local participation of farmers in agricultural cooperatives. Chapter 
4 examines the effect of farmers’ liability on the demand for credit with and 
without insurance. Chapter 5 looks at the environmental impacts of organic coffee 
certification. Chapter 6 summarizes the empirical findings, lessons learned, and 
offers a discussion of policy implications. 
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Alternatives for risk elicitation in the field
Evidence from coffee farmers in Costa Rica
Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate a survey-based method to other methods that elicit 
farmers’ risk attitudes.  For both researchers and practitioners, surveys can be 
easier to implement than field experiments in developing countries. We first assess 
correlations between a context-free survey estimate of risk-taking and context-
specific risk preferences. Then, we test whether survey data predicts risk-taking 
behavior in an incentivized experiment. Finally, we show how the different 
estimates of survey risk preferences relate to real-life farming choices in a population 
of coffee farmers in Costa Rica. Our results indicate that one should be careful 
when extrapolating risk attitudes across contexts. Context-neutral and context-
specific survey questions elicit different risk preferences. While the context-free 
survey estimate of risk preferences predicts risk-taking behavior in a context-free 
risk experiment, and context-specific estimates are associated with risk-taking in 
the same agricultural real-life context , the context-free survey estimate of risk-
taking is not associated with actual risk-taking behavior in the agricultural setting. 
Connecting these methods to farm practices, we find that higher willingness to take 
risk is associated with the implementation of agricultural practices that require 
more farm investment. In contrast, farmers who report less willingness to take risks 
are more likely to have higher expenditures on fertilizer use. Researchers interested 
in using risk preferences as inputs into the design of policy instruments should make 
sure that preferences are elicited in the specific context targeted by the potential 
policy instrument.
This chapter is based on: 
Naranjo, M.A., Alpizar, F., Martinsson, P. (2019) “Alternatives for risk elicitation in 
the field: Evidence from coffee farmers in Costa Rica.” (Working paper).  
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2.1 Introduction
In an agricultural setting there is nothing like certainty. On a daily basis, farmers 
have to make risky decisions, from the choice of crops and timing of harvest to the 
application of farming inputs and other strategies to cope with weather variation. 
Accordingly, it is important that governments and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) take into account risk attitudes when assessing the impact of agricultural and 
development programs. Because the adoption or success of a given policy varies with 
the target population’s risk preferences (Charness and Viceisza 2016), policy-makers 
and researchers must collect information about risk attitudes 
A central issue here is how to estimate risk attitudes. The standard in the literature is the 
use of incentivized experiments, where individual’s choices have direct consequences 
on their earnings (see discussion on induced value theory in Smith (1976)) and many 
papers have adopted this strategy. However, conducting risk experiments in the field, 
for example with farmers, is costly, as well as technically and logistically complicated. 
An alternative is to use stated preference data collected via survey questionnaires, 
which are less expensive since they are not incentivized with money, and are easier 
to apply to a more extensive population. However, based on the logic of induced 
value theory, stated preference can be criticized for not having direct consequences 
for respondents. Falk and Heckman (2009) summarize this discussion and argue that 
experiments and surveys are complements, and both have their pros and cons. 
Risk experiments typically are conducted in a context-free environment, where 
individuals make decisions between different lotteries. Experiments can vary regarding 
the elicitation method or choice task, framed in the loss or gain domain, probabilities, 
and stakes (Jamison et al. 2012).2 By contrast, survey methods often use Likert scales 
to elicit risk attitudes. Survey-based methods are typically more elaborative about the 
framing of the question, with a general context-free assessment of willingness to take 
the risk, or a context-specific question regarding risk-taking in, for example, driving 
or health-related choices, as in Dohmen et al. (2011). 
In this paper, we are interested in evaluating a method for estimating risk attitudes 
that can be easily implemented by policy-makers in developing countries. Hence, 
our objective is to evaluate a survey-based method to collect risk attitudes in the 
field with a population of farmers in rural Costa Rica. We do this, first, by assessing 
correlations between a context-free survey estimate and context-specific survey 
estimates. Then, we test whether survey data predicts risk-taking behavior in an 
incentivized experiment, and, finally, we show how the different estimates of risk 
attitudes relate to real-life farming choices.
2  See Jamison et al. (2012) for a complete review on risk elicitation methods.
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This paper makes two major contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to 
the under-researched issue of the extent to which survey risk preferences are stable 
across contexts (Barseghyan et al. 2018). We combine laboratory and field settings 
to gain insight into whether different risk estimates can be directly applied to make 
real-life predictions. Second, our paper contributes to the literature on the role 
that lab in the field experiments play in informing policymaking, and the nature of 
different empirical methods to estimate parameters associated with characteristics 
such as risk preferences (Viceisza 2016). 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, regarding the consistency of 
survey risk preferences across contexts, we do not find one general component across 
specific contexts. Hence, it is important to elicit risk attitudes for the specific context 
of interest. Researchers and practitioners should be careful when extrapolating risk 
attitudes across contexts. 
Second, our survey estimate of risk-taking (with no context) predicts behavior in 
the risk experiment in line with previous studies. Furthermore, we explore how our 
survey-based estimate of willingness to take risk characterizes the utility function 
parameters. Higher willingness to take risk is associated with less pessimism, less 
sensitivity to changes in probabilities that increase the likelihood of a loss, and more 
loss aversion. 
Crucially, we find differences between survey estimates with and without a context in 
relationship with real-life farming behavior. The context-free survey estimate of risk-
taking is not associated with actual risk-taking behavior in the agricultural setting. 
The risk preference elicited through a survey is associated with real-life farming 
choices only when the survey question is asked in the specific agricultural context. 
In this context, we contribute by understanding farmers’ risk-related real-life 
decisions. Higher willingness to take risk is associated with the implementation of 
agricultural practices that require more farm investment. In contrast, farmers who 
report less willingness to take risks are more likely to have higher expenditures 
in fertilizer use. This last result is consistent with studies showing that applying 
fertilizer reduces the risk of pests and low yields in coffee farming in Central America 
(Avelino et al. 2015), but we recognize the effect can be crop and input specific. 
Researchers and practitioners interested in using risk preferences in the design of 
policy instruments should make sure that preferences are elicited in the specific context 
targeted by the policy instrument. For general financial decisions, the estimation of 
risk preferences without a context might be sufficient, but if the policy instrument 
target a specific technology or input (e.g., fertilizer use or implementation of improved 
seeds varieties) risk preferences should be elicited in that particular context. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our 
conceptual framework and hypotheses. The third section describes the study area, 
the sample selection, and the fieldwork implementation. Section four explains the 
methods, including the experimental design and modeling approach. Section five 
presents the results, and the last section concludes the paper.
2.2 Conceptual framework and hypotheses
We divide our analysis into three sets of research questions. First, we want to know 
whether there is stability across context-free and context-specific survey methods 
of risk attitudes. Second, we want to test whether the context-free survey estimate 
predicts risk-taking behavior in an incentivized experiment. Third, we want to know 
how different estimates of risk attitudes relate to real-life farming choices. In this 
section, we describe our theoretical considerations and develop our hypotheses, 
supported by a review of previous studies.
2.2.1 Stability of risk attitudes across context
We want to know whether we can use one general survey-based measure of risk to 
characterize risk-taking in different contexts and in particular for the agricultural 
context. If that is the case, adding a simple question to a questionnaire can help 
practitioners characterize risk attitudes. If that is not the case, more context-specific 
questions are needed to estimate risk preferences in surveys accurately.
Some studies have found that risk attitudes have a general component (i.e., preferences 
are stable across specific contexts) (Dohmen et al. 2011; Einav et al. 2012; Vieider et 
al. 2015). On the other hand, Barseghyan et al. (2011) and Lönnqvist et al. (2014) 
do not find a link between a general risk question and specific context settings 
for risky behaviors. Hence, evidence is still mixed, and more importantly, studies 
have used subjects from developed countries or student samples in a controlled lab 
setting, either of which can be considered an “unusual population” (Henrich et al. 
2010) and difficult to extrapolate to the developing world.3 
3  Dohmen et al. (2011) used the German Socio-Economic Panel to compare stated risk attitudes in 
the survey to responses in real-stakes lotteries. Lönnqvist et al. (2014) conducted the experiment at the 
Laboratory for Experimental Economics in Bonn. Barseghyan et al. (2011) and Einav et al. (2012) data is 
from the United States and Vieider et al. (2015) applied controlled lab experiments with students in 30 
countries who also responded to a series of survey stated preference questions.
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In this study, we present an extension from Dohmen et al. (2011) from a non-
work context4 to a real-life working activity such as farming using a population 
of developing country farmers. We emphasize the context in which the survey is 
asked. Questions are framed in a general risk question with no context, in a financial 
context, in an agricultural context, and in to agriculture-specific questions regarding 
changing or diversifying crops, changing coffee varieties, and applying farm inputs 
such as fertilizer and pest control (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1 | Survey-based estimates of risk attitudes: from general to agricultural specific risk attitudes. 
If survey-based estimates for risk-taking in different contexts are correlated with a 
general survey-based estimate of risk, then we can conclude that risk attitudes have 
one domain-general component across specific contexts. Otherwise, a principal 
component analysis will identify if we can group risky choices in components. In 
other words, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: there is a positive and significant correlation across survey-based risk 
estimates from general to specific contexts. 
2.2.2 Experimental validation of survey estimates
Motivated by different models of risk preferences5, risk experiments are conducted 
typically in a context-free environment, where individuals make decisions between 
different lotteries. Lotteries can be implemented using choice tasks or by eliciting 
safe alternatives (i.e., certainty equivalents) next to the lottery. Lotteries can 
differ regarding the frame in the loss or gain domain, under different stakes and 
probabilities. For example, some experiments offer options over gambles that 
4  Dohmen et al. (2011) studied the stability of risk attitudes across six contexts: general, car driving, 
financial matters, sports and leasure, career and health. These contexts do not relate to specific decisions 
in the main income activity of a household.
5  For Expected Utility (EU) theory to non-EU models including rank dependent expected utility (RDEU) 
theory and cumulative prospect theory (CPT), see Barseghyan et al. (2018) for a complete review on the 
risk preferences models.
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increase in expected value (Binswanger 1980; Cardenas and Carpenter 2013). 
Others elicit certainty equivalents of fixed bets (Henrich and McElreath 2002) or 
offer a series of paired lotteries to obtain prospect theory parameters (Tanaka et al. 
2010), looking at gain-ranked events (gain domain) and loss-ranked events (loss 
domain) (e.g., Sutter et al. 2013; Vieider et al. 2015).
We want to explore whether reporting a higher willingness to take a risk in response 
to a general survey-based question is reflected in a greater willingness to take a 
risk in an incentivized lab-styled experiment. We use the survey-based general 
willingness to take risks (with no context) because the experiment is context-free as 
well. Previous studies have found that a general estimate of risk predicts risk-taking 
in an experiment  (Dohmen et al. 2011; Vieider et al. 2015). However, a recent study 
by Charness and Viceisza (2016) finds different results in a developing country 
context. They test subjects’ comprehension of three methods in rural Senegal: two 
experimental tasks (the Holt–Laury task and the Gneezy–Potters mechanism) and a 
non-incentivized willingness-to-risk scale following Dohmen et al., 2011). They find 
a low level of understanding of the Holt-Laury task and the experimental estimates 
unlikely to be correlated with the willingness to risk question in general. 
Our second objective aims to test whether general survey estimate predicts risk-
taking behavior in an incentivized experiment as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Survey-based general risk-taking (with no context) is positively and 
significantly correlated with the average risk-taking behavior in a context-free experiment.
2.2.3 Risk attitudes and real-life farming choices
Our final research question aims to analyze how different estimates of risk attitudes 
relate to real-life farming choices in our sample of Costa Rican coffee farmers. We 
analyze decisions that require significant financial investment: changing to other 
coffee varieties, changing to other crops, or diversifying coffee farming with other 
crops. We also analyze fertilizer and pest control applications, which are more day-
to-day farm input management practices.
In order to estimate risk preferences in a field context, researchers make assumptions 
about how the complex field context is translated into a precise estimation that can 
be used to approximate risk preferences. However, not all risk decisions are the 
same. Decision making can be  broadly bracketed or narrowly bracketed. On the one 
hand, an individual’s decision making could bracket a decision as one grand decision 
taking into account many aspects of life (broadly bracketed). On the other hand, 
the decision could be evaluated in isolation from all others (narrowly bracketed) 
(Barseghyan et al. 2018, p.558).
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How risk affects farm investment decisions will depend on the specific agricultural 
activity and biophysical environment (Berg 2001; Hanus and Schoop 1989). Looking 
at previous literature, risk aversion delays the adoption of new technologies, 
because uncertainty regarding a new technology discourages individuals who are 
more reluctant to take a risk (Feder 1980; Holden and Quiggin 2017; Liu 2013). 
Investment in agricultural technologies is costly, and farmers have to balance the 
advantages regarding reduced exposure to uncertainty in agriculture (for example, 
by replacing their plantation with improved coffee varieties that are resistant to 
pests and drought) with the increased exposure to financial risk (i.e., acquiring 
loans). See Feder et al. (1985) and Just and Zilberman (1983) for a full discussion.
Therefore, we expect risk-averse farmers to implement fewer practices that can 
reduce risk from an agricultural perspective when this entails a higher exposure 
to financial risk. For instance, Brick and Visser (2015) find risk-averse farmers are 
more likely to maintain the use of traditional seeds and less likely to use modern 
farming inputs that require costly financing. Holden and Quiggin (2017) find that 
more risk-averse households were less likely to adopt improved maize varieties and 
less likely to dis-adopt traditional local maize.
In contrast, the effect of risk on farm inputs is ambiguous. Farm inputs can increase 
not only the level of output but also its variability. In other words, fertilizer can 
increase the average farm yield, but at the same time, the yield can be very low or 
very high, and this variation across farms yield represents a risk to farmers ( Berg 
2001; Hanus and Schoop 1989; Vablauwe et al. 2016). As a result, farmers can 
manage risk through input use, but they can also be discouraged from adopting 
an input because the input is associated with output variability (Vablauwe et al. 
2016). Even so, farmers’ risk perceptions do not necessarily correspond with the 
biophysical effect of fertilizer on yield variability. For example, a typical farmer 
in the U.S. applies more fertilizer than the utility maximizing level (Berg 2001; 
Babcock 1992), as producers consider fertilizer to be risk-reducing (Sriramaratnam 
et al. 1987).
In some contexts risk aversion encourages expenditures on practices that reduce 
exposure to agricultural risk (Alpízar et al. 2011; Barham et al. 2014), especially 
if practices do not involve large investments. For example, applying fertilizer and 
actively controlling for pests reduces the risk of pests and low yields (Avelino et al. 
2015) and risk aversion increases pesticide use in China (Liu and Huang 2013). On the 
other hand, Roosen and Hennessy (2003) and Khor et al. (2015) show theoretically 
and empirically that an increase in risk aversion reduces fertilizer use intensity, but 
recognize that it might not be the same for farmers of different wealth levels. 
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Hence, we want to contribute to the debate by analyzing how different estimates of 
survey risk attitudes relate to real-life farming choices. According to the theory, we 
hypothesized that farmers who are more willing to take risks are also more likely to 
implement investments and changes in their farms, as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Survey-based willingness to take a risk in general and in different contexts 
is positive and significantly associated with the implementation of risky real-life farming 
practices. 
2.3 Description of the study area, sample, and implementation
Our study took place in the year 2014 in two coffee regions of Costa Rica: Tarrazú 
and Brunca. Households were sampled through stratified random sampling based 
on the density of coffee plots within six districts of the two coffee regions (three 
districts from each region)6. 
Only household head farmers took part in the survey and experiment. The experiment 
was introduced as part of the survey and conducted with each farmer at his or 
her house. Most experiments take place in a lab setting where subjects self-select 
themselves to participate. By applying the experiment as part of the survey, we 
ensure randomness, representativeness, and anonymity during the experiment as 
well. First, a survey questionnaire collected detailed household characteristics and 
farming practices. After completing the survey, the farmer was presented with the 
incentivized risk experiment, followed by a set of hypothetical willingness to take 
risks questions as in (Vieider et al. 2015).
In our final sample, we have 293 coffee farmers. Their household socioeconomic 
characteristics and coffee farm characteristics are presented in Table 2.1. In our 
sample, coffee farmers have on average only primary education, have life experience 
in coffee farming, and on average 57% of their income is earned through selling 
coffee.7 
6  Costa Rica’s national public administration divides the country into provinces, cantons, and districts. 
Districts were chosen to capture the spread and variation of intensity of the coffee rust epidemic in 
2012-13.  
7  Only 278 farmers out of 293 answered the question related to the percentage of income from coffee 
activities.
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Table 2.1 | Variables and sample means from survey sample.
Variable N Mean min max sd
Household characteristics
Household head female 293 0.10 0 1 0.30
Age (years) 293 51.77 19 86 13.64
Education (years) 293 5.795  0 15 2.61
Household size 293 3.33 1 10 1.38
Household head labor in another farm 293 0.13 0 1 0.33
Total farm area (ha) 293 5.49 0.04 109 9.96
Number of bedrooms in house 293 3.11 1 7 0.90
Coffee farm characteristics
Farm experience (years) 293 25.50 1 71 14.49
% of income coming from coffee 278 56.78 0 100 36.20
Total area planted with coffee (ha) 293 3.48 0.09 41.77 4.62
Brings coffee to a cooperative 293 0.78 0 1 0.42
Farm affected by coffee leaf rust 293 0.81 0 1 0.39
Real-life farming risky choices
Change coffee variety 293 0.13 0 1 0.33
Change or diversify with other crops 293 0.08 0 1 0.27
Number of fertilizer applications (2013) 293 2.58 0 6 0.74
Number of pest control applications (2013) 293 3.40 0 8 1.49
We gathered extensive information on all farmers’ management practices.8 For this 
paper, we emphasize farming choices that are standard practices for conventional 
coffee farming and not dependent on specific characteristics of topography. 
Therefore, we focus on four sets of activities: i. changing crops or diversifying the 
farm by adding other crops in recent years; ii. changing coffee variety in recent 
years, iii. the number of fertilizer applications and iv. the number of pest control 
applications in the year before the survey. From these practices, we can observe 
that diversification with other crops is very rare among coffee farmers. In addition, 
only 13% have changed the coffee variety in the last 10 years before the survey. 
Regarding fertilizer, agronomists recommend a minimum of three applications 
per year and preventive use of pesticide. Here, the average number of fertilizer 
applications is below that recommendation, and farmers tend to apply pesticides in 
a reactive way rather than in a preventive manner.9 
8  We collect information about the following farming practices: contour planting, use of deviation 
ditches, natural barriers, shadow management, windbreakers, terraces, live coverage, pruning, 
application of pesticides and herbicides, fertilizer application, change or diversification with other crops 
and change of coffee varieties.
9  Pesticide use includes fungicide, insecticide, and nematicide. Fungicide, for example, is applied after 
long periods of rain to prevent the growth of fungus.
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2.4 Methods
This section explains in detail the survey questions on risk preferences implemented 
in the structured questionnaire. Then, we describe the design and implementation 
of the risk experiment. Our experimental data also allows us estimate the risk 
preferences parameters derived from the utility function. Therefore, at the end of this 
section we include the modeling approach for the estimation of these parameters.
2.4.1 Survey questions
We asked a set of hypothetical willingness to take risks questions based on Dohmen 
et al. (2011). The general survey-based question is stated as follows: “On a scale 
where the value 0 means “not at all willing to take risks” and the value 10 means “very 
willing to take risks; how do you see yourself, are you a person who is fully prepared to 
take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?” (Dohmen et al., 2011, p.525).
When asking farmers about their willingness to take risks in specific contexts, we focus 
on agriculture-relevant contexts and decisions. We asked about their willingness to 
take risks in financial decisions, farming (in general), and then in specific farming 
context: when changing or diversifying with other crops, when changing to different 
coffee varieties, and regarding the use of pesticides and fertilizer. All questions 
follow the same structure as Dohmen et al. (2011)10. For example: “On a scale where 
the value 0 means “not at all willing to take risks” and the value 10 means “very willing 
to take risks; how do you see yourself regarding your decisions on changing to other 
coffee varieties, are you a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to 
avoid taking risks?”
2.4.2 Experimental design and modeling approach
In the experiment, we elicited individuals’ risk attitudes with real payoffs, following 
a design by Vieider et al. (2019) and Sutter et al. (2013). Their design elicits certainty 
equivalents (CEs), which are easy to explain to subjects with low education. 
In this paper, we focus on choices with known probabilities. Three tasks offered 
the choice between a certain amount that gradually increased in value or a lottery 
to win 5000 Costa Rican Colones (CRC) or nothing (i.e., gain domain). Then, three 
tasks gave the farmer an initial endowment of 5000 CRC and the choice between 
gradually increasing payments to avoid a lottery where the total endowment could 
potentially be lost (i.e., loss domain).  Lastly, we included a task necessary to estimate 
10  We also asked questions for the specific contexts of driving a car, sport and leisure, working outside 
of the farm and health-related decisions. These results are presented in Appendix 2.2 but are not part of 
the analysis since we focus on work-related real-life farming decisions.
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loss aversion (i.e., mixed prospect), which offered the possibility of winning 5000 
CRC extra or losing part of the endowment. 
Probabilities changed between 50/50, 10/90 and 90/10 of winning or losing the 
fixed amount (see Table 2.2). Choices are expressed by simple prospects in the 
format (p: x:y), where p is the probability of outcome x and (1-p) the corresponding 
probability of outcome y (Vieider et al. 2015). 
Table 2.2 | Choice list for risk tasks in the experiment.
Gains Losses Mixed
(0.5: 5000;0) (0.5: -5000;0) 0~(0.5: 5000;z*)
(0.1: 5000;0) (0.1: -5000;0)
(0.9: 5000;0) (0.9: -5000;0)
Note: z* varied in a choice list from 5000 to 200 colones.  
Source: Vieider et al. (2015)
At the end of the experiment, one choice task was randomly selected for payment 
by taking a chip out of a bag. In case the lottery was preferred by the farmer, we 
used another bag containing precisely ten chips numbered from 1-10 to represent 
probabilities, and this distribution was known and shown to the farmer. We 
explained this to the farmers graphically using a transparent urn (see Appendix 2.6) 
and, to avoid predetermined numbers, each farmer individually assigned the lucky 
number for the winning chips before making the draw.
This method of experimental elicitation allows us to determine the certainty 
equivalent (CE) for each prospect directly. The certainty equivalent is defined as 
the midpoint between two levels of sure payoffs where the farmer switches from the 
lottery to the sure payoff in the gain domain, or from the certain payoff to a lottery in 
the loss domain (Sutter et al. 2013). In other words, we determine the willingness to 
accept increasing certain amounts over a lottery to win a prize, in the gain domain; 
and the certain amount farmers are willing to give up to avoid a lottery where they 
risk losing their endowment, for the case of the loss domain. Consequently, the 
higher the certainty equivalent, the more willing the farmer is to take risk in the 
gain domain. The higher the certainty equivalent, the less willing the farmer is to 
take risks in the loss domain. For the analysis, we specify the certainty equivalent 
in the loss domain lotteries with negative values to show the same direction: the 
higher the value of the certainty equivalent, the more willingness to take risks.
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2.4.3 Modeling risk preferences parameters
A common approach in the experimental literature is to characterize risk preferences 
through a single parameter that reflects the curvature of the utility function using 
expected utility theory (Holt and Laury 2002). However, several studies have 
highlighted the predictive power of prospect theory by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) (Camerer 2001; Liu 2013). 
In the context of farming, the prospect theory concepts of reference-dependence, loss 
aversion, and probability weighting can help us understand farmers’ real-life choices 
better. Reference dependence utility is when people evaluate outcomes relative to 
a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Farming decision making is not 
necessarily about gain-ranked events, but about loss-ranked events where yields 
might be lost with a given level of risk.  Then, it is intuitive to assume that farmers’ 
choices under risk are to avoid  losses rather than to pursue gains. Furthermore, 
individuals tend to underweight high probability events and overweight low 
probability events (Babcock 2015; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). 
We model individual preferences following L’Haridon and Vieider (2017). They 
use a cumulative prospect theory model (CPT) in the format (p: x:y), where p is the 
probability of obtaining the outcome x and y is achieved with the corresponding 
probability (1-p), |x| > |y|. We assume preferences are reference-dependent and, in 
the experiment, are framed with a reference point equal to zero (Abdellaoui et al. 
2011; L’Haridon and Vieider 2017; Tversky and Kahneman 1992).11 The utility of a 
prospect (PU) for outcomes that fit in one domain (gain or loss) can be represented 
as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  1 = + − 
j jPU w p v x w p v y (1)
where ( ) j iw p  is the probability weighting function that combines probabilities 
into decision weights12. The decision domains are specified by j, which takes the 
values for gains and for losses. For mixed prospects, where x > 0 >y, the utility is 
represented as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),   1+ −= + −PU x p w p v x w p v y (2)
11  Reference-dependence is an important principle in prospect theory. Individuals evaluate outcomes 
relative to a reference point to evaluate gains and losses.
12  The function is strictly increasing and satisfies ( )w 0 0=   and ( )  w 1 1=
 Alternatives for risk elicitation in the field
2
31 
We follow the functional forms indicated by L’Haridon and Vieider (2017) and 
assume a piecewise linear utility function as follows:
( ) ( )
                                      0
 
                         0λ
>
= − − ≤
x if x
v x
x if x (3)
where λ is the loss aversion parameter that defines the curvature below zero relative 
to the curvature above zero, and value 1λ > s indicate loss aversion, where higher 
values of λ indicate the farmer is more loss averse (Vieider et al., 2019). 
In this framework, risk preferences are captured by probability weighting and loss 
aversion. Similarly to L’Haridon and Vieider (2017) and Vieider et al. (2019), we 
adopt a 2-parameter weighting function by Prelec, (1998)13 : 
( ) ( )( )exp αβ = − −  
j
j jw p ln p (4)
The parameters of the Prelec function provide a detailed behavioral interpretation. 
The parameter α governs the slope of the probability weighting function, with values 
α < 1 indicating probabilistic insensitivity for gain and losses. Values α < 1 also indicate 
the weighting function has an inverted S-shape, which shows an overweighting of 
low probabilities of the largest gains or biggest losses and an underweighting of high 
probabilities (Liu 2013; L’Haridon and Vieider 2017)14. The parameter β governs 
the elevation of the weighting function indicating the weight assigned to the best 
outcome for gains and the worst outcome for losses. Therefore, the higher values 
for β indicate increased probabilistic pessimism for gains and increased probabilistic 
optimism for losses. Consequently, we refer to the parameter β as pessimism for gains 
and optimism for losses (Vieider et al., 2014, p.10). 
13  The model and functional forms adopted, estimate an error term directly to the certainty equivalent, 
that allows for measurements errors for the stochastic elements in the decision process (L’Haridon and 
Vieider, 2017). All parameters are estimated using the log-likelihood function, programmed in STATA.
14  We could assume the value of α to be equal to one (α=1). This assumption will indicate linearity 
of the weighting function (the EU case), and then the parameter β can be considered as the standard 
estimate of risk aversion. 
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2.5 Results
We start by showing the descriptive statistics of the data collected via the survey and 
the experiments. Then, following our research questions, we assess the consistency 
across contexts by assessing correlations between survey-based estimates of general 
and context-specific risk preferences. We then evaluate how survey risk estimates 
explain risk taking in the experiment, and finally compare the survey estimates to 
real-life farming practices.
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of responses to the general survey-based risk 
question. Our data shows that a relatively small fraction of respondents choose 
low values, indicating that most farmers are willing to take risks in general.  This 
result is very different from Dohmen et al. (2011), where only a small fraction of 
respondents choose high values and subjects are on average risk-averse.
Figure 2.2 | Farmer’s response to general survey-based risk preference question.
Note: Red line indicates mean response to general survey-based risk question and blue line shows the 
adjusted frequency distribution.
In Figure 2.3, we present the distribution of responses to the context-specific risk 
questions. We see variation in the different agriculture-specific attitudes. We find a 
normal distribution regarding risk-taking in financial decisions and when changing 
coffee variety (see 2.3.1 and 2.3.4). Farmers are relatively more risk averse with 
regards to changing crop (see 2.3.3), but are relatively more risk-seeking regarding 
farming decisions and the use of pest control and fertilizer (see 2.3.2, 2.3.5 and 
2.3.6). 
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2.3.1 Risk attitudes toward financial decisions 2.3.2 Risk attitudes toward farming decisions
2.3.3 Risk attitudes toward changing or diversifying 
with another crop
2.3.4 Risk attitudes toward changing a coffee 
variety
2.3.5 Risk attitudes toward pesticide use 2.3.6 Risk attitudes toward fertilizer use
Figure 2.3 | Farmer’s response to context-specific risk preferences questions.
Note: Red line indicates the average response to risk question and blue line show the adjusted probability 
distribution.
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We present the nonparametric representation of the aggregated experimental data 
in Appendix 2.1. When comparing the overall mean CE to the average expected 
value (EV), farmers are found to be on average risk-seeking (mean CE > EV) for 
both the gain and loss domain15.  This result is similar to Charness and Viceisza 
(2016) and Vieider et al. (2016, 2014), who find farmers are willing to take risks 
in Senegal, Vietnam, and Ethiopia, respectively.  On the other hand, results differ 
from Verschoor et al. (2016), who find higher levels of risk aversion hypothetically 
and in their risk experiment. Overall, our study shows supporting evidence that 
farmers in developing countries are not necessarily more risk-averse than subjects 
from developed countries; on the contrary, people from rural areas seem to tolerate 
higher risk levels in their daily activities.
2.5.1 Correlations between general and context-specific survey risk 
attitudes
We want to know whether there is a general component of risk across our survey 
estimates of risk attitudes in different contexts. To do this, we use the Spearman’s 
rank-order correlation coefficient measuring the strength and direction of a 
correlation between two variables measured on an ordinal scale. We test the 
hypothesis that the Spearman’s correlation coefficient (ρ) is equal to zero and 
highlight when the significance level is a p-value < 0.05. Furthermore, given that 
we are testing multiple hypotheses, we report the adjusted p-values according to 
the Bonferroni correction method. When performing multiple hypotheses testing, 
it is argued that some correlations will have p-values lower than 0.05 purely by 
chance. The Bonferroni correction method uses a lower critical value according to 
the number of hypotheses tested. As a result, the probability of observing at least 
one significant result remains below the desired significance level (Dunn 1961).
We show correlations between the stated willingness to take risks in general and 
when asked in specific contexts (Table 2.3). The context-free survey estimate is 
significantly correlated (p-value < 0.05) only with the context-specific estimate 
related to finances (first column). The latter also significantly correlates (p-value 
< 0.05) with changing or diversifying with other crops (second column). We find 
no correlation between the general (no context) or finance risk-taking estimates 
and the estimates in the context of pest control and fertilizer. On the other hand, 
15  Results for each prospect are also in line with Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where individuals 
underweight high probability events and overweight low probability events (Babcock 2015). Also, 
consistent with the cumulative prospect theory (CPT) pattern stated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
and recently tested by Harbaugh et al. (2014), individuals are relatively more risk-seeking over low-
probability gains, risk-averse over high-probability gains, risk-averse over low-probability losses, and 
risk-seeking over high-probability losses.
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when asking farmers about their willingness to take risks framed in the farming 
context (third column), this correlates significantly with risk preferences estimates 
regarding pest control and fertilizer applications (p-value < 0.05). 
Similar to previous studies, we also find that the specific context of finances 
correlates with the general estimate of risk preferences.16 However, it is surprising 
that none of the other survey-based context-specific estimates correlate significantly 
with the general estimate and the estimate of risk regarding finances correlates only 
with changing crops. Furthermore, asking farmers for their risk preferences in the 
farming context correlates only with general farm management like pest control and 
fertilizer applications. We do not know of previous studies with such detailed results 
for the agriculture-specific context. 
Table 2.3 | Correlations between survey-based estimates to take risks in general and agricultural specific 
contexts.
General Finances Farming Changing 
crop
Changing 
variety
Pest control Fertilizer 
used
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
General (no context) 1
Finances 0.4314* 1
Farming 0.1585 0.1497 1
Changing crop 0.1374 0.2763* 0.1488 1
Changing variety 0.1444 0.1603 0.0746 0.2656* 1
Pest control used 0.1646 0.1140 0.2473* 0.0176 0.3248* 1
Fertilizer used 0.1078 0.0965 0.2538* -0.0450 0.2888* 0.8146* 1
Note: Coefficients refer to Spearman’s ρ and are calculated using all non-missing observations between a 
pair of variables;  * p-values < 0.05 using Bonferroni correction method for adjusted p-values.
To complement our analysis, we performed a principal component analysis to 
identify the factors or components that express the maximum information out of 
the survey estimates (Appendix 2.3). Following the Kaiser rule, we should retain the 
components with an eigenvalue larger than one (Kaiser 1960). The analysis shows 
that there are two components with an eigenvalue above one, together explaining 
55% of the variation in the data. The general, the financial and the changing crop 
estimates of risk-taking are grouped under one component, while the other farm 
practices, input used and changing coffee variety, are gathered under the second 
component. The farming context remained highly unexplained (79%) and not 
grouped in either of the two components.
16  For example, Dohmen et al. (2011, p.537) report a significant correlation coefficient of 0.5036 
between the general estimate of risk and risk-taking in financial matters.
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These results tell a coherent story in which those practices that require more financial 
investment, such as changing or diversifying with other crops, relate more to the 
financial and to the context-free estimate of risk. Risk preferences regarding one 
farm management practice, such as changing varieties or expenditures on fertilizer 
or pest control, correlate with each other. Thus, it is essential to elicit risk attitudes 
for the specific context of interest, and one should be careful when extrapolating 
risk attitudes across contexts.
2.5.2 Experimental evaluation of survey estimates
To better understand what the survey risk estimates capture, we test whether survey 
data predict risk-taking behavior in the incentivized experiment. We focus the 
analysis on the survey-based willingness to take risks in general (with no context) 
because the experiment is context-free as well. Our experimental data allows us to 
perform this validation in two ways: using the certainty equivalents directly and 
using utility function parameters. 
First, to test the predictive power of the survey question, we regress the average 
certainty equivalent in each domain (i.e., gain and loss) on the respondent’s answer 
to the general risk question (Table 2.4). To ensure robustness, we cluster the 
standard errors at the village level (33 clusters) using the Wild bootstrap method 
(Cameron et al. 2008). We add household head and coffee farming characteristics as 
controls and include district fixed effects. The coefficient for the willingness to take 
risks is positive and significant (p-value < 0.05), in both the gain and loss domain.
Second, we use the utility function parameters estimated from the experimental 
data to assess the predictive power of the survey-based willingness to take risks 
estimate. We regress each of the expected utility function parameters on the general 
willingness to take risk question (Appendix 2.4). Farmers reporting more willingness 
to take risks in the survey question are relatively less pessimistic, less sensitive to 
changes in probabilities that increase the likelihood of a loss in the experiment, and 
more loss averse. We associate this last result with the endowment effect, where 
people willing to take risks to avoid losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Our results show the general survey-based estimate predicts risk-taking behavior in 
the incentivized experiment, confirming our hypothesis. At the same time, while the 
significant parameters help us to understand the intuition behind farmers’ willingness 
to take risks, these effects are too small to provide an economic interpretation.
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Table 2.4 | Predicting experimental choices with the general survey-based estimate risk attitudes.
Dependent variable: Certainty equivalent, meaning the value of the safe option 
at the switching point. A higher CE means more risk-seeking
Mean CE in the 
gain domain
Mean CE in the 
loss domain
(1) (2)
Willingness to take risks in general (no context)
 (0 “not at all willing to take risks” 10 “very willing to 
take risks”)
90.043** 59.455**
[39.077] [25.399]
Constant 2,038.748*** -1,792.880***
[0.000] [670.791]
Control variables Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 278 278
R-squared 0.110 0.091
Each coefficient estimate is based on a separate OLS regression of the respective dependent variable 
on this particular risk estimate and a set of controls. Control variables included: gender, age, education 
(years), household size, household head labor in another farm, total farm area (ha), number of bedrooms 
in the house, farm experience (years), percentage of income coming from coffee, total area planted with 
coffee (ha), whether farmers bring coffee to a cooperative, and whether farm was affected by the coffee 
leaf rust. Fixed effects at the district level (6 districts). Cluster standard error at the village level (33 
villages). Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications following Cameron et al. (2008). Robust standard errors 
in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.5.3 Risk attitudes and real-life farming choices
Finally, we study how the different survey estimates relate to real-life choices. Our 
dependent variables are a number of real-life farming choices: i. changing crops or 
diversifying the farm by adding other crops in the last decade; ii. changing coffee 
variety in the last decade; iii. the number of fertilizer applications; and iv. the 
number of pest control applications in the year before the survey. 
We analyze our data using a linear probability model and regress the probability 
of changing each of the real-life farm practices on survey-based risk preferences (7 
separate regressions). In Table 2.5, we present the results for each of the dependent 
variables. All regressions include a set of control variables including district fixed 
effects. We ensure robustness by clustering the standard errors at the village level 
(33 clusters) and applying the wild bootstrap following Cameron et al. (2008). 
We start by looking at the estimates for change or diversify with other crops (Column 
1). The coefficients for the general survey-based estimate (with no context), the 
financial context, and the farming context are not are significantly associated with 
changed or diversified with other crops. However, when the survey risk question is 
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asked specifically regarding changing or diversifying crops, the coefficient is positive 
and significant (p-value < 0.05). Estimates regarding the context of changing the 
coffee variety, fertilizer and pest control applications are not significant. 
Table 2.5 | Risk survey-based estimates on real-life farming practices.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
a) General (no context) 0.007 0.002 -0.001 0.001
[0.006] [0.007] [0.010] [0.009]
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
b) Finances context 0.009 -0.000 -0.016* -0.007
[0.005] [0.007] [0.009] [0.012]
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
c) Farming context 0.008 0.008 0.006 -0.007
[0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.011]
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
d) Crop change/diversify
context 
0.013** -0.002 0.004 -0.015
[0.006] [0.008] [0.012] [0.015]
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
e) Variety change context -0.001 0.015** -0.009 0.014
[0.005] [0.006] [0.010] [0.009]
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
f) Fertilizer context 0.009 0.014** -0.020** 0.008
[0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.008]
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
g) Pest control context 0.002 0.018*** -0.025** 0.013
[0.008] [0.006] [0.011] [0.011]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dependent variable 0.075 0.115 0.651 0.428
Observations 278 278 278 278
Each coefficient estimate is based on a separate OLS regression of the respective dependent variable on 
this particular risk estimate and a set of controls. Dependent variables: change crop/diversify (Changed 
or diversified with other crops (yes/no)), change variety (Changed coffee variety (yes/no)), fertilizer 
(Application of fertilizer (high/low)) and pesticide (Application of pesticide (high/low)). Control variables 
included: gender, age, education (years), household size, household head labor in another farm, total 
farm area (ha), number of bedrooms in the house, farm experience (years), percentage of income coming 
from coffee, total area planted with coffee (ha), whether farmers bring coffee to a cooperative, and 
whether farm was affected by the coffee leaf rust. Fixed effects at the district level (6 districts). Cluster 
standard error at the village level (33 villages). Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications following Cameron 
et al. (2008). Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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When looking at the results for reporting changed coffee variety in real life (Column 
2), we find again that the coefficient estimates for the general survey-based risk 
question (with no context), the financial context and the farming context are not are 
significantly associated with changing the coffee variety in real life. However, when 
explicitly contextualized as a willingness to take risks in the context of changing 
coffee variety, the coefficient is positive and significantly (p-value < 0.05). The 
estimate is not significant when contextualized in the changing crop context, but, 
regarding other management farm practices such as fertilizer and pest control 
context, coefficients are also positive and significantly associated with changing the 
coffee variety in real life (p-value < 0.05 and p-value < 0.01, respectively).
We continue by analyzing real-life decisions regarding the application of fertilizer 
and pest control (Columns 3 and 4). We transform these dependent variables into 
dummy variables with reference to the mean. Farmers who apply below-average 
fertilizer or pest control are coded zero, and farmers who apply above-average 
fertilizer or pest control are coded one.
Regarding the application of fertilizer (Column 3), we find the coefficient estimated 
for the general survey-based risk question (with no context) is not significantly 
associated with the application of fertilizer. However, when the survey question is 
explicitly contextualized as a willingness to take a risk in the financial context, the 
coefficient is negatively and significantly associated with the application of fertilizer 
(p-value < 0.10). The coefficients regarding the farming context or contextualized 
as changing crops or changing the coffee variety are not significantly associated with 
real fertilizer use. Furthermore, when the survey risk question is asked specifically 
in the fertilizer and pest control context, the coefficients are negative and significant 
for the application of fertilizer (p-value < 0.05, for both). 
Finally, when looking at the results for the application of pesticide (Column 4), none of 
the coefficients regarding the willingness to pay in different contexts is significantly 
associated with the real application of pesticide. 
We confirm the hypothesis that the context-specific willingness to take risk is 
positively associated with the implementation of changing or diversifying with 
other crops and changing coffee varieties. However, we cannot confirm the same 
for the context-free survey estimate. Previous studies using context-free estimates 
found risk aversion is associated with less implementation of agricultural practices 
that required more farm investment (Brick and Visser 2015; Holden and Quiggin 
2017; Verschoor et al. 2016). 
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More surprising, we observe a negative sign on the coefficient when regressing the 
willingness to take risk questions on the real-life application of fertilizer.  Farmers 
who report being less willing to take risks are more likely to apply more fertilizer. 
We know that, in theory, risk aversion can affect fertilizer investment in different 
ways and depends on crop characteristics. Previous studies typically find the 
contrary: that risk aversion is associated with less fertilizer purchase (Khor et al. 
2015; Roosen and Hennessy 2003; Verschoor et al. 2016), as fertilizer can increase 
not only output but also its variability (Vablauwe et al. 2016). Our findings are 
consistent with studies showing that applying fertilizer reduces the risk of pests and 
low yields (Avelino et al. 2015) and can be perceived as a risk-reducing strategy. 
Similar results regarding pesticide have been found in China (Liu and Huang 
2013), with high availability and input used. Therefore, we expected the results for 
pesticide to be similar to those of fertilizer. Since this was not the case, we reflect 
on farmers applying pesticides in a reactive way rather than in a preventive manner. 
Furthermore, pesticide is a broad category that comprises a different kind of inputs 
(i.e., fungicide, insecticide, and nematicide), and varies widely with environmental 
and geographical conditions.
To complement our previous analysis, we take a look at how the utility function 
parameters derived from the experiment relate to real-life farming practices 
(Appendix 2.5). Interestingly, the experimental risk preferences parameters show 
that optimism (β-) and the loss aversion parameter (λ) are positively and significantly 
associated with the high application of fertilizer (p-value < 0.10)17. In other words, 
optimistic farmers with higher loss aversion are the ones applying more fertilizer 
to avoid agricultural losses. Loss aversion leads people to value what they have 
more than equal things that they do not have (Levy 1996) and to over-value current 
possessions – an endowment effect (Thaler 1980). We think that, because coffee is a 
perennial crop, plantations are considered as possessions that increase the value of 
the land, reflecting an endowment effect. As a result, farmers apply more fertilizer 
to prevent losses.
17  We only find the optimism and loss aversion parameters associated with fertilizer application. No 
significant relationship is found with other parameters and farm practices.  A recent paper by Verschoor 
et al. (2016) explains that some farming decisions are more likely to be a broadly bracketed decision 
(i.e., decisions involved a radical overhaul and were considered as part of an overall livelihood strategy). 
A practice like fertilizer application is a narrowly bracketed decision (i.e., a straightforward investment 
that can be applied on a modest scale). This distinction has consequences for which estimates are 
associated with real-life farming choices.  Risky choices in an experiment based on reference-dependent 
utility theory will reflect only those real-life choices that maintain the assumption of narrow bracketing 
(i.e., fertilizer).
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We did not foresee that the survey risk question would be associated with the real 
farm practice only when the question is explicitly contextualized for the specific 
farming practice, except for pesticide. We acknowledge that reverse causality might 
be a concern and prior experience with a particular farm practice – for example, 
crop diversification – might make a farmer report more willingness to take the risk 
of diversifying her farm. However, farmers’ real decisions and our survey happened 
in totally different moments in time, and the argument that having good prior 
experience with a practice should make the farmer more willing to take risks could 
also be true for the opposite claim. (i.e., when a farmer has bad prior experience 
with crop diversification she should be less willing to take a risk at the time of the 
survey). Nonetheless, our argument is in favor of highly targeted risk preferences 
estimates, and we believe that claim still holds even if endogeneity could be a 
potential confounding factor. Still, we should not consider our results a predictive 
or causal analysis. 
2.6 Conclusions and discussion 
In this paper, we evaluate a survey-based method for estimating risk attitudes that 
can be easily implemented by practitioners in developing countries. We assess the 
correlations between a general survey-based risk estimate (with no context) and 
context-specific estimates. We test whether survey data predicts risk-taking behavior 
in an incentivized experiment. Finally, we show how the different survey-based 
estimates of risk attitudes relate to real-life agricultural choices in a population of 
coffee farmers in Costa Rica. 
Our findings can be summarized in three main results. First, regarding the consistency 
of survey risk preferences across contexts, we find it is essential to elicit risk attitudes 
for the specific context of interest since there is no one domain-general component 
across specific contexts. A principal component analysis shows that we can group 
risky choices in two components: one grouping general-financial investment decisions 
and the other grouping crop-specific farm management. We do not know of previous 
studies showing the consequences for the agricultural specific context. 
Second, the general survey-based estimate of risk (with no context) predicts risk-
taking behavior in the experiment in line with previous studies (Dohmen et al. 
2011; Vieider et al. 2015). Regarding the utility function parameters, we find that 
higher willingness to take risk is associated with less pessimism, less sensitivity to 
changes in probabilities that increase the likelihood of a loss, and more loss aversion, 
suggesting farmers are willing to take risk in order to avoid losses. We do not know 
of other studies relating survey risk estimates to risk preferences parameters.
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Third, we find differences between survey estimates with and without a context in 
relationship with agricultural real-life behavior. The context-free survey estimate of 
risk-taking is not associated with actual risk-taking behavior, and only estimates in 
the specific agricultural context correlate with real-life farming choices. Furthermore, 
higher willingness to take risk is associated with the implementation of agricultural 
practices that required more farm investment, like changing or diversifying with 
other crops and changing to other coffee varieties. In contrast, farmers that report 
being less willing to take risks are more likely to have higher expenditures on 
fertilizer, and we found no significant relationship with the use of pesticide.
In the face of costly investment, farmers balance the advantages regarding reducing 
exposure to uncertainty in agriculture with the increased exposure to financial 
risk, for example acquiring loans to replace their plantation with improved coffee 
varieties that are resistant to pests. Hence, is not strange that practices that 
required more farm investment are associated with higher risk. On the other hand, 
coffee farmers in Costa Rica have good access to information regarding input use 
from cooperative organizations and extension agents, which contributes to their 
perception of fertilizer as a risk-reducing technology. Furthermore, differences 
in decision making can reflect a distinction between a broadly bracketed and a 
narrowly bracketed decision. Future research should take into account whether 
estimates of risk preferences are biased by incorrect assumptions about bracketing 
(Barseghyan et al. 2018). 
A common assumption in economics is the stability of risk preferences across 
decision contexts (Barseghyan et al. 2018). Our study shows that we cannot assume 
one general trait across different specific contexts within agriculture. Similar results 
have been found in other contexts, for example, insurance choices (Barseghyan 
et al. 2013; Einav et al. 2012) and social preferences (de Oliveira et al. 2012). 
Understanding how preferences are affected by context and the type of decision 
is key to use actions from one context to predict actions in another context (de 
Oliveira et al. 2012). 
Projects or programs interested in using risk preferences as inputs into the design 
of policy instruments should make sure that preferences are elicited in the specific 
context targeted by the prospective policy instrument. If the policy instrument aims 
at influencing general financial decisions, the estimation of risk preferences without 
a context might suffice. However, if the policy instrument target a specific adoption, 
say fertilizer use or implementation of improved seeds varieties, risk preferences 
should be elicited in that particular context. 
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2.7 Appendices
Appendix 2.1 | Summary of aggregate experimental risk preferences estimates by prospect.
Gain domain
prob. EV mean CE median CE SD test = EV
0.1 500 2022.47 1875.00 1582.64 t =  16.4665 p = 0.0000
0.5 2500 3257.74 3375.00 1256.36 t =  10.3238 p = 0.0000
0.9 4500 4327.11 4750.50 1042.05 t =  -2.8400 p = 0.0048
Mean 2500 3202.44 3333.50 1293.68 t =  11.8228 p = 0.0000
Loss domain
prob. EV mean CE median CE SD test = EV
0.1 -500 -555.17 -249.00 880.21 t =  -1.0729 p = 0.2842
0.5 -2500 -1718.72 -1875.00 1176.94 t =  11.3629 p = 0.0000
0.9 -4500 -2834.46 -2875.00 1541.75 t =  18.4916 p = 0.0000
Mean -2500 -1702.78 -1666.33 1199.63 t =  14.6947 p = 0.0000
2.2.1 Farmer’s preferences for driving vehicles 2.2.2 Farmer’s preferences regarding health
2.2.3 Farmer’s preferences for practicing sports 2.2.4 Farmer’s preferences regarding work 
Appendix 2.2 | Farmer’s responses to other survey context-specific risk preferences estimates.
Note: Red line indicates mean response to risk question and blue line shows the adjusted probability 
distribution
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Appendix 2.3 | Principal component analysis (PCA).
Appendix 2.3.1 | Principal components and correlation.
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 2.35027 0.866991 0.3358 0.3358
Comp2 1.48328 0.532159 0.2119 0.5477
Comp3 0.951121 0.020768 0.1359 0.6835
Comp4 0.930353 0.324798 0.1329 0.8164
Comp5 0.605556 0.093846 0.0865 0.9029
Comp6 0.51171 0.344001 0.0731 0.976
Comp7 0.167708. 0.024 1
Number of observations 293. Trace = 7. Rotation: (unrotated = principal). Rho = 0.5477
Appendix 2.3.2 | Principal components (eigenvectors) and rotated components.
Variable Component 1 Component 2 Unexplained
General (no context) 0.5490 0.4717
Finances 0.5889 0.3895
Farming 0.7863
Changing crop 0.4834 0.5716
Changing coffee variety 0.3183 0.6841
Pest control used 0.6587 0.1297
Fertilizer used 0.6649 0.1335
Number of observations 293. Number of comp.= 2. Trace = 7. Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser 
off). Rho = 0.5477. (blanks are abs(loading)<.3)
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Appendix 2.3.3 | Screen plot of the eigenvalues and scatter plots of the loadings and score variables.
 Alternatives for risk elicitation in the field
2
45 
Appendix 2.3.4 |Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy.
Variable (kmo)
General (no context) 0.608
Finances 0.6167
Farming 0.7484
Changing crop 0.6224
Changing coffee variety 0.7599
Pest control used 0.5619
Fertilizer used 0.5478
Overall 0.5975
Appendix 2.4 | Willingness to take risks in general and utility function parameters.
Dependent variable: utility function parameters
α+ β+ α- β- λ 
(sensitivity gains) (pessimism) (sensitivity losses) (optimism) (loss aversion)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Willingness to take risks in 
general (0-10)
0.00003 -0.00014*** -0.00009** 0.00013 0.00104***
[0.00004] [0.00005] [0.00004] [0.00008] [0.00038]
Constant 0.60227*** 0.54578*** 0.41866*** 1.37900*** 3.88161***
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dependent variable 0.604 0.544 0.419 1.380 3.892
Observations 278 278 278 278 278
R-squared 0.088 0.123 0.096 0.060 0.097
Each coefficient estimate is based on a separate OLS regression of the respective dependent variable 
on this particular risk estimate and a set of controls. Control variables included: gender, age, education 
(years), household size, household head labor in another farm, total farm area (ha), number of bedrooms 
in the house, farm experience (years), percentage of income coming from coffee, total area planted 
with coffee (ha), whether farmers bring coffee to a cooperative, and whether farm was affected by the 
coffee leaf rust. Fixed effects at district level (6 districts). Cluster standard error at the village level (33 
villages). Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications following Cameron et al. (2008). Robust standard errors 
in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix 2.5 | Risk preferences parameters on real-life farming practices.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
α+ (sensitivity gains) -1.590 -9.988 -2.473 -4.779
[10.884] [9.778] [15.831] [11.201]
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
β+ (pessimism) 2.611 8.446 -11.151 7.312
[10.191] [13.629] [19.206] [17.827]
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
α- (sensitivity losses) -3.505 -3.851 -27.168 19.706
[12.534] [22.802] [27.380] [21.579]
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
β- (optimism) -7.149 -1.439 23.699* 8.143
[10.437] [7.601] [12.644] [12.227]
Change crop/diversify Change variety Fertilizer Pesticide
λ  (loss aversion) -1.073 -0.687 4.276* 0.361
[1.658] [1.630] [2.246] [5.140]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 278 278 278 278
Each coefficient estimate is based on a separate OLS regression of the respective dependent variable on 
this particular risk estimate and a set of controls. Dependent variables: change crop/diversify (Changed 
or diversified with other crops (yes/no)), change variety (Changed coffee variety (yes/no)), fertilizer 
(Application of fertilizer (high/low)) and pesticide (Application of pesticide (high/low)). Control variables 
included: gender, age, education (years), household size, household head labor in another farm, total 
farm area (ha), number of bedrooms in the house, farm experience (years), percentage of income coming 
from coffee, total area planted with coffee (ha), whether farmers bring coffee to a cooperative, and 
whether farm was affected by the coffee leaf rust. Fixed effects at district level (6 districts). Cluster 
standard error at the village level (33 villages). Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications following Cameron 
et al. (2008). Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix 2.6 | Example of decision task in the gain domain.
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Appendix 2.6 Example of decision task in the gain domain
Lottery          Sure amount 
1 O O 250 ¢ for sure 
2 O O 500 ¢ for sure 
3 O O 750 ¢ for sure 
4 O O 1000 ¢ for sure 
5 O O 1250 ¢ for sure 
6 O O 1500 ¢ for sure 
7 O O 1750 ¢ for sure 
8 O O 2000 ¢ for sure 
9 O O 2250 ¢ for sure 
10 O O 2500 ¢ for sure 
11 O O 2750 ¢ for sure 
12 O O 3000 ¢ for sure 
13 O O 3250 ¢ for sure 
You win ¢ 5000  if one of the following balls is drawn 
from the urn: 14 O O 3500 ¢ for sure 
15 O O 3750 ¢ for sure 
16 O O 4000 ¢ for sure 
You win ¢ 0  if one of the following balls is drawn from 
the urn: 17 O O 4250 ¢ for sure 
18 O O 4500 ¢ for sure 
19 O O 4750 ¢ for sure 
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Testing conditional cooperation 
Local participation of farmers in agricultural cooperatives
Abstract
In this paper, we test the internal and external validity of the typology of a 
conditional cooperator classified by using a public goods game together with 
the strategy method. Individuals categorized as conditional cooperators adapt 
their behavior to the group to which they belong. In Costa Rica, coffee farmers 
are traditionally organized in agricultural cooperatives, a setting very similar to 
the scenario presented to an individual facing the strategy method in a public 
goods game: how much to cooperate, given what others do. Our results show that 
conditional cooperators believe they contribute to the public good by matching the 
contribution of others in the experiment. However, we find no evidence that those 
classified as conditional cooperators in the experiment also behave this way when 
it comes to bringing coffee to the local cooperative in real life. We show supporting 
evidence to conclude that the typology of a conditional cooperator is internally 
consistent, but do not find evidence that the typology of conditional cooperators 
is externally valid. Our paper is a contribution to the external validity of context-
free experiments and helps in understanding cooperative behavior relevant to the 
sustainability of agricultural cooperatives in the developing world.
This chapter is based on: 
Naranjo, M.A., Martinsson, P. Alpizar, F. (2019) “Testing conditional cooperation: 
Local participation of farmers in agricultural cooperatives.” (Working paper).  
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3.1 Introduction
Individual social preferences and cooperation influence collective action, with 
consequences for the sustainability of contracts and institutions (Charness and 
Rabin 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2002; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010; Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999), which are essential for community development. Social preferences 
and cooperation are often studied through public goods games. In this paper, we 
test the internal and external validity of the typology of conditional cooperator, 
identified by implementing a public goods game combined with the strategy method 
among farmers traditionally organized in agricultural cooperatives. Individuals 
characterized as conditional cooperators adapt their behavior to the group to which 
they belong (Fischbacher et al.2001). In other words, if other group members shirk, 
they shirk as well, and if others cooperate, conditional cooperators follow through 
(Gächter 2007). In real life, participation in an agricultural cooperative consists 
of taking the harvest for processing to the cooperative mill, in exchange for better 
prices and cheaper access to technical assistance, as well as other benefits. These 
benefits will happen only if enough farmers cooperate in sustaining the structure 
of the cooperative. In other words, the agricultural cooperative setting is similar to 
the scenario presented to an individual facing the strategy method in a public goods 
game: how much to cooperate, given what others do.
A farmers’ agricultural cooperative is a typical example of an institution that strongly 
relies on the cooperation of its members. Cooperatives are an essential vehicle for 
development, mobilizing local resources for a common goal that provides benefits 
to their associates (Zeuli and Radel 2005). The participatory structure of coffee 
cooperatives in Costa Rica and many developing countries reflects some of the 
characteristics of a public good. Membership is voluntary18 and it is not possible to 
exclude members from the services of the cooperative, nor from the benefits that a 
cooperative typically provides to the community. Like many other institutions in the 
developing world, agricultural cooperatives need active cooperation from farmers to 
be sustainable. They represent a policy-relevant setting to test the external validity 
of public goods games and the strategy method.
Previous literature has focused on the external validity of public goods games. Some 
studies have found a positive correlation between experimental and real-life behavior 
(Benz and Meier 2008; Carlsson et al. 2014; Frey and Meier 2004; Rustagi et al. 
2010). Others have found that behavior in experiments is not consistent with real-life 
actions (Laury and Taylor 2008; Voors et al. 2011, 2012) . The evidence is not only 
mixed, but there is little evidence regarding the typology of conditional cooperators. 
18  An exception is Chinese cooperatives, where membership is mandatory and universal so that every 
farmer in the village is automatically a member.
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The objective of this paper is to test both the internal and external validity of the 
conditional cooperator typology among farmers who have to decide whether or 
not to cooperate with the coffee cooperative. Our study contributes to this debate 
by directly applying a public goods game combined with the strategy method to 
identify the conditional cooperators (Fischbacher et al. 2001), and comparing the 
farmers’ pro-social behavior within the experiment and outside the laboratory. 
To test for internal consistency, we explore whether those identified as conditional 
cooperators act as such when contrasting their contributions to their beliefs about 
the contributions of others in the experiment. In theory, conditional cooperators 
should believe in contributing by matching the contributions of others in the group. 
We hypothesize that the conditional contribution (from the strategy method) as a 
function of the individual beliefs of others in the experiment is correlated with the 
farmer’s actual contribution to the public goods game. 
To test for external consistency, we compare whether the type identified in the 
experiment is also a characterization of real-life behavior towards the cooperative. 
Theoretically, conditional cooperators will either cooperate or not, according to 
the behavior of others in the community. We hypothesize that farmers classified 
as conditional cooperators bring coffee to the cooperative if the share of other 
farmers bringing coffee to the cooperative increases. Accordingly, those who are 
not conditional cooperators should not be affected by the actions of other farmers 
in the community.
We find a moderate correlation between the conditional contribution as a function 
of the individual beliefs of others in the experiment and the majority of conditional 
cooperators believing they contribute to the public good by matching the contribution 
of others in the experiment. However, we do not find a significant interaction effect 
between those classified as conditional cooperators in the experiment and the share 
of other farmers bringing coffee to the cooperative in real life. We show supporting 
evidence to conclude that the typology of a conditional cooperator is internally 
consistent, but do not find evidence that the typology of conditional cooperators is 
externally valid.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section describes our 
theoretical framework complemented by a review of recent literature on the external 
validity of public goods experiments. The third introduces the background of coffee 
cooperative organizations in Costa Rica. Section four describes our experimental 
design and fieldwork implementation. Section five explains the sample selection 
and shows descriptive statistics. Section six presents our empirical strategy and the 
results, and the last section concludes the paper.
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3.2 Related literature
Our empirical application is motivated by the seminal characterization of social 
preferences, a review of the literature focused on the external validity of public 
goods games, and the importance of studying social preferences heterogeneity in 
the context of agricultural cooperatives.
As defined by Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), individuals reveal social preferences 
when they do not care only about the resources allocated to them, but also about 
the resources allocated to other relevant agents. Evidence has shown that social 
preferences shape a substantial fraction of people’s choices (Fischbacher et al. 2001; 
Fehr and Fischbacher 2002; Kocher et al. 2008; Martinsson et al. 2013).
Fischbacher et al. (2001) were the first to study the hypothesis that some people are 
conditional cooperators: they are willing to cooperate more, the more others contribute 
to a public good. Their work has been followed by many practical applications 
showing that conditional cooperators account for between 50% and 80% of the 
participants in the population (Fischbacher et al. 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher 2002; 
Kocher et al. 2008; Martinsson et al. 2013).19 
Alternatively, individuals whose behavior does not change as a response to the 
behavior of others are called unconditional cooperators (Martinsson et al. 2009). If 
they place a positive value on the resources allocated to others, individuals are 
considered altruistic (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002; Putterman 2006). In contrast, 
when individuals behave in a purely selfish manner, they are called free riders if 
they cannot be excluded from the benefits of collective action and public goods. 
As a result, the interaction between conditional cooperators and free riders has an 
impact on the dynamics of markets and organizations (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002).
Inherently, conditional cooperation is a two-way road. Conditional cooperators 
adapt their behavior to the group to which they belong, meaning that if other group 
members defect, they defect as well; if others cooperate, conditional cooperators 
also cooperate (Gächter 2007). Therefore, conditional cooperation can either 
strengthen or undermine institutions that require cooperation to be sustainable. 
The composition of the group is decisive in maintaining cooperation (Rustagi et 
al. 2010), and cooperation is achieved in groups with a larger share of conditional 
cooperators (Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2007; Ones and Putterman 2007). Institutions 
where most individuals are conditional cooperators need to have policies that stand 
the beliefs for the cooperation of their members. If free riders dominate, procedures 
should involve monitoring and penalties to reinforce cooperation (Gächter 2007; 
Martinsson et al. 2009). 
19  See Martinsson et al. (2013) for an overview of results found in different countries.  
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Regarding the external validity of public goods games, some studies have found 
a positive correlation between experimental and real-life behavior. For example, 
Benz and Meier (2008) find evidence that pro-social behavior is accentuated in 
the lab but is to some extent correlated with behavior in the field. Carlsson et al. 
(2014) find that correlations between public goods game contributions and real-life 
contributions are not only present but also stable over long periods and contexts. 
On the other hand, some studies have found that behavior in experiments is not 
consistent with real-life actions. A series of studies by Voors et al. (2012, 2011) 
finds no correlation between two experiments: a social intervention that mimics a 
public goods game and the conventional public goods game (Voors et al. 2012), nor 
a robust pattern between the previous experiments and real-life behavior towards 
forest conservation in Sierra Leone (Voors et al. 2011). Laury and Taylor (2008) 
suggest that not all estimates of social preferences from a laboratory setting predict 
contributions on naturally occurring public goods. They find some estimates of 
altruistic behavior carry over to real life, but it was not the same for the free riders. 
Recent literature has shown the importance of studying preferences heterogeneity 
in the context of conditional cooperation. Rustagi et al. (2010) show evidence on 
the extent to which variation in the composition of the group explains the success of 
forest management in Ethiopia. They combine experimental estimates of conditional 
cooperation and survey data among organized forest user groups. Groups vary in the 
share of conditional cooperators, and groups with a larger conditional cooperator 
share are more successful in forest management. They also show that instruments 
such as costly monitoring are essential to enforcing cooperation among conditional 
cooperators. Frey and Meier (2004) find that charitable giving increases, on average, 
if people know that many others contribute as well. 
Overall, we found few studies that assess the external validity of the typology of 
conditional cooperation (Frey and Meier 2004; Rustagi et al. 2010). Our study 
contributes to this debate by applying a public goods game following the strategy 
method (Fischbacher et al. 2001) and comparing the farmers’ pro-social behavior 
in an experiment and outside the laboratory using a population of coffee farmers in 
Costa Rica.  
In the next section, we introduce the background of coffee cooperatives in our study 
area, their participatory structure, and why conditional cooperation is essential for 
the sustainability of these organizations. 
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3.3 Background on coffee cooperatives 
Traditionally, coffee farmers in Costa Rica are organized in cooperatives. The 
cooperative supports farmers with access to inexpensive technical assistance and 
training to improve productivity and reduce the risk of pests and diseases. Coffee 
growers who choose to get their beans processed at the cooperative mill add 
value to the product and get better prices through sales to international roasters if 
quality and quantity of the coffee are high. However, it is not possible to exclude 
members from the mill or other services if they produce poor quality beans. 
Moreover, members can choose between using the cooperative mill (receiving 
higher prices, but not immediate payment) and using private mills (lower prices, 
immediate payment). Furthermore, benefits from cooperatives reach the entire 
community. Agricultural cooperatives are well known for sponsoring sports and 
cultural and educational projects in the coffee regions, and it is not possible to 
exclude any member of the community from these benefits. Hence, our analysis 
looks at farmers’ cooperation towards the cooperative regardless of membership, 
as benefits are shared by the entire community.
Our study took place in 2014 in two coffee regions in Costa Rica: Tarrazú and 
Brunca. In the Tarrazú area, there are three main cooperatives: Coope Llano 
Bonito, Coope Dota and Coope Tarrazú, which have 600, 900 and 4650 members 
respectively. In the Brunca region, there is one big cooperative call Coope Agri 
that registers a total of 10,162 associates and is the largest cooperative in the 
country.20
The structure of coffee cooperatives resembles the characteristics of a public 
good.21 It is not possible to exclude those who do not cooperate. In principle, 
farmers should cooperate with one another by bringing their coffee to the local 
cooperative. However, in reality, many farmers bring all or part of their coffee 
harvest to private mills that attract farmers with direct cash payments. Prices 
offered by the private mills are not necessarily higher than the price provided by 
the cooperatives, but payments are given to the farmer on the spot. In contrast to 
the private mills, when farmers bring their coffee to a cooperative, they receive 
20  Coope Agri also processes other agricultural products, not only coffee, and provides financial services.
21  The governance structure in these cooperatives is participatory. For example, in Coope Tarrazú, for 
every 15 associates, a delegate is appointed to be part of the General Assembly. The General Assembly’s 
main functions are to approve the policies of the cooperative and to decide about surpluses, coffee 
processing, and commercialization. Also, the General Assembly appoints other governing bodies, 
including the Administration Board, the Surveillance Committee, the Education Committee and 
the Arbitration Board (CoopeTarrazú 2018). Once the Administration Board is elected, each of the 
administrative positions is appointed internally. The Board of Directors decides all matters related to the 
management of the cooperative, and selects the General Manager, the Internal Audit and the External 
Audit (CoopeTarrazú 2018).
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payments distributed throughout the year (see Appendix 3.1 for a list of prices and 
Appendix 3.2 for an example of timing of the payments in 2014).22
During harvesting season, the coffee beans must be processed quickly, before 
they can ferment, and therefore the farmers bring their coffee to collection points 
available in each village soon after harvest. These collection points are set up by 
both the cooperative and the private mills, and are spread around the villages. 
Farmers gather in line at the end of the day to deliver the coffee at these collection 
points. Hence, the information about who brings their coffee where, either to 
the private or the cooperative mill, can be considered public information among 
farmers.
Agricultural cooperatives need cooperation from the local farmers to keep 
functioning. Contracts with international coffee roasters are made in advance 
(before the harvest), and quotas must be achieved. If the majority of farmers are 
conditional cooperators, they will bring coffee to the cooperative mill if others 
farmers in the community do so, but they will not participate if other farmers do 
not. Therefore, conditional cooperation can either enhance or weaken cooperation, 
depending on the proportion of farmers who are free riders and do not bring their 
coffee for processing. 
The next section describes the experimental design and the procedures followed to 
derive a typology of social preferences among this population.
3.4 Experimental design and procedures
Our experiment is based on the experimental design by Fischbacher et al. (2001). 
Farmers have to decide how to divide an endowment of 20 points, which at the end 
of the game is converted to colones (1 point = 200 colones).23 Farmers are told that 
they are simultaneously playing in a group with two other anonymous peer farmers 
from the community chosen at random. 
Farmers’ tasks consist of three decisions: the unconditional contribution, the 
conditional contribution and the guessed contribution (detailed instructions are 
given in Appendix 3.4).  The first task is the unconditional contribution, i.e., 
farmers’ willingness to contribute to the public good.  Farmers decide how many of 
the 20 points to deposit into the project account, and the rest of the points go to the 
22  Both cooperative and private mill prices are regulated by law. The final price is published before 
the harvest season and includes a 9% from the final liquidation price in favor of the coffee mill for the 
processing and marketing of coffee (MAG 2016).
23   In dollars, the 20 points are equivalent to 7 USD. 
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personal account with the following payoff function:  
3
1
20 0.5π
=
= − + ∑i i j
j
g g
where gi is the unconditional contribution, and the public good pays back the sum 
of all contributions gj multiplied by 0.5. The enumerator tells the farmers that he or 
she is going to send an SMS with their choices to the coordinator. The coordinator 
collects the information from the other participants and calculates the payoffs (see 
Appendix 3.5).
The second task is to complete the table of contributions. The farmer must indicate, 
for each possible average contribution of the other two farmers in the group, the 
number of points to put in the project account (see Appendix 3.6). Farmers are told 
that one member of each group is selected, and their income will be determined 
according to the table of contributions. For the other two farmers in the group, the 
income will be the unconditional contribution payoff.
In the final task, we asked the farmers how much they think the other two farmers of 
the group have contributed in task 1 (i.e., unconditional contribution) (see Appendix 
3.7). If the farmer guesses the average contribution from the other two farmers to 
the project account, they could earn additional points. If the exact unconditional 
contribution of others is equal to the guessed contribution, the farmer earns four 
extra points. If the real contribution is a point above or below, the farmer earns 
three extra points. If the contribution is two points above or below, the farmer 
earns one extra point. At the end of the game, the coordinator arrives with the 
information collected from the other two farmers and payment is given in cash 
directly to the farmer. 
3.5 Sample selection and data
We applied the public goods game as part of a survey. By doing this, we ensure a 
random selection of participants in the game as well as the survey.24 Households 
were sampled through a stratified random sampling based on the density of coffee 
plots within six districts of the two coffee regions (three districts from each region).25 
Districts were chosen to capture the spread and variation of intensity of the coffee 
24  A public goods game is commonly implemented as a lab-in-the-field experiment, gathering 
participants in a communal area and making an open call, or inviting subjects to participate in the game. 
This procedure can have a self-selection bias, which we avoid by applying the public goods game as part 
of the survey.
25  Costa Rica’s national public administration divides the country into provinces, cantons, and districts.
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rust epidemic in 2012-2013.26 Household head farmers took part in the fieldwork 
data collection carried out by trained enumerators at each household. First, a 
survey questionnaire collected detailed household characteristics, farming practices 
and community participation in different organizations. Then, the enumerator 
introduced the public goods game. 
In our final sample, we have 293 coffee farmers. Their household socioeconomic 
characteristics and coffee farm characteristics are presented in Table 3.1. In our 
sample, coffee farmers have on average only primary education, life experience in 
coffee farming, and on average 57% of their income is earned through selling coffee. 
For our main cooperation variable, we gathered information on where farmers 
delivered their coffee. Specifically, we asked for each of their plots whether the 
coffee was delivered to the cooperative mill, to a private mill or both. Hence, we 
know with certainty that those bringing coffee to the cooperative mill are members, 
but we are not able to identify those who are members and do not bring coffee 
to a local cooperative. Nonetheless, benefits of the cooperative reach the entire 
community – members and non-members – and so farmers who do not bring coffee 
could be considered free riders in the community.
Table 3.1 | Descriptive statistics of main variables.
N mean sd min max
Household variables
Willingness to contribute to public goods game 293 9.67 3.83 0 20
Household head female 293 0.10 0.30 0 1
Age (years) 293 51.77 13.64 19 86
Education (years) 293 5.80 2.61 0 15
Household size 293 3.33 1.38 1 10
Total farm area (ha) 293 5.49 9.96 0.03 109
Coffee farm characteristics
Farmer experience (years) 293 25.50 14.48 1 71
% of income coming from coffee 278 56.78 36.20 0 100
Total area planted with coffee (ha) 293 3.48 4.62 0.09 41.77
Farm affected by coffee leaf rust 293 0.81 0.39 0 1
Have a credit with the cooperative 293 0.11 0.32 0 1
Farmers bringing any coffee to a private mill 293 0.26 0.44 0 1
Main variables
Farmers bringing any coffee to a cooperative (Pi) 293 0.78 0.42 0 1
Share of other farmers in the village bringing 
coffee to the cooperative (POij) 
293 0.78 0.17 0.29 1
26  Coffee rust epidemic was an exogenous shock which affected coffee plantations at an altitude 
between 700 and 2000 meters above sea level. 
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In our empirical model, farmers’ cooperation is defined by bringing or not bringing 
coffee to the local cooperative (Pi). We focus on the interaction of the typology of 
social preferences with the cooperation of other farmers in the village. To measure 
the participation of other farmers in the village (POij), we take the share of other 
farmers in the village who bring their coffee to the cooperative, excluding farmer i. 
3.6 Empirical strategy and results 
Following Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), we used 
the experimental data to classify farmers in distinct categories: the conditional 
cooperators, the unconditional contributing over the mean, the unconditional 
contributing below the mean, the free riders, and the remaining others (Figure 3.1). 
Conditional cooperators are farmers whose own conditional contribution increases 
weakly and monotonically with the average contribution of other members. These 
include subjects for whom the relationship between their average contribution and 
that of others is positive and significant at the 1% significance level, based on the 
Spearman correlation coefficient (Martinsson et al. 2013). The farmers who always 
report the same contribution from the first task, independently of the average 
contribution of the other two farmers, are classified as unconditional cooperators 
(Martinsson et al. 2009).
Figure 3.1 | Average own conditional contribution for each contribution level of the other group 
members (diagonal = perfect conditional cooperators).
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Our biggest group is the conditional cooperators with 210 farmers (72%), who tend 
to match the expected contributions of others. This percentage is consistent with 
results from previous lab studies. However, in previous research, the majority of 
conditionally cooperative contributions tend to lie at or below the diagonal (in the 
selfish direction) (Fischbacher et al. 2001). Conversely, in our sample, conditional 
cooperator farmers start contributing on average above the diagonal, and, after the 
average contribution of 10 tokens, contributions fall below the diagonal. 
Unconditional cooperators account for 19% (56 of the subjects). These include 
43 farmers (15%) who always contribute above the mean and 13 who always 
contribute below the mean (4%). We found only two free riders displaying purely 
selfish behavior with a contribution of zero (1%).27 Finally, 25 farmers (9%) are 
classified as other. For further analysis, we include the two free riders within the 
group of others.28
We start by testing the internal validity of the typology of conditional cooperators. 
As detailed in section 3.4, our experiment included three tasks. Task 1 asked farmers 
their willingness to contribute to a public good. In task 2, we elicited farmers’ 
willingness to cooperate conditionally on the average cooperation of other farmers, 
and, in task 3, we asked farmers about their beliefs regarding the contribution of 
others.
We wanted to know if the conditional contribution (task 2), as a function of the 
individual beliefs of others (task 3), is correlated with the farmer’s actual contribution 
to the public goods game (task 1). We test the null hypothesis that the public good 
contribution (task 1) and conditional contribution as a function of the individual 
beliefs about others (task 2(task 3)) are independent. We reject the null hypothesis 
and find a Spearman’s correlation coefficient equal to 0.4126, showing a moderate 
correlation which is highly significant (p-value < 0.01).
Furthermore, we compared one by one to see whether those classified as conditional 
cooperators remained consistent in the experiment. For example, if a farmer 
believed that on average the other two farmers contributed five tokens (in task 3), 
we looked at how much the farmer was willing to contribute if the other two farmers 
contributed on average five (table of contributions, task 2), and then compared this 
result with their original contribution (task 1). Figure 3.2 shows the frequency of 
farmers matching their beliefs with their willingness to contribute to the public 
27  Previous studies in the lab typically found a higher percentage of pure free riders (4-6%) (Martinsson 
et al. 2013). 
28  Previous literature also identifies a category called the hump-shape contributors (Fischbacher et al. 
2001; Fehr and Fischbacher 2002; Kocher et al. 2008; Martinsson et al. 2013). These are subjects showing 
a monotonically increasing contribution up to an average level of others, after which contributions 
decrease. From our data, we do not find farmers displaying this behavior.
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good. The large majority of conditional cooperators, a total of 130 out of the 210 
(62%), remained “consistent” within -/+ 1 standard deviation of 3.83 ≈ 4 from 
their original contribution. Furthermore, 31% perfectly matched their contribution 
to their beliefs. Our results show supporting evidence to conclude that the typology 
of a conditional cooperator is consistent within the experiment.
Figure 3.2 | Frequency of farmers matching their beliefs with their willingness to contribute to the 
public good.
To test for external consistency of the typology of conditional cooperation, we 
examine whether conditional cooperators will cooperate, according to the behavior 
of the other farmers in the community. We explore the aggregated behavior at the 
village level following the study by Rustagi et al. (2010). We look at the share of 
behavioral types and the outcome variable of cooperation in each village, estimated 
as the total share of farmers bringing coffee to the cooperative (Figure 3.3).29 
We regress the share of farmers bringing coffee to the cooperative in each village 
(SPj ) on the share of conditional cooperators in each village (SCCj ). We control for 
relevant factors at the village level such as the share of female household heads, 
average elevation from farms in the village, average total area planted with coffee, 
and village sample size (Xj ). The error term is denoted by εij and the model is 
specified as follows: 
1    α β ε= + + +j j i ijSP SCC X
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are presented in Table 3.2. To ensure 
robustness, standard errors are clustered at village level (33 clusters), and we applied 
the wild bootstrap with 1000 repetitions (Cameron et al. 2008). The coefficient for 
29  We present the frequency distribution of farmers’ social preferences in Appendix 3.3. 
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the share of conditional cooperation is positive and not significant. Hence, we do 
not find evidence that the share of conditional cooperation in the village affects the 
participation of farmers in the local agricultural cooperatives. Our results are different 
from Rustagi et al. (2010), who find that groups with a larger share of conditional 
cooperators are more successful in forest management. 
Figure 3.3 | Share of behavior types and village cooperation towards the cooperative. 
Table 3.2 | Farmers’ participation in local agricultural cooperatives and conditional cooperation.
Dependent variable:
Share of farmers bringing coffee to local cooperative
(1) (2) (3)
Share of conditional cooperators (sample/
village)
0.1418 0.1577 0.1577
[0.1885] [0.1978] [0.2005]
Constant 0.6921*** 0.8436*** 0.8436***
[0.1489] [0.2517] [0.2475]
Other control variables No Yes Yes
Wild bootstrap No No Yes
Observations 33 33 33
R-squared 0.018 0.114 0.114
The independent variables are the average elevation in sample/village, the area planted with coffee in 
sample/village, and the number of farmers in sample/village. We apply the wild bootstrap following 
Cameron et al. (2008). Cluster standard error at the village level (33 villages). Robust standard errors in 
brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Our hypothesis stated that farmers classified as conditional cooperators are more 
likely to bring coffee to the cooperative if the share of other farmers bringing coffee 
to the cooperative increases. Therefore, we add further analysis to specifically test 
this hypothesis and look at the interaction effect between the type of cooperator 
and the share of other farmers in the village bringing coffee to the local cooperative.
We regress as the dependent variable whether farmer i brings coffee to the cooperative 
in village j (Pij ), on the classification of pro-social behavior types: conditional 
cooperators (CCij ), unconditional cooperators (UCij ) and others (Oij ), the share of 
other farmers bringing coffee to the cooperative (POij ), and the complete interaction 
effects with the type of cooperator. We control for a set of household controls (Xi ). 
The error term is denoted by εij . To ensure robustness, standard errors are clustered 
at the village level (33 clusters), and we include fixed effects at the district level (6 
districts) and apply the wild bootstrap with 1000 repetitions (Cameron et al. 2008). 
We set those classified as conditional cooperators as the reference group, and the 
model is specified as follows: 
1 2 3 4 5     ( )  (  )    α β β β β β ε= + + + + × + × + +ij i i ij i ij i j i ijP UC O PO UC PO O PO X
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are presented in Table 3.3. The coefficient 
for those classified as unconditional cooperators (UCi) is negative but not significant, 
meaning that they are no different from those classified as conditional cooperators 
(CCi). The same result is found for those in the category of others (Oi). The coefficient 
for the share of other farmers in the village bringing coffee to the cooperative 
(POij) is positive but not significant, indicating that the behavior of others has no 
significant effect on whether or not farmer i brings coffee to the cooperative, for the 
reference group of conditional cooperators. Furthermore, there are no significant 
differences when looking at the interaction effect with the unconditional cooperators 
(UCi X POij) and others (Oi X POij). In summary, we do not find a significant impact 
of the share of other farmers bringing coffee on the participation of conditional 
cooperators, and this is no different for the unconditional cooperators. 
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Table 3.3 | Farmers’ participation in local agricultural cooperatives, type of cooperator and interaction 
effect with the participation of other farmers in the village. 
Base category: Conditional cooperator (CCi)
Dependent variable:
Dummy for farmers bringing any coffee 
to a cooperative (Pi)
(1) (2)
Unconditional cooperator (UCi) -0.0959 -0.0959
[0.4059] [0.5357]
Others (Oi) -0.5381 -0.5381
[0.4607] [0.7505]
Share of other farmers in the village bringing coffee to coop 
(POij)
0.1204 0.1204
[0.3335] [0.6033]
UCi X POij 0.1046 0.1046
[0.4813] [0.5843]
Oi X POij 0.6865 0.6865
[0.5622] [0.8648]
Women 0.0730 0.0730
[0.0579] [0.0661]
Education (years) -0.0031 -0.0031
[0.0123] [0.0142]
Household size 0.0118 0.0118
[0.0209] [0.0228]
Total farm area (ha) -0.0036 -0.0036
[0.0025] [0.0032]
Farming experience (years) 0.0070*** 0.0070***
[0.0015] [0.0000]
Total area planted with coffee (ha) 0.0074 0.0074
[0.0053] [0.0057]
Farm affected by the coffee leaf rust fungus 0.0703 0.0703
[0.0714] [0.0776]
Patience1 -0.0050 -0.0050
[0.0090] [0.0084]
Diversify with other crops -0.0160 -0.0160
[0.0482] [0.0432]
Household received remittances -0.1150 -0.1150
[0.1402] [0.1468]
Have a credit with the cooperative 0.2369*** 0.2369***
[0.0556] [0.0000]
Constant 0.4091 0.4091
[0.3401] [0.5456]
District fixed effects Yes Yes
Wild bootstrap No Yes
Observations 293 293
R-squared 0.167 0.167
1 A measure of patience from survey questionnaire, where 0 means very impatient and 10 means very patient. 
Fixed effects at the district level (6 districts). Wild bootstrap following Cameron et al. (2008). Cluster standard 
error at the village level (33 villages). Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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To further understand cooperation towards the cooperative, we take a look at the 
control variables in the previous model. The coefficient for farming experience is 
positive and highly significant (p-value < 0.01). As reported in Table 3.1, farmers 
have on average a farming experience of 25.50 years; with an increase of one 
standard deviation (14.48), the probability of farmers bringing coffee to the local 
cooperative is predicted to increase by 11%.  In further consultation with local 
cooperatives, it is clear that tradition is an essential factor explaining cooperation 
towards the cooperative (Murillo-Monge 2018). Farming experience, in this case, 
can work as a proxy for a farmer’s tradition in the coffee business. Farmers with 
more farming experience are also the older farmers who traditionally have brought 
coffee to the local cooperative since its origins. An implication of this finding is that 
agricultural cooperative organizations should enhance policies to actively involve 
young coffee farmers in the cooperative organization.
The coefficient for having a credit with the cooperative is also positive and highly 
significant (p-value < 0.01). Farmers having a credit with the cooperative are 24% 
more likely to bring coffee, compared to the baseline probability of 40%. Agricultural 
cooperatives have grown strong over the years and many function as financial 
institutions that give credit to farmers. Our results suggest that cooperatives have 
the ability to engage farmers via credits to ensure part of their harvest as a payment 
mechanism.
3.7  Conclusions and discussion
In this paper, we test whether the typology of conditional cooperation, derived from 
a public goods game using the strategy method, is internally consistent, and whether 
the typology carries through to reality. In other words, if we find that a farmer 
is a conditional cooperator, what is the farmer’s behavior in real life concerning 
supporting local agricultural cooperatives? If farmers are conditional cooperators, 
we expect they will match the behavior of others in real life.  
Agricultural cooperatives need farmers to cooperate (e.g., bring coffee to the 
cooperative). Consequently, cooperatives should be concerned if there is a significant 
share of free riders (e.g., those who do not bring coffee to the cooperative). Free 
riders not only lower the total production process of the cooperative but also can 
bring down the contributions of the conditional cooperators in the community. 
Results from a public goods game using the strategy method show there is 
experimentally minimal pure free riding. However, the majority of farmers are 
conditional cooperators (72%), an important group that can enhance cooperation, 
Testing conditional cooperation
3
65 
but can also weaken the cooperative structure if farmers hesitate to bring coffee to 
the local cooperative.
We find a moderate correlation between conditional contribution as a function 
of individual beliefs about others in the experiment. The majority of conditional 
cooperators believe their contribution to the public good matches the contribution 
of others in the experiment. However, we do not find a significant interaction effect 
between those classified as conditional cooperators in the experiment and the share 
of other farmers bringing coffee to the cooperative in real life. 
In other words, we find the typology of conditional cooperator to be consistent 
within the experiment, but it does not carry over outside the laboratory into a real-
life setting. The lack of correlation suggests that social preferences can be related 
to a particular context or setting. Our results are in line with other types of social 
preferences measures in the lab that do not relate to pro-social preferences measured 
in real life (Laury and Taylor 2008; Voors et al. 2011, 2012). Similar results have 
also been found in the case of risk preferences in Chapter 2. Hence, one should be 
careful when extrapolating the typology of conditional cooperation measures in the 
lab to other real-life contexts.
Given our results, a question that arises is whether farmers see the action of bringing 
coffee to a local cooperative as a public good. We have no doubt that the agricultural 
cooperative has been an essential institution for development in the rural areas of 
Costa Rica, delivering benefits to households regardless of whether they are coffee 
farmers. However, cooperatives are also known for not excluding yields on the basis 
of quality. Therefore, there are cases where the only place that accepts the coffee is 
a local cooperative. As a consequence, there can be any typology (i.e., conditional, 
unconditional cooperators, altruists, and free riders) producing low-quality coffee 
and the only place they can deliver coffee is the local cooperative. Furthermore, in 
the last years, there has been a growing establishment of micro mills and farmers 
trying to differentiate themselves from the crowd by processing and marketing their 
coffee. These are details that together make it difficult to consider our real-life 
scenario a perfect public goods game with which to look for external validity.
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3.8 Appendices
Appendix 3.1 | Final liquidation prices. Harvest 2013-2014.
Mills reported in Tarrazú and Brunca Region Ripe Green
Cooperatives Coope Dota R.L. 87,437.99 60,717.44
Coope Llano Bonito R.L. 78,077.12
Coope Tarrazú R.L. 69,646.40 48,339.90
Coope Agri El General R. L. 60,567.93 41,394.65
Private Mills Beneficio la Candelilla de Tarrazú S.A. 101,915.99
Beneficio Volcafé (C.R.) S.A. San Diego 64,309.71 44,681.29
Benefocio Volcafé (El General) 42,660.80 29,230.12
F.J. Orlich & Hnos LTDA. (El Marqués) 52,444.58 36,260.78
Notes: Prices in Costa Rican Colones (CRC). The final price is published before the harvest season and 
includes a 9% from the final liquidation price in favor of the coffee mill for the processing and marketing 
of coffee (MAG 2016) in accordance with the provisions of Law 2762 of June 21, 1961 on the regime 
of relations between producers, mills and coffee exporters. The Costa Rican Institute of Coffee (ICAFE) 
communicates to the interested parties the final liquidation prices of the coffee delivered to each mill. 
Source: (ICAFE 2014).
Appendix 3.2 | Payments distributed through the year in Coope Tarrazú.
Harvest
period Advancement Adjustment
Official 
liquidation 
price
Final 
liquidation 
price
Amount in colones Date of payment
2012-2013 58,000 3,000 July
3,000 August
3,000 September
3,000 November
500 December 62,983.00 70,500.00
2013-2014 5000 September
5000 October
160 December 69,646.40 75,160.00
Source: CoopeTarrazú (2018) Note: In addition, the associate contributes 2% per fanega (coffee 
measurement unit that is approx. 250 kg) as a contribution to the capital of the cooperative. The amount 
collected over the years is returned when the associate retires or is delivered to the family when she/
he dies.
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Appendix 3.3 | Distribution of farmers’ social preferences per village and participation in agricultural 
cooperatives.
Appendix 3.4 | Public Goods Game Instructions.
In this game we are going to talk about “points.” At the end of the game, the total amount of points you 
get will be converted to colones. Each point you get is equivalent to 200 colones. 
1 point = 200 colones
You will play considering the decisions of two other peer farmers in the community, but you do not know 
who they are. Only the coordinators of the game know who they are and they are chosen at random.
We are going to read the instructions together and present some examples. Please consider the numbers 
in the example as an illustration. The points you will obtain from the game will be different. At the end 
of the instructions, we are going to ask you a few questions that will help you to understand the game.
BASIC DECISION 
You are a member of a group of three farmers. Each of you has to decide how to divide 20 points (20 
points = 4000 colones) into two different accounts. You can put these 20 points in your private account, 
or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do not invest in the project will 
automatically be transferred to your private account. 
INCOME FROM THE PRIVATE ACCOUNT
For each point you put in your private account, you will earn exactly one point. For example, if you put 
twenty points on your private account (which implies that you do not invest anything in the project), you 
will earn exactly twenty points from the private account. If you put 6 points into the private account, you 
will receive an income of 6 points from the private account. Nobody except you earns something from 
your private account. 
INCOME FROM THE PROJECT ACCOUNT
For each point you deposit into the project account, all members of the group receive the same income. 
That is, you will also earn income for the points that the other two farmers deposit into the project 
account. However, you do not know how many points that will be. The coordinators will collect the 
information from the other farmers and will notify me of the result when making payments at the end 
of the game.
For each member of the group, the income from the project account will be determined as the sum of the 
contributions of the three farmers multiplied by 0.5.
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Project account income = the sum of the contributions of the 3 x 0.5
For example, if the sum of the three contributions to the project account is 60 points, you and the other 
people in the group will receive → 60 x 0.5 = 30
Another example, if the three farmers in the group deposit a total of 10 points, then you and all the others 
receive → 10 x 0.5 = 5
YOUR TOTAL INCOME
Your total income is the sum of your income from the private account and your income from the project 
account.
Income from the private account   →
20 points from your initial endowment
–
Your contribution to the project
+
Income from the project account   → Sum of all contributions to the project x 0.5
Total income
CONTROL QUESTIONS
Of the 20 points available, suppose that no one, including you, puts points in the project account. Then…
• What is your total income? R / 20 points from the personal account
• What is the income of the other people in your group? R / Equal
Of the 20 points available, let’s assume that everyone, including you, puts all the points in the project 
account. Then…
• What is your total income? R / 20 + 20 + 20 = 60 x 0.5 = 30
• What is the income of the other three people in your group? R / Equal
(Check farmers’ responses to the control questions. If they do not give a correct answer, repeat the explanation 
from the basic decision.)
These are the extreme cases (all or nothing), but you and the other farmers in the group can decide how 
you want to distribute the points in any way.
Remember that what you leave in your personal account is yours. What you put into the project account 
will be returned to you according to the sum of the contributions of each farmer in your group.
UNCONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION (Show decision sheet 1)
In the unconditional contribution, you must decide how many of the points you deposit into the project 
account. You must write a whole number that cannot be less than zero or greater than the 20 points you 
have to distribute. The rest of the points will go to your personal account.
CONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION (Show decision sheet 2)
Your second task is to complete the table of contributions. You should indicate for each possible average 
contribution of the other two people in the group the number of points that you want to put in the project 
account.
The average contribution is the sum of the contributions of the other two producers divided by two.
• Example 1: the other two farmers contribute (20 + 20 = 40 ÷ 2 = 20)
• Example 2: the other two farmers contribute (5 + 5 = 10 ÷ 2 = 5)
• Example 3: the other two farmers contribute (5 + 20 = 25 ÷ 2 = 12.5 = 13). The nearest
whole number would be used.
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You have to write in the right column how many points you want to contribute to the project account 
given that the other farmers contribute on average (approximate) the number of points in the left column. 
That is, you will decide how much you want to contribute depending on what other people contribute.
After all the farmers have made their unconditional contribution and completed the table of contributions, 
one person from each group will be selected, and their income will be determined according to the 
table of contributions. For the other two farmers in the group, the income will be determined by the 
unconditional contribution. I will tell you if you were selected at the end of the games.
CONTRIBUTION OF OTHERS (Show decision sheet 3)
Now you will tell us how much you think the other two farmers of your group have written as their 
unconditional contributions. In other words, what number do you suspect they wrote on average?
If you correctly guess the average contribution of the other two farmers to the project account, you can 
earn additional points.
If the true unconditional contribution of others is equal to what you guessed, you will earn four extra 
points. If the real contribution is a point above or below, you earn three extra points. If the contribution 
is two points above or below, you earn one extra point. 
Mark only one box with an X (single selection).
Appendix 3.5 | Decision sheet for unconditional contribution and final payment.
Unconditional contribution
How many of the 20 tokens do you want to invest in the project? _________ 
(Number between 0 – 20)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Complete after receiving the information of the donations of the other members of the group: 1 point = 200 
colones.
Points
Income from private account → ____________
+
Income from the project account → ____________
+
Income from guessing the contributions from the other farmers                    → ____________
Total income → ____________ x 200  =  ¢   ____________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix 3.6 | Decision sheet for conditional contribution.
Conditional contribution
Average contribution (approximate) of the
other two farmers to the project account Your contribution to the project account is:
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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Appendix 3.7 | Decision sheet for guessed contribution.
Guessing contributions
Average contribution (approximate) of the 
other two farmers to the project account
Mark with an X the box that you think corresponds 
to what the other two farmers contributed unconditionally 
to the project account. (JUST CHECK ONE BOX)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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Credit, insurance and farmers’ liability 
Evidence from a lab in the field experiment 
with coffee farmers in Costa Rica
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of farmers’ liability on demand for credit with and 
without insurance. We test predictions of a theoretical model in a lab in the field 
experiment with coffee farmers in Costa Rica. Farmers choose how much to invest 
in six different settings, described on the one hand by whether the loan is insured 
or not, and on the other by their liability. Our results show that the uptake of 
loans bundled with insurance is significantly higher than uptake of loans without 
insurance, both when farmers are liable for sure for their debt, and interestingly 
when there is uncertainty about their liability. When farmers are not liable for 
their debt, i.e. under limited liability, the uptake of credit is high irrespective of 
whether the loans are insured or not. Our results suggest that in order to increase 
the uptake of insurance as a strategy to increase private investment and reduce the 
vulnerability of farmers to shocks, it is important that farmers are liable with at least 
some probability. In terms of policy design, our results show that the “principle” 
of limited liability does not have be abandoned altogether in order to generate an 
increase in the uptake of insured credit.
This chapter is based on: 
Naranjo, M.A., Pieters, J. and Alpizar, F. “Credit, insurance and farmers’ liability: 
evidence from a lab in the field experiment with coffee farmers in Costa Rica.” 
Environment for Development Discussion Paper Series. March 2017. EfD DP 17-04. 
Submitted to the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
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4.1 Introduction
To cope with losses from extreme hydro-meteorological events, governments typically 
implement disaster relief programs and offer debt relief to affected parties (The World 
Bank 2007). For example, agricultural banks in developing countries frequently 
cooperate with poor agricultural borrowers after they experience a significant loss, 
restructuring their loans, and sometimes outright canceling outstanding debts (Carter 
et al. 2007). However, governments in general and in developing countries, in 
particular, have a limited capacity to help.  Moreover, in the context of climate change, 
debt relief practices are becoming less viable because the risk is systemic and losses 
can easily surpass most governments’ debt relief budgets. An example of systemic risk 
is exposure to increasingly frequent flood and droughts events, as predicted under 
climate change scenarios for Central America30. Insurance is potentially an alternative, 
but in developing countries insurance markets are thin (Carter et al. 2014). 
Rural households in developing countries face a number of credit constraints and 
market imperfections that shape investment decisions (Karlan et al. 2014). In the 
absence of insurance markets,  “risk rationing,” as explained by Boucher et al. (2008), 
suggests that the borrower voluntarily withdraws from taking a loan, due to the risk 
of losing collateral (Giné and Yang 2009). Traditional formal insurance instruments 
can be used to manage risks, but such insurance services are basically non-existent in 
rural areas of developing countries (Carter et al. 2014). This lack of insurance markets 
might aggravate the effect of risk rationing on credit uptake (Boucher et al. 2008; 
Giné and Yang 2009). The combination of credit and crop insurance, therefore, could 
be applied as a mechanism to improve credit markets and encourage investment in 
the agricultural sector (Carter et al. 2014), but limited empirical research has been 
conducted (Marr et al. 2016).
A number of previous studies have focused on the combined effects of credit and 
insurance on investment, and the effects of insurance on credit demand and vice 
versa.31 The evidence is mixed. When combining credit and insurance, some studies 
find credit with insurance increases investment (i.e., fertilizer purchase) (Hill and 
Viceisza, 2012), while others find that mandatory insurance actually reduces the 
demand for credit (Giné and Yang, 2009) or has no effect on investment and adoption 
of new technologies (Brick and Visser, 2014). Finally, Karlan et al. (2014) state that 
crop insurance alone increases farm investment, but when insurance is bundled with 
credit, it does not necessarily increase investment. Giné and Yang (2009) suggest that 
the bundling of insurance and credit may reduce investment due to farmers’ limited 
30  Systemic and highly covariate weather risks can be insured with the appropriate reinsurance. See 
Carter (2013) for a review on insurance partnerships for agricultural insurance markets.
31  See Marr et al. (2016) for a review of the most recent literature on index insurance and bundling 
insurance with credit.
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liability (i.e. certainty of debt relief in case of default). The idea is intuitive, namely 
that limited liability provides implicit insurance; thus, when an insurance premium 
must be paid, this results in lower demand for loans.
Although in theory, limited liability plays an important role in the links between 
credit and insurance, empirical evidence on how farmers’ individual liability affects 
the uptake of insured credit is scarce. Some studies are focusing on joint liability 
and credit, showing that joint liability promotes screening, monitoring, enforcement 
of repayment (Chowdhury 2005; Ghatak and Guinnane 1999)32 and reduces moral 
hazard among borrowers (Flatnes and Carter 2015).
Our objective is to examine the effect of farmers’ liability on the uptake of credit with 
and without mandatory insurance, using a lab-in-the-field experiment. We believe 
this is the first empirical study to address this question. We follow the theoretical 
model of Giné and Yang (2009), and conduct an experiment with coffee farmers in 
Costa Rica. Each farmer chooses how much to borrow in order to invest in his farm. 
Credit is offered either with or without mandatory insurance with a premium cost, 
under three types of liability scenarios. Under these scenarios, farmers have limited 
liability, or a 50% or 100% probability of full liability (i.e. the farmer is liable for 
sure). A laboratory approach allows us to isolate the impact of limited liability on 
the demand for loans with and without mandatory insurance. To abstract from 
other factors that are likely determinants of insurance uptake, our design involves 
an actuarially fairly priced insurance, with pay-out triggered by weather realization 
and without any basis risk.
Our results show uptake of credit with insurance is significantly higher than without 
insurance when farmers are liable for sure, but also when there is a 50% probability 
of full liability. Insurance has no effect on credit demand if farmers have limited 
liability (through the guarantee of public debt relief in case of bad weather). That 
is, we find no evidence that mandatory insurance reduces credit demand in case of 
limited liability, but we do see a positive effect on the demand for insured credit when 
farmers are liable, even if only in probabilistic terms.  Frequently authorities fear 
that making farmers fully liable for their debt might put them in a disadvantageous 
situation in case of extreme events. Our results show that limited liability should 
not be abandoned altogether in order to generate an increase the uptake of insured 
credit. Introducing uncertainty on the promise of limited liability is enough to 
increase insured investment, thereby reducing the vulnerability of farmers to 
shocks. Moreover, providing limited liability only in probabilistic terms should ease 
the burden on the authorities should there be a systemic shock to farmers.
32  Joint liability is when borrowers receive individual loans but form a group in which all members 
are mutually responsible for the total repayment to the lender (Flatnes and Carter 2015).
CHAPTER 4
4
76
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the 
literature on credit constraints, credit combined with insurance, and the role of 
limited liability; the third section presents a model on credit, investment and 
insurance, and develops our hypotheses; section four describes our experimental 
design and implementation procedures; section five presents the results; and the last 
section concludes the paper.
4.2 Literature review 
In this section, we briefly review the relevant literature on credit market imperfections. 
We then discuss previous evidence on bundling credit with mandatory insurance 
and the effects on farm investment. Finally, we reflect on the role of limited liability.
In the absence of insurance markets, “risk rationing,” as explained by Boucher et al. 
(2008), suggests that the borrower voluntarily withdraws from taking a loan, due 
to the risk of losing collateral (Giné and Yang 2009). Traditional formal insurance 
instruments can be used to manage risks, but such insurance services are basically 
non-existent in rural areas of developing countries (Carter et al. 2014). This lack 
of insurance markets might aggravate the effect of risk rationing on credit uptake 
(Boucher et al. 2008; Giné and Yang 2009). Hence, the combination of credit and 
crop insurance, therefore, could be applied as a mechanism to improve credit 
markets and encourage investment in the agricultural sector (Carter et al. 2014).
Some studies focus on bundling credit with mandatory insurance and the effects 
on risk rationality and farm investment. Regarding risk rationality, Cheng (2014) 
studies the effects of index insurance on risk rationed households in China. In his 
experiment, providing insurance to risk rationed farmers induced more than half 
of the farmers to apply for credit, with approximately two-thirds using the loan for 
productive investment rather than for consumption. Regarding farm investment, 
Carter et al. (2016) formally model and analyze the conditions under which index-
based crop insurance can be most effective. They show that insurance will have 
no impact on investment and technology adoption when risk is low and the loan 
is covered by limited liability contracts. Then the impact of the insurance will 
depend strongly on the collateral requirements by the lender. Under low collateral 
requirements, bundling credit and insurance will foremost benefit the lenders by 
bringing stability to the loan portfolio. In high collateral situations, even stand-
alone index insurance can considerably increase the adoption of new technologies 
through credit when the risk is covered by a well-designed index contract (Carter 
et al. 2016). 
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In an experimental study on the importance of capital constraints and uninsured 
risk, Karlan et al. (2014) examine if financial market imperfections discourage 
investment by smallholder farmers. They applied a randomized controlled trial 
with cash grants, rainfall insurance grants, and rainfall insurance sales in northern 
Ghana. They find strong responses of agricultural investment to the rainfall insurance 
grant, but relatively small effects of the cash grants. Hence, uninsured risk limits 
farmer investment, while farmers with insurance grants manage to find resources 
to increase investment on their farms. This clearly suggests that agricultural credit 
market policy alone is not sufficient to increase investment in the agricultural sector. 
Brick and Visser (2014) use a lab in the field experiment in South Africa to examine 
whether the provision of index insurance induces farmers to opt for riskier activities. 
They find that providing a loan with insurance does not increase investment in 
new technologies. Furthermore, risk-averse farmers are more likely to opt for 
traditional seeds than for high-yield seeds, regardless of the presence of insurance. 
Their experimental design reflects the reality of an index insurance product that 
minimizes the risk of rainfall variability, but the design does not account for other 
risk factors (i.e., basis risk) that might have affected their results given the high 
degree of risk aversion in their sample.
Giné and Yang (2009) implemented a field experiment in Malawi to examine 
whether production risk suppresses the demand for credit. They offered credit to 
purchase high-yielding seeds to a control group of farmers and credit bundled with 
index insurance (at actuarially fair price) to a treatment group. Their results show 
that take-up is lower when credit is bundled with insurance. They argue, and show 
theoretically, that limited liability provides enough implicit insurance, so farmers 
will prefer loans without mandatory insurance, which are less costly. 
To summarize, existing experimental and theoretical evidence is mixed. On the 
one hand, providing crop insurance increases farm investments (Elabed and Carter 
2014; Karlan et al. 2014; Hill and Viceisza 2012). On the other hand, when credit 
and insurance are combined, investment does not necessarily increase (Brick and 
Visser 2015; Karlan et al. 2014) and may even decline (Giné and Yang 2009). 
We now turn to a more extensive review of the role of limited liability. When 
production is low, farmers may be forced to default to maintain a subsistence level 
of consumption (Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega 2011). Default can occur involuntarily 
when associated with shocks or other risks that make borrowers unable to repay, 
but can be voluntary when lack of contract enforcement incentivizes borrowers to 
default even when they have the means to repay their loans (Ghosh et al. 2000). 
When contracts are subject to limited liability, borrowers are not forced to repay 
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the bank if returns on investment are less than loan repayment obligations (Ghosh 
et al. 2000). 
Agricultural banks and governments in developing countries often cooperate with 
poor agricultural borrowers to deal with losses from extreme events, by restructuring 
loans and through debt relief programs (Carter et al. 2007). This affects farmers’ 
liability, even though governmental assistance is not guaranteed (Carter et al. 2007; 
Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega 2011). After the strong effects of “El Niño” 1998 in 
Peru, for example, a government decree forced lenders to reschedule, meaning that 
farmers in default could pay later. Lenders believed these public sector interventions 
damaged the credit culture that had been formed in previous years (Trivelli et al. 
2006). In Costa Rica, the government applied debt relief six times between 2004 
and 2012, to assist borrowers who had received credit from development banks and 
were struggling to repay their loans (Gutierrez-Vargas 2015). 
Empirical evidence on the effect of farmers’ liability on uptake of credit combined 
with insurance is scarce. There is some evidence that farmers’ belies about availability 
of disaster relief is associated with less participation in insurance programs. A study 
by van Asseldonk et al. (2002) explores the role of producers’ belies in disaster 
relief in the Netherlands. Farmers’ willingness to pay to participate in a hypothetical 
insurance program is negatively and significantly associated with the producer’s 
belief that disaster relief will be available in the future. In addition, a recent study 
by Deryugina and Kirwan (2016) hypothesizes a similar pattern by estimating 
whether the Samaritan’s dilemma exists in U.S. agriculture.33 They instrument for 
disaster payments using political variation at county level and then estimate how 
expectations of receiving these payments affect farmers’ decisions. They find that 
bailout expectations reduce crop insurance coverage by reducing expenditures on 
premiums and inducing farmers to choose less generous insurance plans. At the 
same time, farmers also reduce farm labor and fertilizer use. 
Giné and Yang (2009) explicitly focus on the bundling of credit and insurance and 
refer to the existence of limited liability as a possible explanation for lower credit 
demand when credit is bundled with insurance. They show theoretically that a loan 
contract with limited liability provides enough implicit insurance, and therefore 
credit demand is predicted to decline with mandatory insurance that increases the 
price of credit. 
The next section presents their theory in more detail. 
33  First described by Buchanan (1975), the Samaritan’s dilemma explain how individuals who expect 
to be bailed out in times of crisis (e.g., natural disasters and financial crises) take on additional risk in 
response (Deryugina and Kirwan 2016).
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4.3 Theoretical model
This section describes the theoretical model for credit demand and insurance, 
building on the model developed by Giné and Yang (2009). We start with the general 
model setup and then illustrate the simple case of loans without insurance, followed 
by the case of loans with mandatory insurance. Finally, we introduce differences in 
farmers’ liability and discuss the hypotheses.
4.3.1 General model setup
To analyze farmers’ demand for credit, we consider a risk-averse farmer who is 
offered credit under two types of contract (with and without mandatory weather 
insurance) and three types of liability (limited liability, uncertainty about liability, 
or full liability for farmers). Farmers use the credit to invest in their agricultural 
production. Farm output depends on the level of investment, the return on 
investment, and the state of the weather. We define p and (1-p) as the probability of 
good (bad) weather. Following Giné and Yang (2009), we assume perfect correlation 
of investment returns and state of the weather, so that investment returns depend 
solely on the realization of the weather with a probability p = ½.
Without investment, farmers can realize a base output level YB in case of bad 
weather or YB + a in case of good weather34, while investment will increase output 
to the level YH in case of good weather and reduce output to the level YL in case of 
bad weather.35 We assume that expected output is higher when the farmer invests 
than without investment, so that
( ) ( )( ) 1 1+ + − < + −B B H L p Y a   p Y p Y p Y
Output with investment, YH  or  YL, depends on the amount invested, which is 
equal to the loan size C. In case the weather is good, investment gives the farmer a 
positive return r, so that YH = Yb + a + rC. In case of bad weather, the return is 
negative r, so that YL = Yb – rC.  
To invest, the farmer needs to borrow from a bank. We define i as the interest rate, W 
as the value of famers’ assets required as collateral for a loan of any given size, and 
R as the repayment of the loan, consisting of the amount borrowed and the interest 
due. We assume that the value of the collateral is enough to cover the repayment of 
the loan: ( )  1> + =W i C R  , and that output in the low state is not sufficient to repay 
34  In the original model by Giné and Yang (2009), the base output (i.e. from traditional seeds) does 
not change with the probabilities, so that ( ) 1< + −B H LY p Y p Y  .
35  We give farmers the example of investing in new coffee trees (see Appendix 4.2), when indeed a 
bad weather shock can lead to negative returns on investment.
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the bank (YL ‹  R). The lender can always seize up to the full value of farm output
YL  or  YH  in order to secure repayment of the loan, but only seizes other assets W 
with a probability φ. The three scenarios we analyze are limited liability (φ = 0), 
uncertain liability (φ = 1/2), and full liability (φ = 1).
4.3.2 Credit without insurance
First, consider the case when credit is offered without insurance and farmers decide 
whether to borrow and invest amount C.  When the farmer chooses not to invest, 
expected utility is defined as
( ) ( )1 1   
2 2
= + + + +B B BU u Y a W u Y W (1)
When the farmer chooses to invest, output can be high or low, depending on the 
weather. Consumption in the high output state is = − +H Hc  Y R W . In the low output 
state, consumption depends on whether the bank seizes (part of) the collateral to 
recover repayment, which it does with probability ϕ. Hence, expected utility with 
investment in the case of credit without insurance is given by:
4.3.3 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1  1  
2 2
φ φ = − + + − + + − U H LU u Y R W u Y R W u W (2)
Credit with mandatory insurance
Second, consider the case when credit is offered only in combination with weather 
insurance provided by the bank. The insurance premium π is set at an actuarially 
fair price (following Giné and Yang 2009), so that, in order to invest level C, farmers 
need to borrow an amount C + π. The total repayment to the bank for a loan 
with insurance is therefore . In states of bad weather, the insurance pays out the 
total amount RI = (1 + i ) (C + π). Given thectuarially frly priced insurance, the 
premium can be written as a function of repayment whout insurance (as in Giné and 
Yang, 2009), which gives   2= =
p
I RR R.  (see Appendix.4). Hence, expected utility of
investment when credit is combined with insurance is:
(3)( ) ( )1 1  2        2 2= − + + +I H LU u Y R W u Y W
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4.3.4 Differences ifarmers’ liability
We evae three different liability scenarios: limited liability (φ = 0), uncertain liability 
(φ = 1/2), and full liability (φ = 1). In general, credit demand with actuarially 
fairly priced insurance dends on the level of output in case of bad weather, YL , and 
on farmers’ risk averon.  In the next section, we use a constant relative risk aversion 
utility function (CRRA)36 and show the predictions of the theoretical model under 
the distinct features of our experimental design. 
tuitively, when farmers have limited liability and income in the low state is lower 
than repayment wh insurance YL ‹ R, loans without insurance should provide
sufficient implicit insurance. Thus, demand for uninsured credit should be higher 
than demand for insured credit. Then, when farmers are uncertain about their 
liability or are liable for sure, low values of YL and a contract without insurance 
still provide implicit insurance and thus higher expected utility for uninsured loans. 
However, when YL  increases, farmers’ default costs also increase and expected 
utility is higher for loans with insurance (Giné and Yang 2009, p4). 
4.4 Experimental design and implementation
To test our hypotheses in a controlled environment, we implemented a lab in the 
field experiment with coffee farmers in Costa Rica. The experiment is set up as a 
within-subject design in which each farmer faces six different treatments. In each 
treatment, the farmer chooses how much to borrow for investment in her farm, 
while facing ex-ante uncertainty about the weather, which can be good or bad. 
In the treatments, credit is offered either with or without mandatory insurance, 
and with farmers having limited liability (φ = 0), uncertainty about their liability 
(φ = 1/2), or full liability (φ = 1). We explain that farmers’ liability is the result of 
whether or not there will be debt relief by the government in case of bad weather. 
Each treatment is presented as a one-period decision-making game, independent 
from the other treatments.
The experimental design is developed in line with the previous model, in which 
good and bad weather occur with equal probability ( p = 1/2 ). We determined our 
experimental parameters with a CRRA risk aversion parameter (σ ) of ½ in mind but 
assess the model’s predictions across all levels of risk aversion. Base output (without 
any investment) is Yb = 2  in case of bad weather, while good weather will result in 
additional output over base output equal to a = 1 (Hill and Viceisza 2012). Farmers 
can choose to invest zero, one or two units of capital C. If the weather is good, 
36  Constant relative risk aversion utility function: ( )
1-  ; 0 1; 0
1-
σ
σ σ
σ
= < < =
ccu  indicates risk neutrality and
0σ >  indices risk aversion.
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investment gives the farmer a positive return over the capital (r = 5): YH = Yb + 
a + rC. In case of bad weather, the return is negative (r = -1) and: YL = Yb – C.  
In each of the six treatments, farmers are given an endowment (W = 3) that can serve 
as collateral. This endowment is sufficient to guarantee the maximum uninsured 
repayment amount (W > R), with the interest rate fixed at i =0.10 throughout the 
experiment. Farmers are told that their asset endowment can be seen as farmland, 
housing, or other properties that the lender can take in case of default. Farmers’ 
consumption will depend on the amount invested C, the weher draw, and whether 
or not their collateral is seized by the bank.  One unit of income or csumption in the 
experiment is set equal to 1,000 Costa Rican Colones (CRC).37
Figure 4.1 shows expected utility without credit (zero investment) and with maximum 
investment (C=2), with or without insurance, for different risk aversion parameter 
values and while lng the expected returns constant. As Figure 4.1 shows, for low 
levels of risk aversion, the expected utility associated with maximum investment is 
always higher than the expected utility without investment, whether or not credit 
comes with insurance. Yet when comparing insured and uninsured credit, it is clear 
that farmers’ liability and risk aversion determine which type of credit is preferred. 
In case of limited liability, uninsured credit provides higher expected utility than 
insured credit. With uncertain liability, insured credit provides higher expected 
utility for relatively risk-averse farmers. Finally, with full liability, insured credit is 
always the best option regardless of the risk aversion parameter. 
Farmers in our experiment choose their level of credit under each type of loan (insured 
or uninsured) and liability scenario, rather than choosing between an insured and 
uninsured loan. Hence, our theoretical model predicts that, when farmers have limited 
liability, credit demand should be higher if credit is not bundled with insurance than 
if credit is bundled with insurance, unless farmers are very risk-averse in which case 
the difference becomes small. When farmers are uncertain about their liability and 
have relatively low risk aversion, credit demand should also be higher if credit is not 
bundled with insurance. With uncertain liability and high levels of risk aversion, credit 
demand should be higher if credit is bundled with insurance. When farmers are liable 
for sure, credit demand should be higher if credit is bundled with insurance. 
Each of the six treatments was repeated three times to be able to perform several 
robustness tests. We explain that rounds are independent from each other, and that 
one round will be randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. The 
draw of the round for payment and weather is determined in private for each farmer. 
Selection of the payment round was done by taking one chip out of a bag with 18 
37  1000 CRC equals approximately two US dollars. 
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chips numbered 1-18, while the weather draw was determined with the toss of a coin. 
Final payment consisted of a show-up fee of 2000 CRC plus the level of consumption 
the farmer reached in the selected round. Detailed instructions are included in the 
complete experimental protocol in Appendix 4.2.
Farmers participating in the experiment were selected from two coffee regions, Brunca 
and Tarrazu, using stratified random sampling according to the density of coffee plots. 
Regions were selected to capture the variation in altitude and effects of a coffee rust 
epidemic in 2012-13; all farmers were surveyed in 2014 as part of a different study 
(Chapter 2). We contacted all surveyed farmers and conducted thirteen experimental 
sessions at local primary schools during the second and third week of October 2015.38 
Sessions were organized one per day during the afternoon, with on average 10 farmers 
per session, who were assigned randomly to individual desks around the classroom. 
The order of treatments was selected randomly in the first two sessions, repeated in 
subsequent sessions, and alternating between the first and second order.
In total, 134 (46% of the 2014 survey participants) farmers participated in the 
experiment. Two farmers had incomplete responses for the experiment; these are 
excluded from the analyses.  Table 4.1 presents farmers’ characteristics for the survey 
and experimental participants. Differences in means (t-test) show no differences 
between the two groups for most of the variables, except that farmers participating 
in the experimental sessions have on average a smaller total area planted with coffee. 
We show in the next section that this has no effect on the outcomes of the experiment. 
Hence, our results can be seen as representative for the two coffee regions.
Table 4.1 | Variables and sample means for survey and experimental sample.
Survey 
2014
Experiment 
 2015 t-test
Mean sd Mean sd Difference p-value
Age (years) 51.76 13.62 51.52 13.04 0.25 0.828
Women 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 -0.01 0.783
Education (years) 5.79 2.61 5.79 2.78 0.00 0.993
Region (% from Brunca) 0.47 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.08* 0.053
% income from coffee 56.94 36.23 57.83 35.63 -0.89 0.780
Total coffee area (ha) 3.48 4.61 2.53 2.45 0.96*** 0.000
Affected by leaf rust 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.39 0.00 0.975
Observations 294 132
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
38  Farmers were offered two possible dates to attend a workshop session at two nearby villages.
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Figure 4.1 | Expected CRRA utility varying the risk aversion parameter.
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4.5 Empirical strategy and results
To analyze the effect of farmers’ liability on demand for credit with and without 
insurance, our main dependent variable is the average amount borrowed across the 
three repeated rounds within each treatment. Figure 4.2 presents the distribution of 
farmers’ credit demand across the experimental treatments. Credit demand varies 
considerably across treatments. Farmers are more likely to demand the highest level 
of credit (2000 CRC) when governmental debt relief ensures limited liability for the 
two types of loans, with insurance (52%) and without insurance (58%). 
Comparing Figures 4.2a and 4.2b, there appears to be little impact of mandatory 
insurance on farmers’ credit demand when farmers are not liable, in line with 
theoretical predictions at high levels of risk aversion (see Figure 4.1). Compared 
to limited liability, credit demand is lower when farmers are uncertain about 
their liability and especially when they are liable for sure. Comparing Figures 
4.2c and 4.2d, as well as Figures 4.2e and 4.2f, we see that, with uncertain or 
full liability, mandatory insurance increases demand for credit. Again, this is in 
line with predictions from the model, and suggests the farmers in our sample have 
intermediate to high levels of risk aversion.
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 explores differences in means between treatments using 
a paired t-test. Comparing means across the rows of Table 4.2 again shows that 
liability decreases total credit demand. We also confirm that uptake of loans with 
insurance is significantly higher than without insurance when farmers are liable or 
when there is uncertainty about their liability. We find no significant differences 
between demand for loans with and without insurance in case of limited liability. 
Table 4.2 | Paired t-test for differences in credit demand means across treatments.
Without insurance With insurance t-test N
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error Difference p-value
Limited liability 1.39 0.053 1.36 0.052 -0.03 0.593 132
Uncertainty 0.62 0.050 1.14 0.052 0.53*** 0.000 132
Full liability 0.51 0.051 0.96 0.053 0.45*** 0.000 132
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 4.2 | Credit demand by treatment.
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Figure 4.3 | Differences in credit demand across treatments.
To formally analyze the effect of mandatory insurance and liability, we estimate the 
following equation:
1 2 3 4 5  _   _    _  _   α β β β β β γ ε= + + + + × + × + +ijk j k k j k j k i ijY Insurance Uncertain liability Full liability Insurance Uncertain liability Insurance Full liability
1 2 3 4 5 _   _     _   _    α β β β β β γ ε= + + + + × + × + +ijk j k k j k j k i ijY Insurance Uncertain liability Full liability Insurance Uncertain liability Insurance Full liability
(4)
Our dependent variable Yijk  is the arage amount borrowed by farmer i in insurance 
treatment j and under liability treatment k, γi are farmer fixed effects, and εij is the 
error term. The average amount borrowed is measured as the average of all three 
rounds within a treatment. The treatment with no insurance and limited liability is 
taken as the reference. Standard errors are clustered by farmer.  
In Table 4.3, the first column shows that the introduction of mandatory insurance 
has no significant effect on credit demand when liability is limited. This result differ 
from Giné and Yang (2009) where take-up was significantly lower among farmers 
offered insurance with the loan in the presence of limited liability. Hence, we do 
not find evidence for their prediction that insurance reduces credit demand in case 
of limited liability.
On the other hand, the coefficients on the interaction terms show that, when there 
is uncertainty about liability or full liability, the effect of mandatory insurance is 
positive and highly significant. Moreover, the effect is large: insurance increases 
credit demand by around 0.5 (or 500 CRC), which is more than one-third of the 
sample average (1.38), and close to one standard deviation (0.60). 
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Table 4.3 | Impact of insurance and liability on credit demand.
Dependent variable: average amount borrowed
Full 
sample
First round per 
treatment dropped
Subsample 
treatment order 1
Subsample 
treatment order 2
Insurance -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.03
[0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.08]
Uncertain liability -0.77*** -0.83*** -0.88*** -0.66***
[0.06] [0.07] [0.08] [0.09]
Full liability -0.88*** -0.95*** -0.97*** -0.79***
[0.06] [0.07] [0.08] [0.10]
Insurance * Uncertain liability 0.55*** 0.52*** 0.58*** 0.52***
[0.06] [0.07] [0.09] [0.09]
Insurance * Full liability 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.53*** 0.43***
[0.06] [0.07] [0.09] [0.08]
Constant 1.39*** 1.41*** 1.41*** 1.38***
[0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Mean dependent variable 1.38 1.41 1.39 1.36
Observations 792 792 414 378
R-squared within subjects 0.417 0.385 0.487 0.348
Number of subjects 132 132 69 63
Note: standard errors clustered by respondent are shown in in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We perform a number of robustness checks. First, we drop the first observation 
of each round, as this may be considered a practice round, after which farmers 
are better able to determine their preferred level of credit. Hence, the dependent 
variable is the average amount borrowed across the second and third round of 
the respective treatment (results in the second column of Table 4.3). Second, to 
ensure results are not driven by the order of the rounds in the experiment, we split 
the sample according to the order of treatments: each session followed one of two 
possible (randomly determined) treatment orders, so we analyze whether results 
differ between the two groups of experiment sessions (third and fourth columns of 
Table 4.3). In all estimations, we find very similar results.
4.5.1 Heterogeneous treatment effect
In this section, we present results for heterogeneous effects of treatment. We start 
with verifying whether treatment effects depend on farmers’ total area planted with 
coffee. Recall from Table 4.1 that coffee area is significantly smaller for farmers 
in the experiment sample, compared to the total random sample of farmers that 
were invited to participate. Results in Table 4.4 show there are no differences by 
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farmers’ total coffee area. This suggests our results are representative of farmers in 
the two regions, even though our sample is not representative in terms of coffee 
area planted.
Table 4.4 | Heterogeneous effects for coffee area. 
Dependent variable: average amount borrowed (1)
Insurance -0.06
[0.07]
Uncertain liability -0.70***
[0.08]
Full liability -0.77***
[0.09]
Insurance*Uncertain liability 0.52***
[0.09]
Insurance*Full liability 0.46***
[0.09]
Coffee area*Insurance 0.01
[0.02]
Coffee area*Uncertain liability -0.03
[0.02]
Coffee area*Full liability -0.04*
[0.02]
Coffee area*Insurance*Uncertain liability 0.01
[0.02]
Coffee area*Insurance*Full liability 0.01
[0.02]
Constant 1.39***
[0.04]
Fix effects Y
Mean dependent variable 1.38
Observations 792
R-squared with-in subjects 0.425
Number of subjects 132
Note: standard errors clustered by respondent are shown in in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We analyze other heterogeneous effects across farmers’ social and financial 
indicators (Appendix 4.1). Evidence from previous studies suggests there is a 
positive relationship between credit take-up and farmer’s education and income 
(Giné and Yang 2009), and that previous exposure to weather shocks can affect 
the take-up of credit bundled with insurance (Hill and Viceisza 2012). We analyze 
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heterogeneity by farmers’ age, gender, years of schooling, percentage of income 
coming from coffee harvest, and having been affected by other shocks in the past, 
including their experience with the recent coffee leaf rust epidemic in 2012-13. 
However, we do not find significant effects of these variables in interaction with 
treatments (Appendix 4.1, Table A1). 
Our lab in the field experiment design was relatively simple and easy to understand 
for farmers, compared to previous field experiments evaluating existing insurance 
programs (which typically carry basis risk and involve trust concerns due to lack 
of information). This may explain why we find no differences based on education, 
income, and previous experience with shocks. Another explanation could be that 
our experimental sample and the farmers’ population in our study regions in general 
is very homogeneous in their socioeconomic characteristics, and hence we do not 
have sufficient variability in the data to detect heterogeneous effects. 
4.6 Conclusions and discussion
In this paper, examine the effect of farmers’ liability on the uptake of credit with 
and without mandatory insurance, using a lab-in-the-field experiment. We follow 
the theoretical model of Giné and Yang (2009) and conduct an experiment with 
coffee farmers in Costa Rica. Using their conceptual model, we explore the effect of 
insurance on the credit demand under different degrees of liability. 
Our results show that the uptake of loans bundled with insurance is significantly 
higher than uptake of loans without insurance, both when farmers are liable for 
sure for their debt, and interestingly when there is uncertainty about their liability. 
When farmers are not liable for their debt, i.e. under limited liability, the uptake 
of credit is high irrespective of whether the loans are insured or not. This last 
result differs from Giné and Yang (2009) where take-up was significantly lower 
among farmers offered insurance with the loan in the presence of limited liability. 
A possible explanation is that by design, in our experiment there was never a binary 
choice between loans with and without insurance. Farmers were offered one option 
at a time, and then decided on the level of investment. In the presence of limited 
liability, acquiring debt is very attractive, and the saliency of costly insurance is 
not the decisive factor. Moreover, it could also be that farmers considered that 
governmental support (reflected as limited liability for farmers) and insurance are 
not necessarily substitutes of each other, but complementary policies. 
Our results suggest that in order to increase the uptake of insurance as a strategy 
to increase private investment and reduce the vulnerability of farmers to shocks, it 
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is important that farmers are liable with at least some probability. Governments in 
developing countries have accustomed farmers to enjoy limited liability when in 
reality there is always uncertainty about the level of governmental resources. We 
show that clearly and credibly communicating this level of uncertainty can result 
in increased uptake of insured credit and hence in farmers being better covered 
against risk. 
In terms of policy design, our results show that the “principle” of limited liability 
does not have be abandoned altogether in order to generate an increase in the uptake 
of insured credit. Because of public pressure and a concern for the well-being of 
farmers in rural areas, authorities are typically reluctant to make farmers fully liable 
for debt that was validly acquired by farmers in the pursuit of their trade, but that 
has gone wrong because of extreme hydro-meteorological events or pests. According 
to our results, introducing uncertainty on the promise of limited liability is enough 
to increase insured investment, thereby reducing the vulnerability of farmers to 
shocks. Moreover, providing limited liability only in probabilistic terms should ease 
the burden on the authorities should there be a systemic shock to farmers.
An important question we do not address in this study is how to design insurance 
products. More research needs to be done on the supply side, taking into account the 
lender’s standpoint and other conditions under which financial instruments like the 
weather index insurance is likely to work.  In theory, well-designed insurance can 
incentivize investment in new technologies by small-scale farmers, but the impact of 
the insurance depends strongly on the collateral requirements by the lender (Carter 
et al. 2016). Lenders in developing countries are diverse, from private companies 
to state support entities and from informal to informal lenders, with different 
characteristics and requirements that shape the environment for the sustainability 
of credit and insurance instruments. 
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4.7 Appendices
Appendix 4.1 | Additional results.
Table A1 | Heterogeneous effects by farmers’ characteristics.
Dependent variable: 
average amount borrowed
Interaction variable (X)
Age
(2)
Female
(3)
Schooling1
(4)
Income2
(5)
Shocks3
(6)
Insurance 0.1830 -0.0339 -0.0746 -0.0313 -0.0145
[0.1978] [0.0539] [0.1500] [0.1127] [0.1333]
Uncertainty -1.3330*** -0.7684*** -0.4653*** -0.7045*** -0.9420***
[0.2191] [0.0571] [0.1376] [0.1128] [0.1236]
Full liability -1.8480*** -0.8870*** -0.5074*** -0.7490*** -1.0000***
[0.2301] [0.0642] [0.1649] [0.1303] [0.1404]
Insurance*Uncertain liability 0.4735* 0.5706*** 0.5636*** 0.5234*** 0.6377***
[0.2530] [0.0637] [0.1546] [0.1254] [0.1744]
Insurance*Full liability 0.8242*** 0.4802*** 0.2668* 0.3320*** 0.4348***
[0.2326] [0.0645] [0.1535] [0.1194] [0.1441]
X*insurance -0.0041 0.0577 0.0081 -0.0002 -0.0161
[0.0037] [0.1953] [0.0259] [0.0016] [0.1448]
X*Uncertain liability 0.0109** -0.0412 -0.0531** -0.0008 0.2050
[0.0042] [0.2625] [0.0206] [0.0017] [0.1395]
X*Full liability 0.0187*** 0.0299 -0.0650** -0.0023 0.1407
[0.0044] [0.2412] [0.0276] [0.0018] [0.1566]
X*Insurance*Uncertain liability 0.0015 -0.1659 -0.0018 0.0006 -0.1025
[0.0050] [0.2469] [0.0226] [0.0018] [0.1864]
X*Insurance*Full liability -0.0066 0.0198 0.0372 0.0028 0.0576
[0.0044] [0.2365] [0.0242] [0.0017] [0.1599]
Constant 1.3914*** 1.3914*** 1.3914*** 1.3942*** 1.3914***
[0.0383] [0.0391] [0.0384] [0.0406] [0.0390]
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dependent variable 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38
Observations 792 792 792 756 792
R-squared within subjects 0.451 0.420 0.438 0.411 0.421
Number of subjects 132 132 132 126 132
Note: standard errors clustered by respondent are shown in in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Years of schooling
2  Percentage of the total household income coming from coffee farming
3 Dummy variable of being affected by shocks in the past including their experience with the recent 
coffee leaf rust epidemic in 2012-13
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Appendix 4.2 | General Experimental Instructions.
I. Welcome procedures
1. Meet people at the door; request ID.
2. Match ID with survey ID.
3. Write the ID survey number in the decision sheet booklet.
4. Give them the closed decision sheet booklet. Stress that they can’t open the booklet until indicated
by the coordinator.
5. Invite them to sit, assigning them randomly across the room.
II. General instructions for farmers and experimenters
[START POWERPOINT PRESENTATION]
☼ [Slide 1] Good afternoon. Today you will participate in a decision-making workshop. You are invited as
a follow-up to a survey conducted last year. The exercises are based on real-life decisions that will allow us to 
learn from your experience, according to the decisions made during the workshop. The workshop will last about 
two hours, and we need to stay together until the end. At the end of the workshop, you will be compensated with 
real money, the amount of which will depend on the decisions made and on chance. You will receive a minimum 
payment of 2,000 colones, plus the result of your decisions in the workshop exercises.
We are going to read the instructions together. First the general instructions and then gradually through the 
decision game rounds. Listen carefully to the instructions for each choice. Look carefully at the possible payments 
and the probabilities associated with each choice before making a decision. Remember that your final earnings 
will depend on the decisions you make and on chance. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and one of my colleagues or I will come to help you! Please 
do not hesitate to ask a question if you do not understand. There are no right or wrong answers. Your decisions 
are personal and depend on your own preferences. Your decisions are also anonymous. This means the decisions 
can only be yours and your choices will remain private. So, please remain quiet and do not share your decisions 
or talk to the person sitting next to you. This is very important! 
[GO THROUGH INSTRUCTIONS WITHOUT INVITING QUESTIONS. AVOID PUBLIC QUESTIONS]
☼ [Slide 2] To borrow or not to borrow money from the bank
You choices today consist of deciding whether or not to take a loan to invest in your farm.  If you decide to 
invest, just like any loan contract, you must have illiquid assets as a guarantee in case you cannot pay the loan. 
These assets can be your own farmland, house or other properties that are taken by the lender if you can´t pay 
back what you borrowed. 
Since we cannot quantify what you possess, today you all have the same value of wealth as a guarantee, equal 
to 3,000 colones, before you make your decision.
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☼ [Slide 3] You pay an interest rate
You decide how much to borrow.  You can borrow nothing, 1,000, 2,000 or 3,000 colones. The decision is 
yours. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. 
Like any credit, you must pay an interest rate to the Bank. The interest rate is 10% of the amount you 
decide to borrow. This means that, according to the table below, if you decide to invest and borrow 1,000 
colones from the bank, you have to pay back 1,100 colones. If you invest and borrow 2,000 colones, you 
have to pay back 2,200 colones. If you decide not to borrow, then you pay nothing back to the bank. Do you 
have any questions?
You invest and borrow You pay back to the bank
₡0 ₡0
₡1,000 ₡1,100
₡2,000 ₡2,200
☼ [Slide 4] Your investment is risky and depends on the weather
Note that the result depends on the weather. For example, consider renewing your farm with a new variety of 
coffee. If things go well and the weather conditions are favorable, you get a profit. However, if things go wrong 
and there is a lack of rain or a hurricane to damage your new coffee plantation, then you will have a much 
lower output than if you had not invested.
The probability of a good or bad result is 50/50. That is, after deciding how much to borrow to invest, you 
have to throw a coin. If the coin marks “Crown,” that means there will be good weather and if the coin marks 
“Shield,” that means there will be bad weather. If you choose not to invest, you will have an output of 3,000 
colones if there is good weather and production of 2,000 colones if weather conditions are not favorable and 
affect the harvest.
On the other hand, if you decide to borrow and invest, there is a chance that things will go well and that you will 
earn more money, or that things will go badly and you will be worse off than without investing. If you borrow 
and invest 1,000 colones and there is good weather, you might get 8,000 colones and if bad weather 1,000 
colones. If you borrow and invest 2,000 colones and there is good weather, you might get 13,000 colones, and 
if bad weather zero colones. Do you have any questions?
You invest and borrow Good weather Bad weather 
₡0 ₡3,000 ₡2,000
₡1,000 ₡8,000 ₡1,000
₡2,000 ₡13,000 ₡0
Do you have any questions? [WAIT AND EXPLAIN AGAIN IF NECESSARY]
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☼ [Slide 4] Production + Capital – Payment to the bank
After the good or bad weather determines the outcome of your investment, you will still have to pay the Bank 
according to your loan. Remember that everyone has the same initial capital as collateral, which is equal to ₡ 
3,000. Therefore, your final output is production + capital – what you have to pay the bank.
You invest and borrow Good weather Bad weather 
₡0 ₡3,000 + ₡3,000 – ₡0 = ₡6,000 ₡2,000 + 3,000 – ₡0 = ₡5,000
₡1.000 ₡8,000 + ₡3,000  – 1,100 = ₡9,900 ₡1,000 + ₡3,000 – 1,100 = ₡2,900
₡2.000 ₡13,000 + ₡3,000 – 2,200 = ₡13,800 ₡0 +₡3,000 – 2,200 = ₡800
Any questions?  [WAIT AND EXPLAIN AGAIN IF NECESSARY]
☼ [Slide 5] Weather insurance
Pay attention to the instructions. Sometimes the loan offered is bundled with insurance. This means that, when 
you take the loan, it includes mandatory insurance. The benefits from the insurance are that it takes care 
of repaying the bank when bad weather events occur, securing your assets. However, the insurance is costly. 
Therefore, when the weather is good, there is a cost reflected by the amount to repay to the bank. 
You invest and borrow You pay back the bankwith NO insurance
You pay back to the bank
with insurance
₡0 ₡0 ₡0
₡1.000 ₡1,100 ₡2,200
₡2.000 ₡2,200 ₡4,400
Do you have any questions? [WAIT AND EXPLAIN AGAIN IF NECESSARY]
☼ [Slide 6] Government help in case of bad weather
Sometimes when a bad weather event occurs and affects an entire sector, for example, coffee production, the 
government takes action to relieve the consequences of the shock. In the past, the government has applied debt 
forgiveness on credit loans when farmers affected by shocks can´t pay back the banks. Please pay attention to 
the instructions, since in some rounds the government will apply debt forgiveness when bad weather events occur 
and sometimes it might help according to a probability. Do you have any questions?
 [WAIT AND EXPLAIN AGAIN IF NECESSARY]
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Debt forgiveness when bad weather events occur
• No help → You have to pay the bank
• Debt forgiveness → You don’t have to pay the bank
• Depends on a probability →
- You have to pay the bank
- You don’t have to pay the bank
☼ [Slide 7] Payment procedure
You will take 18 decision tasks. After you have taken all the decisions, one of your decisions will be drawn for 
real payment. This means the amounts indicated in the decision problem will be paid out for real.
At the end of this workshop, one of the 18 decision tasks will be drawn at random by each of you, by taking 
one chip out of this bag with equal probability for each decision task to be extracted for payment. You can 
check that in the bag there will be precisely 18 numbered chips, one for each decision previously taken. Then, 
you will draw a coin to pay you according to the good weather or bad weather. Do you have any questions?
[WAIT AND EXPLAIN AGAIN IF NECESSARY]
Appendix 4.3 | Example of decision sheet.
EXAMPLE
 3 Credit does not require insurance
 3 The government cannot help and the Bank will seize your properties if no payment
POSSIBLE RESULTS
Amount borrowed Good weather Bad weather Mark your answer
₡ 0 ₡ 6,000 ₡ 5,000 
₡ 1,000 ₡ 9,900 ₡ 2,900 
 ₡ 2,000 ₡ 13,800 ₡ 800 
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Appendix 4.4 | Case of loan bundled with insurance.
To analyze the case of loans with mandatory insurance, we need to define the joint probabilities of income 
and weather. Using the definition of correlation between income and weather ( ) ( )  1 1ε ρ= − −p p q q , 
the joint probabilities can be rewritten as (Giné and Yang, 2009, p.3): 
Pr(YH, h) = pq + ε Pr(YL, h)  = (1-p)q – ε
Pr(YH, l) =  p(1-q) – ε Pr(YL, l)  =(1-p)(1-q) + ε
Following Giné and Yang (2009), the insurance always pays in states of bad weather, both the loan (1 + 
i)C and the insurance premium π.  The farmer repayment to the bank is: RI = (1 + i)(C + π) for a loan 
with mandatory insurance and the priced fair premium for the insurance is:  (1 + i) π = (1 - q) RI  and 
simplifies to ( )1  π −= q C
q
  as follows: 
1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )Iq R q i C q C C qC qi i ππ π π π− − + += = = − + = − + −+ +
1( )q Cq C qC
q
π π π π −− + = − → =
Then, the amount to repay the bank with mandatory insurance writes as a function of the loan without 
insurance I RR
q
= .   
11 1 1 1( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )I q C C RR i C i C i i C
q q q
π
 −
= + + = + + = + = + = 
 
We assume p = q = ½  and rewrite the joint probabilities. Then ( ) ( )  1 1   
4
ρε ρ= − − =p p q q and the joint 
probabilities are:
Pr(YH, h) = pq + ε =  
( )1
4
ρ+ Pr(YL, h)  = (1-p)q – ε  = 
( )1
4
ρ−
Pr(YH, l) =  p(1-q) – ε  = 
( )1
4
ρ− Pr(YL, l)  =(1-p)(1-q) + ε  =
( )1
4
ρ+
Finally, the repayment of the loan with insurance becomes 2RR R
q
= = .
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Does Eco-Certification Have Environmental Benefits?
Organic Coffee in Costa Rica
Abstract
Eco-certification of coffee, timber, and other high-value agricultural commodities 
is increasingly widespread. In principle, it can improve commodity producers’ 
environmental performance, even in countries where state regulation is weak. 
However, eco-certification will have limited environmental benefits if, as one would 
expect, it disproportionately selects for producers already meeting certification 
standards. Rigorous evaluations of the environmental effects of eco-certification in 
developing countries that control for selection bias are virtually nonexistent. To 
help fill this gap, we use detailed farm-level data to analyze the environmental 
impacts of organic coffee certification in central Costa Rica. We use propensity score 
matching to control for selection bias. We find that organic certification improves 
coffee growers’ environmental performance. It significantly reduces chemical input 
use and increases adoption of some environmentally friendly management practices.
This chapter is based on: 
Blackman, A. and Naranjo M.A. (2012), “Does Eco-Certification Have Environmental 
Benefits? Organic Coffee in Costa Rica”. Ecological Economics.  vol: 83: 60–68.
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5.1 Introduction
Certifying agricultural commodities as having been produced in an environmentally 
friendly manner is increasingly popular. For example, in the last half of the 
2000s, sales of organic, Rainforest Alliance, and other types of eco-certified coffee 
quadrupled and now account for 8% of global exports. During this same period, 
the area certified by the two largest forest eco-labeling umbrella organizations, the 
Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification and the Forest Stewardship 
Council, doubled and now comprises 18% of globally managed forests (Potts et al. 
2010).
According to proponents, eco-certification has the potential to improve commodity 
producers’ environmental performance (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005; Rice and 
Ward 1996). In theory, it can do this by enabling the consumer to differentiate 
among commodities based on their environmental attributes. This capability 
facilitates price premiums and better market access for certified producers, which, 
in turn, create financial incentives for them to meet certification standards.
If that logic holds, eco-certification may help address pressing environmental 
problems associated with agricultural commodities in developing countries. 
Growing and processing bananas, cocoa, coffee, timber, and other high-value 
agricultural products in poor countries often entail deforestation, soil erosion, and 
agrochemical pollution. These problems are difficult to tackle using conventional 
command-and-control regulation because producers are typically small, numerous, 
and geographically dispersed while regulatory institutions are undermanned and 
underfunded (Wehrmeyer and Mulugetta 1999). Eco-certification has the potential 
to sidestep these constraints by creating a private-sector system of economic 
incentives, monitoring, and enforcement.
Certification programs that aim to improve commodity producers’ environmental 
performance also faces critical challenges. They must ensure that standards, 
monitoring, and enforcement are stringent enough to exclude poorly performing 
producers. Also, they must offer price premiums high enough to offset the costs of 
certification. Even if these two challenges are met, eco-certification schemes still 
can be undermined by selection effects. Commodity producers already meeting 
certification standards have strong incentives to select into certification programs: 
they need not make additional investments in environmental management to pass 
muster and can obtain price premiums and other benefits. However, certification 
programs that mainly attract such producers will have limited effects on producer 
behavior and few environmental benefits. 
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Although a growing academic literature examines commodity certification, we 
still know little about whether it affects producers’ environmental performance. As 
discussed below, few studies evaluate the environmental impacts of certification 
and many of those that do rely on problematic methods that bias their results. To 
identify certification impacts, an evaluation must construct a credible counterfactual 
outcome, that is, an estimate of what environmental outcomes for certified entities 
would have been had they not been certified. However, most evaluations use 
problematic counterfactual outcomes: either certified producers’ precertification 
outcomes or uncertified producers’ outcomes. In the first case, results are biased 
whenever outcomes change during the study period because of factors unrelated 
to certification (including changes in commodity prices, input prices, weather 
conditions, and technology, all of which are common). In the second case, results are 
biased whenever commodity producers are already meeting certification standards 
disproportionately select into certification. 
A variety of ex-post statistical methods are available to overcome these problems 
including propensity score matching and instrumental variables (Ferraro 2009; 
Frondel and Schmidt 2005). A comprehensive review of the published empirical 
studies of certification of agricultural commodities and tourism operations found only 
two that use such methods to identify environmental impacts (Blackman and Rivera 
2011). (Most empirical studies focus on certification’s effects on the socioeconomic 
status of the producer, e.g., on-farm profit, household income, health, education, 
etc.) Neither concerns the certification of coffee—one of the most prominent high-
value agricultural commodities produced developing countries, both in terms of 
economic value and eco-certification (Blackman and Rivera 2011; Potts et al. 2010).
As a first step toward filling that gap, this paper presents an evaluation of the 
environmental impacts of organic coffee certification in central Costa Rica. We 
use rich farm-level data from a recent census of coffee growers and a geographic 
information system (GIS) that comprises detailed geophysical data. We rely on 
propensity score matching to control for selection bias. We find that certification does 
have an environmental benefit. It significantly reduces the use of all three chemical 
inputs for which we have data (pesticides, chemical fertilizers, and herbicides) and 
spurs adoption of at least one of the four environmentally friendly management 
practices for which we have data (organic fertilizer). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section briefly reviews 
the literature evaluating the environmental effects of coffee certification. The third 
section presents background on coffee production, organic certification, and our 
study area. The fourth section discusses our empirical strategy and data. The fifth 
section presents our results, and the last section discusses their policy implications. 
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5.2 Literature
Rigorous evaluations of the environmental impacts of certification are rare, and 
those that have been conducted often fail to find significant effects. Blackman and 
Rivera (2011), reviewed more than 200 published studies of agricultural commodity 
and tourism certification and identified only two ex post quantitative studies using 
farm-level data that both constructed a reasonable counterfactual and focused on 
environmental (versus socioeconomic) impacts: Rivera and de Leon (2004) and 
Rivera, de Leon and Koerber (2006). Both studies conclude that the environmental 
effects of certification are negligible. They analyze the Sustainable Slopes Program, 
a voluntary certification program established by the U.S. ski areas’ industry 
association. Using a Heckman procedure to control for self-selection bias, they 
compare third-party environmental performance ratings of certified and uncertified 
ski areas. They find that in the Sustainable Slopes Program’s early years, uncertified 
areas actually had better environmental performance than certified areas, and 
subsequently, they had equivalent but not superior levels. 
As for ex-post quantitative studies using farm-level data focusing on coffee eco-
certification, to our knowledge, all existing published studies that construct a 
reasonable counterfactual focus on socioeconomic impacts (Blackman and Rivera 
2011). Three less rigorous studies analyze environmental impacts by comparing 
environmental outcomes for certified farms and unmatched uncertified farms and 
reach mixed conclusions despite the fact that failure to control for self-selection bias 
typically generates overly optimistic results. Jaffee (2008) compare environmental 
(and social) outcomes for Fair Trade and certified organic growers and unmatched 
uncertified growers in Oaxaca, Mexico, and find that certified growers adopt more 
soil conservation practices. Similarly, Martínez-Torres (2008) compares ecological 
indicators (soil erosion, number of shade species, and leaf litter depth) for certified 
organic and unmatched uncertified growers in Chiapas, Mexico, and finds that 
organic growers perform better. However, Philpott et al. (2007) compare ecological 
indicators for Fair Trade/organic certified growers and unmatched uncertified 
growers in Chiapas, Mexico, and find no differences between the two subsamples. 
Additional unpublished or purely qualitative studies of the environmental effects 
of coffee eco-certification also generate mixed results. As for unpublished studies, 
Quispe-Guanca (2007) uses survey data on changes in environmental management 
practices before and after certification (organic, FT, Rainforest Alliance, Utz Kapeh, 
and C.A.F.E. Practices) or a sample of 106 certified farms in Costa Rica. He finds 
that although all farms reduced herbicide use after certification, most did not reduce 
other agrochemicals. Similarly, Martínez-Sánchez (2008) compares ecological 
indicators for ten certified organic and ten unmatched uncertified farms in northern 
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Nicaragua. He finds that organic farms do not have significantly different shade 
levels, bird diversity, or bird abundance. 
As for qualitative studies, Bray et al. (2002) focus on the environmental (and 
socioeconomic) effects of organic certification among producers belonging to a 
single cooperative in Chiapas, Mexico and conclude that producers perceived that 
certification led to the elimination of “environmentally harmful” practices. Utting-
Chamorro (2005) and Utting (2009) examine the environmental (and socioeconomic) 
effects Fair Trade certification among producers belonging to two cooperatives in 
northern Nicaragua. She finds only that certification has increased awareness of 
environmental protection. Finally, van der Vossen (2005) reviews the literature and 
catalogs a number of adverse environmental and economic effects of the organic 
certification of small-scale coffee farms in developing countries.
5.3 Background
5.3.1 Coffee in Costa Rica
Although coffee is no longer the backbone of Costa Rica’s economy, it remains 
a leading agricultural commodity. In the 2003/2004 harvest year—the year in 
which the census data used in our analysis were collected—roughly 60,000 growers 
produced 2.7 million fanegas (100-pound bags) of coffee beans that earned US $200 
million, equivalent to 14% of total agricultural export revenues and 3% of total 
export revenues. The coffee sector was dominated by small-scale growers: more 
than 93% produced less than 100 fanegas of coffee per year (ICAFE 2004; 2010).39
Coffee growing in Costa Rica has serious environmental consequences that at least 
partly offset those economic benefits. Traditionally, Costa Rican coffee, like most 
coffee in Latin America, was grown alongside shade trees, an agroforestry system 
that predated the development of agrochemicals and therefore did not rely on them. 
However, since the 1980s, 90% of the country’s coffee has been converted to a high-
yielding “technified” monocrop in which coffee is grown with minimal shade cover 
and intensive application of agrochemicals, a system that was pioneered in Costa 
Rica (Adams and Ghaly 2007; Rice and Ward 1996). The switch to technified coffee 
has hastened soil erosion and contributed to such off-site negative externalities 
as the contamination and sedimentation of surface and groundwater (Adams and 
Ghaly 2007; Babbar and Zak 1995; Loria 1992).
39  In harvest year 2010/2011, roughly 48,000 growers produced 2 million fanegas of coffee beans that 
earned US$ 232 million, equivalent to 12% of total agricultural export revenues and 3% of total export 
revenues (ICAFE, 2010). A fanega is a standard unit of volume to measure coffee in Central America, of 
approximately 250 kg.
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5.3.2 Organic coffee certification
We focus on organic certification because it is one of the leading eco-certification 
schemes worldwide (Potts et al., 2010) and emphasizes environmental, not 
socioeconomic, performance. Organic agriculture certification requires producers 
to adhere to five broad production principles (IFOAM 2010; Van der Vossen 2005).
• use of composted organic matter instead of chemical fertilizers to maintain
soil quality;
• use of natural methods for controlling disease, pests, and weeds instead of
synthetic pesticides and herbicides;
• use of soil conservation practices, including contour planting, terracing,
planting cover crops, mulching, and planting shade trees;
• minimum use of fossil fuels in the production process; and
• minimum pollution during postharvest handling.
Several international organic certifying bodies, the largest of which is the 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM, 2010), 
formulate basic organic standards for various commodities. These large organizations 
accredit smaller national ones that in turn certify producers and conduct follow-up 
monitoring. Organic certifications require growers to complete a transition period 
of two to three years during which they must discontinue use of chemical inputs and 
adopt various conservation and pollution prevention practices. Certified producers 
are regularly monitored to ensure they continue to meet organic standards.
From the coffee growers’ perspective, organic certification has both benefits and costs 
(Calo et al. 2005; Giovannucci and Ponte 2005; Van der Vossen, 2005). Of the main 
benefits is the price premium, which is set in international markets and averages 10 
to 20%, depending on coffee quality (although, not all growers receive premiums). 
In addition, the certification also may improve access to markets, production inputs, 
and agricultural extension services. Finally, organic production reduces the costs of 
purchased inputs for growers who formerly depended on chemical inputs.
On the cost side, organic production typically increases labor costs and reduces 
yields for growers who formerly depended on chemical inputs. Also, transaction 
costs—for initial certification and subsequent annual monitoring and reporting—
are significant. Annual costs easily can amount to 5% of sales. Although subsidies 
are sometimes available, these costs often are borne by the grower. Note that the 
transition period implies that the grower must pay them for two to three years 
without one of the principal benefits of certification—a price premium.
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5.3.3 Study area and period
We examine organic coffee certification in Turrialba, Costa Rica, a rural canton 
(an administrative unit that would fall between a state and county in the United 
States) in the country’s central valley, located about 64 km east of Costa Rica’s 
capital.40 The leading organic certifying organization in Turrialba is a Costa Rican 
organization called Eco-Logica, which is accredited by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, among other organizations (Eco-Logica 2011). Certified farmers in this 
region belong to the Association of Organic Producers of Turrialba (APOT 2001). 
For the reasons discussed below, we analyze coffee certification in 2003, the year 
of our farm-level census data. In this year, Eco-Logica had certified 38 growers and 
was tracking 44 more in the transition phase. APOT’s organic production standards 
are included in Appendix A.
5.4 Empirical strategy and data
5.4.1 Propensity score matching
Our analysis of organic certification’s impact on environmental performance 
confronts the usual program evaluation challenge (Holland 1986; Rubin 1974). 
Ideally, the impact of a program would be measured by comparing the outcome of 
interest for each agent both with and without program participation. However, we 
never actually observe both outcomes. In practice, therefore, a program’s impact is 
typically measured by comparing the average outcome for participants and a control 
group of non-participants—with the latter average serving as the counterfactual. 
However, as discussed in the introduction, this approach can be undermined if 
certain types of participants who tend to have certain outcomes disproportionately 
select into the program. For example, in our case, small, undercapitalized farms 
that cannot afford to use chemical inputs may self-select into organic certification 
because the net benefits are high: they can meet organic standards and obtain price 
premiums without having to discontinue chemical input. Alternatively, farms on 
steeply sloped land that already use soil conservation measures may self-select into 
certification because they do not have to adopt them to meet organic standards. 
An evaluation that failed to control for such selection would conflate the effects 
of certification on outcomes with the effects of preexisting differences between 
certified and uncertified farms.
40  We choose this study area because we had excellent access to it. At the time the study was 
conducted, both authors were working in Turrialba and were therefore able to conduct focus groups 
with coffee growers, visit farms, and interview local stakeholders to help design the empirical strategy 
and interpret the results.
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To address this selection problem, we use a matching estimator. That is, following 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and more recently Blackman et al. (2010), List et al. 
(2003) and Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we construct a matched control sample of 
uncertified farms that are very similar to the certified farms in terms of observable 
characteristics. We measure program impact as the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT)—the difference between the percentage of certified farms that use a 
management practice and the percentage of matched uncertified farms that use it.
This approach depends on two identifying assumptions. The first assumption, 
“ignorability” or “conditional independence,” is that conditional only on farms’ 
observed characteristics, the certification decision is ignorable for purposes of 
measuring outcomes. That is, we can observe and control for all variables that 
simultaneously affect the certification decision and the outcome variables. This first 
assumption is untestable. The second assumption, “common support” or “overlap,” 
is that the distribution of observed characteristics for uncertified farms is similar to 
that for certified farms, such that farms with similar characteristics have a positive 
probability of being certified and uncertified.
Creating a large set of matched pairs of farms with the exact same observed 
characteristics is challenging when, as in our case, these characteristics are numerous. 
However, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that we need to match farms 
only based on their propensity score—that is, their likelihood of certification as 
predicted by a regression model—which amounts to an index of farm and grower 
characteristics weighted by their importance in predicting certification. The 
propensity score method collapses the difficult problem of matching all observable 
characteristics to a much simpler one of matching a single summary variable.
Various methods are available to match certified and uncertified farms based on 
propensity scores (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Morgan and Harding 2006). To 
ensure robustness, we report results from five: (i) nearest neighbor 1-to-1 matching, 
wherein each certified farm is matched to the uncertified farm with the closest 
propensity score; (ii) nearest neighbor 1-to-4 matching, wherein each certified farm 
is matched to the four uncertified farms with the closest propensity scores and the 
counterfactual outcome is the average across these four; (iii) nearest neighbor 1-to-8 
matching; (iv) nearest neighbor 1-to-16 matching; and (v) kernel matching, wherein 
a weighted average of all uncertified farms is used to construct the counterfactual 
outcome. For all five models, we enforce a common support and allow matching 
with replacement. 
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Calculating standard errors for ATT estimated using propensity score matching is 
not straightforward because these errors should, in principle, account for the fact 
that propensity scores are estimated and for the imputation of the common support 
(Heckman et al. 1998). Therefore, following Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and others, 
we bootstrap standard errors (using 1,000 replications).
5.4.2 Data
The data used for our analysis come from three sources. The first is a national 
census of Costa Rican coffee growers conducted by the National Statistics and 
Census Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, INEC) in collaboration 
with the Costa Rican Coffee Institute (Instituto del Café de Costa Rica, ICAFE). Data 
for Turrialba, with more than 6000 farms, were collected in 2003. The INEC/
ICAFE census includes dichotomous dummy variables that indicate whether farms 
use seven of the agriculture practices monitored by organic certifiers.41 We divide 
these into three “negative” practices that must be discontinued for APOT organic 
certification and four “positive” practices that must be adopted. 
The negative practices are the use of:
• chemical pesticides;
• chemical fertilizers; and
• chemical herbicides.
The positive practices are the use of:
• soil conservation measures such as deviation canals, water collection holes,
water ladders, and vegetative barriers;
• shade trees;
• windbreaks; and
• organic fertilizer.
In addition to information on these practices, the INEC/ICAFE data include 
information on grower characteristics (age and education), farm characteristics (e.g., 
geolocator information, size, and coffee variety), and geophysical characteristics 
(e.g., temperature and precipitation).
Our second source of data is a GIS complied from a variety of sources. It comprises 
spatial data on geophysical characteristics of coffee farms, including elevation, 
aspect (directional orientation), slope, Holdridge life zone, and distances to coffee 
markets and population centers.
41  Unfortunately, the INEC/ICAFE data do not include measures of the extent of use of management 
practices such the percentage of the growing area with contour planting, or the percentage with shade.
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Our final source of data is a list of 82 APOT farmers for 2003, the year of the INEC/
ICAFE census, including 38 certified organic farms and 44 that were in transition. 
Because the APOT and INEC/ICAFE databases do not include a common identifying 
code, records were matched by owner name and farm size.
Although the INEC/ICAFE census for Turrialba covered more than 6000 farms, 
responses to certain questions are missing in some records. We drop all records 
for which responses needed to generate the variables used in our regressions are 
missing. The resulting dataset contains 2603 observations: 36 certified organic 
farms and 2567 uncertified farms.42
5.4.3 Variables
Table 5.1 lists, defines and presents summary statistics for the variables used in 
our matching analysis, including both outcome variables and grower and farm 
characteristics. In addition to the seven dichotomous outcome variables listed 
above, we include counts of negative and positive practices on each farm—the sum 
of the three dichotomous outcome variables for negative practices, and the sum 
of the four dichotomous outcome variables for positive practices. Mean use rates 
for the negative practice outcome variables range from a low of 16% for chemical 
pesticide use to a high of 73% for herbicide use. On average, farms use 1.48 of 
the three negative practices for which we have data. The mean use rates for the 
positive practice outcome variables range from a low of 10% for organic fertilizer 
to 95% for use of some shade cover. On average, farms use 1.59 of the four positive 
practices for which we have data. Hence, the proportion of growers using practices 
consistent with organic certification is substantial. As a result, it is reasonable to 
expect that a disproportionate share of de facto organic growers—that is, those 
already meeting organic standards—self-selected into organic certification, implying 
that certification only had limited effects on the environmental performance of the 
average grower in our sample. Our empirical analysis aims to determine whether 
that in fact was the case.
42  Sample attrition is significant. The six regressors responsible for roughly two thirds of this attrition 
are AGE, the three education dummies (ED_PRIMARY, ED_SECONDARY, ED_SUPERIOR), OTHER_LOT, 
and VARIETY_CATA. That is, survey response rates for these variables were relatively low. As reflected 
in the results of the probit regression used to generate propensity scores (Table 5.2), three of these six 
variables—AGE, OTHER_LOT, and VARIETY_CATA—are important determinants of organic certification. 
Therefore, we are reluctant to drop them in order to reduce sample attrition. However, to check the 
robustness of our findings to sample attrition bias, we dropped all six these variables from our analysis. 
The resulting sample has 4763 observations. The qualitative propensity score matching results using this 
larger sample (available from the authors upon request), are identical to those using the smaller sample 
(reported in Section 5.5). Hence, sample attrition does not drive our qualitative results.
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Table 5.1 | Variables, definitions and means.
Variable Definition
Mean
All
(n=2,603)
Mean
Certified 
(n=36)
Mean
Uncert. 
(n=2567)
OUTCOME VARS.
  Negative practices
NEMATICIDE applies nematicide (0/1) 0.16 0.00 0.17
CHEM_FERT applies chemical fertilizer (0/1) 0.58 0.11 0.59
HERBICIDE applies herbicide 0.73 0.11 0.74
COUNT_NEG count above negative practices 1.48 0.22 1.50
  Positive practices
SOIL_CON uses soil conservation practices (0/1) 0.46 0.58 0.46
SHADE uses shade (0/1) 0.95 1.00 0.95
WINDBREAK uses windbreaks (0/1) 0.14 0.14 0.14
ORG_FERT applies organic fertilizer (0/1) 0.10 0.67 0.10
COUNT_POS count above positive practices 1.59 2.36 1.58
GROWER/FARM CHARACTERISTICS
   Grower
AGE age (years) 50.61 46.11 50.67
ED_NONE no education (0/1) 0.09 0.06 0.09
ED_PRIMARY primary education (0/1) 0.71 0.64 0.71
ED_SECONDARY secondary education (0/1) 0.08 0.25 0.08
ED_SUPERIOR > secondary education (0/1) 0.11 0.06 0.11
  Farm
APOT organic cert or transition (0/1) 0.01 1.00 0.00
AREA_COFFEE area coffee on the farm (ha.) 1.29 1.64 1.28
AREA_COFFEE_SQ area coffee on the farm (ha.) squared 5.66 3.97 5.68
OTHER_LOT 2 separate plots of coffee (0/1) 0.37 0.08 0.37
VARIETY_CATA coffee variety=caturra (0/1) 0.89 0.97 0.89
VARIETY_CATI coffee variety=catuai (0/1) 0.06 0.03 0.06
VARIETY_CR95 coffee variety=costa rica-95 (0/1) 0.02 0.00 0.02
VARIETY_CATE coffee variety =catimore (0/1) 0.02 0.00 0.02
  Geophysical b
PRECIPITATION rainfall (mm) 2994.83 2997.25 2994.80
PRECIPITATION_SQ rainfall (mm) squared 9139495 9102179 9140018
ELEVATION elevation (m. above sea level) 894.66 811.03 895.83
TEMPERATURE avg. annual temperature (Co) 22.89 23.09 22.89
A_LEVEL % farm level 0.05 0.03 0.05
A_NORTH % farm facing north 0.07 0.06 0.07
A_NORTHEAST % farm facing northeast 0.15 0.14 0.15
A_EAST % farm facing east 0.15 0.14 0.15
A_SOUTHEAST % farm facing southeast 0.14 0.10 0.14
A_SOUTH % farm facing south 0.12 0.17 0.12
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Variable Definition
Mean
All
(n=2,603)
Mean
Certified 
(n=36)
Mean
Uncert. 
(n=2567)
A_SOUTHWEST % farm facing southwest 0.11 0.12 0.11
A_WEST % farm facing west 0.08 0.12 0.08
A_NORTHWEST % farm facing northwest 0.10 0.06 0.10
SLOPE average slope (%) a 27.12 27.36 27.12
SLOPE_MAX maximum slope 53.21 54.15 53.20
SLOPE_SD standard deviation slope 10.10 9.79 10.10
LZP_BMHP % farm v. humid premontane 0.71 0.81 0.71
LZP_BPP % farm rain forest premontane 0.17 0.03 0.18
LZP_BHTTP % farm v. humid trans premontane 0.02 0.00 0.02
LZP_BHP % farm humid premontane 0.03 0.00 0.03
DISTANCE_SJOSE ln road distance San José (minutes) 4.79 4.80 4.79
DISTANCE_CANCAPb ln road distance nearest of 15 Canton 
capitals (minutes)
3.27 3.11 3.27
a % Slope=100*tan(п angle/180). 100% slope=45°.
b The 15 canton capitals are Aserrí, Cartago, Desamparados, Juan Viñas, Pacayas, Paraíso, Parrita, 
Quepos, San Ignacio, San Marcos, San Pablo, Santa Maria, Siquirres, Tejar, and Turrialba.
To match certified and uncertified farms, we used propensity scores generated by 
regressing an organic certification dummy onto a rich set of grower, farm, and 
geophysical characteristics from our coffee census and GIS data. The grower 
characteristics are AGE, the age of the farmer in years, and four dichotomous 
dummy variables that indicate the farmer’s highest level of education: ED_NONE 
for no formal education, ED_PRIMARY for primary education, ED_SECONDARY for 
secondary education, and ED_SUPERIOR for more than secondary education.
The farm characteristics are AREA_COFFEE, the number of hectares planted in coffee; 
AREA_COFFEE_SQ, the square of the number of hectares planted; OTHER_LOT, a 
dichotomous dummy variable that indicates whether the farmer has noncontiguous 
patches of coffee in the same “work area”; and four dichotomous dummy variables 
that indicate the variety of coffee planted on the farm: VARIETY_CATA for caturra, 
VARIETY_CATI for catuai, VARIETY_CR95 for Costa Rica-95, and VARIETY_CATE 
for catimore. 
The farm-level geophysical variables are PRECIPITATION, the average annual 
rainfall in millimeters; PRECIPITATION_SQ, the square of average annual rainfall; 
ELEVATION, the average elevation in meters above sea level; TEMPERATURE, the 
average annual temperature in degrees Celsius; SLOPE, the average slope in percent; 
SLOPE_MAX, the maximum slope in percent; SLOPE_SD, the standard deviation of 
slope; DISTANCE_SJOSE, the natural log of travel time in minutes from the farm 
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centroid to San José; and DISTANCE_CANCAP, the natural log of the travel time 
from the farm centroid to the nearest of 15 canton (county) capitals in Turrialba.43 
The geophysical variables also include several aspect variables (precisely defined in 
Table 5.1) that indicate the percentage of the farm-oriented in different directions: 
A_LEVEL, A_NORTH1, A_NORTHEAST, A_EAST, A_SOUTHEAST, A_SOUTH, A_
SOUTHWEST, A_WEST, A_NORTHWEST, and A_NORTH2. Finally, we include four 
variables that indicate the percentage of the farm that falls within the most common 
Holdridge life zones in our study area: LZP_BMHP, very humid premontane forest; 
LZP_BPP, premontane rain forest; LZP_BHTTP, very humid transpremontane forest; 
and LZP_BHP, humid premontane forest.44
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Propensity Scores and Balance Tests
Table 5.2 presents the results from the probit regression (of organic certification 
on grower and farm characteristics) used to generate propensity scores. The results 
indicate that compared with average growers in our sample, certified growers tend 
to be younger, and that compared with average farms in our sample, certified farms 
tend to be larger (although not extremely large), have contiguous growing areas, 
grow the caturra variety of coffee, and be located at low altitudes and in certain life 
zones. Also, certified farms tend not to have a large percentage of their farms sloped 
in certain directions.
Having generated propensity scores and we use them to match certified and 
uncertified farms. For the kernel estimator, all 36 observations are on the common 
support and for the remaining estimators, 35 observations are on the common 
support (Table 5.3). 
We performed balance tests for the five matching estimators. All except the kernel 
estimator achieved balance (a statistically insignificant difference in covariate 
means for certified and matched uncertified plants) for all 29 covariates (Table 
5.3). The kernel estimator achieves balance for all 29 covariates except OTHER_
LOT. Table 5.3 reports median standardized bias—Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) 
balance statistic—across all covariates for each matching estimator.45 The highest 
43  % Slope=100*tan(п angle/180). 100% slope=45°. The 15 canton capitals in our study area are 
Aserri, Cartago, Desamparados, Juan Viñas, Pacayas, Paraiso, Parrita, Quepos, San Ignacio, San Marcos, 
San Pablo, Santa Maria, Siquirres, Tejar, and Turrialba.
44  The Holdridge life zone system is a widely used method of classifying land on the basis of climate 
and vegetation (Holdridge 1979).
45  Standardized bias is the difference of the sample means in the certified and uncertified subsamples 
as a percentage of the square root of the average of sample variances in both groups.
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median standardized bias is 11.659 for the nearest neighbor 1–1 estimator, and the 
lowest is 2.694 for the nearest neighbor 1–16 estimator. Although a clear threshold 
for acceptable median standardized bias does not exist, according to Caliendo and 
Kopeining (2008), a statistic below 3 to 5% is generally viewed as sufficient. These 
encouraging balance statistics are likely due to the fact that even though our probit 
selection model has 29 explanatory variables, our sample includes 75 uncertified 
farms for each certified farm. As a result, we are able to find close matches for each 
certified farm.
Table 5.2 | Probit regression results (dependent variable = organic certification).
Variable Coefficient S.E.
   Grower
AGE -0.150*** 0.066
ED_PRIMARY -0.049 0.324
ED_SECONDARY 0.494 0.367
ED_SUPERIOR -0.148 0.454
  Farm
AREA_COFFEE 0.541*** 0.206
AREA_COFFEE_SQ -0.083* 0.044
OTHER_LOT -0.644*** 0.227
VARIETY_CATA 0.641* 0.368
  Geophysical
PRECIPITATION 1.115 3.162
PRECIPITATION_SQ -0.252 0.548
ELEVATION -1.486** 0.568
TEMPERATURE 0.294 0.832
A_LEVEL -1.436 1.088
A_NORTH1 -1.426 0.928
A_NORTHEAST -0.998 0.649
A_EAST -1.001 0.656
A_SOUTHEAST -1.454** 0.723
A_SOUTH -0.377 0.644
A_SOUTHWEST -1.140* 0.665
A_WEST -0.656 0.649
A_NORTHWEST -2.032** 0.933
SLOPE -0.044 0.104
SLOPE_MAX 0.006 0.008
SLOPE_SD -0.346 0.316
LZP_BMHP -0.053 0.252
LZP_BPP -0.742* 0.417
DISTANCE_SJOSE -0.006 0.395
DISTANCE_CANCAP -0.015 0.144
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Variable Coefficient S.E.
CONSTANT -1.698 4.283
Observations 2,603
Pseudo R2 0.194
LL -153.097
***, **,* = significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Table 5.3 | Matching quality: Number of treated observations on common support (CS); Number of 
covariates achieving balance (N); median standardized bias (SB) after matching; for five propensity score 
matching methods.a,b,c,d
Method CS N SBd
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1 35 29 11.659
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4 35 29 4.679
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8 35 29 4.284
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16 35 29 2.694
(v) Kernel 35 29 7.530
a The sample includes 36 treated observations.
b The model includes 29 covariates.
c For a given covariate, the standardized bias (SB) is the difference of means in the certified and matched 
uncertified subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average sample variance in both groups. 
We report the median SB for all covariates.
d Median SB before matching is 16.422.
5.5.2 Average treatment effect on the treated
Table 5.4 presents results from the five matching estimators for the negative 
practices—chemical pesticides, fertilizers, and herbicides—and for a count of 
negative practices.46 The results strongly indicate that certification significantly 
reduces the use of negative practices. For each negative practice, ATT is negative 
and significant for all five matching estimators. In each case, the magnitude of the 
effect is substantial.  For pesticide, it ranges from 14 to 18 percentage points; that is, 
the rate of pesticide use is 14 to 18 percentage points lower among certified growers 
than among matched uncertified growers who represent the counterfactual. For 
chemical fertilizers, ATT ranges from 43 to 45 percentage points, and for herbicides, 
it ranges from61 to 71 percentage points. Finally, for the count of negative practices, 
ATT ranges from 1.2 to 1.3, implying that on average, certified growers use 1.2 to 
1.3 fewer negative practices than matched uncertified growers.
46  Note that the mean of the outcome variables for certified farmers is positive, albeit small, implying 
that a handful of the 32 certified growers in our sample used chemical inputs in 2003. APOT organic 
standards allow the occasional use of chemical inputs when deemed necessary and preauthorized by a 
local Eco-Logica inspector (see Appendix A, items 1g and 5c).
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Table 5.4 | Negative practices: average treatment effect on treated (ATT) estimates, by outcome variable 
and matching method; critical value of Rosenbaum’s Γ.
Propensity score matching method Mean treated ATT S.E.a P-value Γb
Pesticide (Nematicide)
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1 0 -0.143 0.074 0.053 3.0
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4 0 -0.150 0.052 0.004 10.6
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8 0 -0.179 0.041 0.000 17.6
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16 0 -0.157 0.030 0.000 17.2
(v) Kernel 0 -0.152 0.012 0.000 17,2
Chemical fertilizer
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1 0.114 -0.429 0.118 0.000 4.6
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4 0.114 -0.464 0.086 0.000 6.2
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8 0.114 -0.454 0.075 0.000 5.4
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16 0.114 -0.448 0.064 0.000 8.0
(v) Kernel 0.114 -0.449 0.058 0.000 10.0
Herbicides
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1 0.114 -0.714 0.105 0.000 7.8
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4 0.114 -0.643 0.080 0.000 10.0
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8 0.114 -0.607 0.074 0.000 10.0
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16 0.114 -0.582 0.064 0.000 11.0
(v) Kernel 0.114 -0.595 0.058 0.000 10.0
Count negative practices
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1 0.229 -1.286 0.193 0.000 9.8
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4 0.229 -1.257 0.153 0.000 16.8
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8 0.229 -1.239 0.129 0.000 13.4
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16 0.229 -1.188 0.110 0.000 13.4
(v) Kernel 0.229 -1.197 0.095 0.000 12.2
a Computed using bootstrap with 1000 repetitions.
b Critical value of odds of differential assignment to organic certification due to unobserved factors (i.e., 
value above which ATT is no longer significant).
Table 5.5 presents results from the five matching estimators for the positive 
practices—soil conservation, shade, windbreaks, and organic fertilizer—and for 
a count of positive practices.47 The results provide strong evidence that organic 
certification increases the use of only one positive practice: organic fertilizer. For 
this practice, ATT is positive and significant for all five matching estimators, and 
the magnitude of the effect is substantial, ranging from 59 to 63 percentage points. 
47  Note that the mean of the outcome variables for certified farmers is less than 1, implying that some 
of the certified growers in our sample had not adopted the four environmental management practices we 
consider. In particular, less than one-sixth of certified farmers adopted windbreaks. Eco-Logica inspectors 
relax certification requirements in certain cases—for example, when winds are so inconsequential that 
windbreaks are not needed. In general, inspectors enforce prohibitions against negative practices (use of 
agrochemicals) more stringently than they require the positive ones (soil conservation, etc.) (Soto, 2009).
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Table 5.5 | Positive practices: average treatment effect on treated (ATT) estimates, by outcome variable 
and matching method; critical value of Rosenbaum’s Γ.
Propensity score matching method Mean treated ATT S.E.a P-value Γ
Soil conservation
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1 0.571 0.286 0.128 0.026 1.6
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4 0.571 0.143 0.102 0.162 -
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8 0.571 0.132 0.092 0.150 -
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16 0.571 0.146 0.087 0.094 1.4
(v) Kernel 0.571 0.134 0.087 0.125 -
Shade
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1 1.000 0.029 0.042 0.501 -
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4 1.000 0.043 0.032 0.818 -
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8 1.000 0.043 0.022 0.056 6.2
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16 1.000 0.045 0.017 0.008 11.6
(v) Kernel 1.000 0.049 0.007 0.000 17.2
Windbreak
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1 0.143 0.000 0.087 1.000 -
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4 0.143 0.014 0.075 0.849 -
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8 0.143 0.043 0.064 0.501 -
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16 0.143 0.032 0.064 0.616 -
(v) Kernel 0.143 -0.010 0.065 0.877 -
Organic fertilizer
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1 0.657 0.629 0.084 0.000 13.8
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4 0.657 0.614 0.086 0.000 9.0
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8 0.657 0.604 0.085 0.000 4.4
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16 0.657 0.589 0.084 0.000 3.4
(v) Kernel 0.657 0.587 0.082 0.000 3.6
Count positive practices
(i) Nearest neighbor 1-1 2.343 0.914 0.211 0.000 3.8
(ii) Nearest neighbor 1-4 2.343 0.793 0.173 0.000 3.8
(iii) Nearest neighbor 1-8 2.343 0.811 0.158 0.000 3.6
(iv) Nearest neighbor 1-16 2.343 0.814 0.161 0.000 3.2
(v) Kernel 2.343 0.775 0.145 0.000 2.6
a Computed using bootstrap with 1000 repetitions.
b Critical value of odds of differential assignment to organic certification due to unobserved factors (i.e., 
value above which ATT is no longer significant).
The results provide much weaker evidence that organic certification increases the 
use of shade cover and soil conservation. For shade cover, ATT is significant for three 
of the five matching estimators (all but nearest neighbor 1–1 and 1–4). However, 
the magnitude of the effect is small, ranging from 4 to 5 percentage points. For soil 
conservation, ATT is significant for two of the five matching estimators (nearest 
neighbors 1–1 and 1–16). In each case, ATT is significant, ranging from 15 to 29 
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percentage points. Lack of consistently significant ATT for shade and soil conservation 
may be partly because our sample includes a relatively low number of treatment 
observations (certified farms). As a result, our difference in means test has less power 
than it otherwise would. This is a limitation of our analysis. For windbreaks, none of 
the matching estimators generate a significant ATT. Finally, for the count of positive 
practices, ATT is positive and significant for all five matching estimators, although the 
magnitude of the effect is not large, ranging from 0.8 to 0.9. 
Hence, our results suggest that organic certification has a stronger causal effect 
on negative practices than positive ones. This finding comports with anecdotal 
evidence that Eco-Logica inspectors do not enforce all of the organic certification 
standards listed in Appendix 5.1 equally: enforcement is more stringent for standards 
prohibiting negative practices than for those requiring positive ones (Soto 2009).
5.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Might endogeneity drive our results? As noted above, the effectiveness of our matching 
estimators in controlling for selection bias depends on the untestable identifying 
assumption that we are able to observe confounding variables that simultaneously 
affect growers’ decisions to obtain organic certification and to use or not use the 
production practices that serve as our outcome variables. That is, we essentially 
assume endogeneity is not a problem. We calculate Rosenbaum bounds to check the 
sensitivity of our results to the failure of this assumption (Aakvik 2001; Rosenbaum 
2002)48 Rosenbaum bounds indicate how strongly unobserved confounding factors 
would need to influence growers’ decisions to obtain organic certification in order 
to undermine the matching result. To be more specific, the Rosenbaum procedure 
generates a probability value for Wilcoxon sign-rank statistic for a series of values 
of Γ, an index of the strength of the influence that unobserved confounding factors 
have on the selection process. Γ=1 implies that such factors have no influence, such 
that pairs of growers matched on observables do not differ in their odds of obtaining 
organic certification; Γ=2 implies that matched pairs could differ in their odds 
of certification by as much as a factor of two because of unobserved confounding 
factors; and so forth. The probability value on the Wilcoxon sign-rank statistic is a 
test of the null hypothesis of a zero ATT given unobserved confounding variables 
that have an effect given by Γ. So, for example, a probability value of 0.01 and a Γ 
of 1.2 indicate that ATT would still be significant at the 1% level even if matched 
pairs differed in their odds of certification by a factor of 1.2 because of unobserved 
confounding factors.
48  An example of an unobserved confounder might be environmental consciousness or managerial 
skill. Each could cause growers to select into organic certification and— independent of certification—to 
use fewer negative practices and more positive ones.
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We calculate Γ*, the critical value of Γ at which ATT is no longer significant at 
the 10% level in each case where ATT is significant (that is, for each combination 
of production practice and matching estimator) (Tables 5.4 and 5.5, last column). 
Except in the case of soil conservation, Γ* is at least 3.0, and in most cases, it is 
considerably larger. For the pesticide estimators, Γ* is at least 10.6 for four of the 
five matching estimators; for the chemical fertilizer models, it is at least 4.6; for the 
herbicide models, it is at least 7.8; and for the count of negative practices models, it 
is at least 9.8. Except in the case of soil conservation, the results for positive practice 
ATTs are similar. For shade, Γ* is at least 6.2; for organic fertilizer, it is at least 3.4; 
and for a count of positive practices, it is at least 3.2. Hence, our sensitivity tests 
suggest that unobserved confounders would need to be quite strong to undermine 
our statistically significant results. In other words, endogeneity is unlikely to drive 
our results.
5.6 Conclusion
We have used detailed cross-sectional data on more than 2600 coffee farms in central 
Costa Rica to identify the environmental impacts of organic coffee certification in 
2003–2004. We have used propensity score matching techniques to control for self-
selection bias. Our findings suggest that in our study area and period, certification 
significantly reduced the use of all three chemical inputs for which we have data 
(i.e. chemical pesticides, fertilizers, and herbicides) and increased adoption of at 
least one of the four environmentally friendly management practices for which we 
have data—organic fertilizer. 
Our findings contrast with those from the only two methodologically rigorous 
studies of eco-certification environmental impacts, both of which find that eco-
certification has no causal effects. They also contrast with findings from several less 
rigorous studies of coffee certification. What might explain these differences? First, 
we have examined a certification scheme that has relatively well defined, stringent 
standards enforced by independent third-party monitors. The tourism certification 
schemes summarized in Section 3 do not have these attributes—the Sustainable 
Slopes Program examined by Rivera and de Leon (2004), and Rivera et al. (2006) 
have relatively lax standards enforced by a trade association.
Second, in Costa Rica’s coffee sector, opportunities for certification impacts to be 
undermined by self-selection—that is, opportunities for growers already meeting 
organic standards to obtain certification—may be relatively limited. As noted in 
Section 3, coffee growing in Costa Rica is heavily technified. Most farmers use 
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chemical inputs, and few use organic fertilizers (Table 5.1). Therefore, relatively 
few farms can obtain certification without significantly changing their management 
practices. This is not the case in the regions of Nicaragua and Mexico studied by 
Philpott et al. (2007) and Martínez-Sánchez (2008). Here, most growers use rustic 
practices and few chemical inputs (Rice and Ward, 1996).
Finally, our study has looked at the impact of certification on various management 
practices, not on ecological indicators like bird diversity, the focus of studies by 
Philpott et al. (2007) and Martínez-Sánchez (2008). Presumably, certification can 
alter management practices more easily than it can change in ecological indicators. 
What are the policy implications of our findings? They suggest that commodity 
certification schemes that require adherence to well-defined stringent standards 
are enforced by independent third-party monitors, and are implemented in areas 
where producers do not already adhere to these standards can have significant 
environmental benefits. That said, certification schemes meeting these criteria 
may have an important disadvantage: they are likely to entail significant costs for 
producers. Absent high price premiums or other benefits from certification, these 
costs will discourage certification. Indeed, the relatively small number of certified 
organic producers in our sample (1%) likely reflects this phenomenon (among other 
factors such as low variable profits from certification).
Does Eco-Certification Have Environmental Benefits?
5
119 
5.7 Appendices
Appendix 5.1 | Organic Producers’ Association of Turrialba Standards for Organic Production (APOT 
2001).  
1. Soil conservation
a. Must use soil conservation  practices: drains (drenajes), canals (canales de agua), terraces
(terrazas), contour planting (siembra en contornos). contamination barriers (barreras de 
contencion), and overflow ditches (zanjas de ladera para cortar escorrentia). 
b. Must not use herbicides, pesticides, or synthetic goods that damage the soil.
c. Must use a diverse variety of shades (legumes, fruits, leñosas, musacaeas, etc.) that will be
shade useful to the family, coffee and nature.
d. Must not permit the soil to be exposed to the sun, using soil covers, such as shade, coffee,
grass or dead cover. It is recommended to use dead cover in the case of selected vegetables.
e. Must use windbreakers when necessary, with a preference for species that are useful for the
family and the farm.
f. Must incorporate organic material in the soil, such as bokashi, compost, and compost with
worms and others.
g. Must give preference to always using the resource of the farm, but in the case when it is
necessary can use external inputs always of the natural origen, such as products minerals 
like lime, rock phosphate, dolomite, K-Mg, zinc sulfate, and magnesium sulfate, in cases of 
documented deficiency.
h. If cultivation requires it and conditions permit, it’s permitted to use a plow.
i. It is permitted to plant without contours only in plantation already established, but in new
plantations, contour planting is required.
2. Protection and management of water
a. Must take care so that there is a good management of water in the farm: reforestation
around the rivers, “acequias o quegbradas,” to avoid erosion and contamination of the waters 
with agrochemicals and trash.
b. Must undertake a rational use of water in the case of the use of irrigation.
3. Care of biodiversity
a. Must take care the farm has a variety of trees, birds, plants and insects: o protect the nature
and aid in the control of natural plagues.
b. Must have diversity in the foods in the farms: for animals and humans.
c. Must have biodiversity that permits having different income/inputs for the producer and his 
family in different seasons of the year.
d. Must have a diversity of cultivation for  example: rotation of crops
e. Using the coffee variety “catimor” is not permitted for new planting and replanting coffee.
4. Care of farm animals
a. Must provide the animals with a good space for moving: ventilated and clean, and cannot
be in stables all the time.
b. Must provide to animals clean and organic food.
c. Must have a diversity of food for animals on the farm.
d. Must have a proper management of the animal wastes of the farm: must avoid contamination.
e. Must use natural control of sicknesses: medicinal plants, natural control of parasites.
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5. Management of plagues and sicknesses
a. Must favor diversity of cultivation that aids in the natural control of plagues and sicknesses.
b. Must manage the soil with a diversity of organic material.
c. The case where it is deemed necessary and with previous authorization of the local inspector, 
it is permitted to use “copper sulfate” but it is not permitted to apply more than 6.2 kg/
ha/year.
d. It is not permitted to use gasoline for burning of “zomopas” (Atta Cephalotes)
6. Contamination of the farm
a. It is not permitted to throw wastes of containers of agrochemicals in the farm or in sources
of water.
b. It is not permitted to apply synthetic agrochemicals 36 months before the harvest.
c. Must maintain the distance and the live barrier necessary to avoid contamination that
comes from neighboring lots that use agrochemicals.
7. Post-harvest management practices
a. Must only take fresh, mature coffee to the mill.
b. Must not use sacks contaminated with synthetic agrochemicals.
c. Cannot mix the organic product with transitional product.
d. In cases where are producing organic coffee and coffee in transition, must carefully label the 
organic coffee to avoid mixing it with other types of coffee.
e. The transport of organic products must be clean and free of contamination.
8. General care of the farm
a. Must plan the farm well and have a road that does not promote erosion
b. The organic producer must not have the same cultivated field in conventional and organic
(parallel production).
c. The organic producer that already has conventional parcels on which grows crops other
than coffee must have a plan for converting the entire farm to organic within the next five 
years.
d. Must have a clear separation between live barriers between organic lots and conventional
lots.
9. Norms for the management of the quality of life of producers
a. The organic producer must understand the principals of organic agriculture.
b. The organic producer must undertake training periodically.
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6
Synthesis
6.1 Introduction
The success of development projects and programs depend on characteristics of the 
population, including their choice over the available alternatives and in interaction 
with the institutions and government policies in place. Hence, the design of policies 
requires understanding the motivations behind individual decisions, measuring the 
impact of those decisions and effectively communicating the tradeoffs, so it becomes 
more clear to the decision maker.
The overall aim of this thesis was to enhance the understanding of farm-level 
decision making to manage risks in interaction with the institutions and government 
policies that can influence these decisions. It assessed how individual preferences 
shaped these decisions and endeavored to show how, through understanding 
farmers’ choices, research can contribute to policy design in agriculture. In addition, 
it highlighted the role that lab-in-the-field experiments play in informing policy 
making (Viceisza 2016). 
The thesis combined laboratory and field settings to gain insight into whether 
individual preferences can be directly applied to make real-life predictions. Chapter 
2 explored alternatives to elicited risk preferences in the field by evaluating survey 
estimates next to experimental estimates and showing how different estimates of 
survey risk preferences relate to real-life farming choices. Chapter 3 focused on 
the internal and external validity of social preferences, focusing in particular on 
conditional cooperation. Chapter 4 tested a developed model and examined the 
effect of farmers’ liability on demand for credit with and without insurance. Lab-in-
the-field experiments allow us to redefine choices and isolate mechanisms to control 
the decision environment and study individual behavior at a relatively low cost 
(Falk and Heckman 2009; Viceisza 2016) and, in combination with other empirical 
methods, help us understand mechanisms observed in the field, such as preferences 
and decisions regarding credit and insurance. 
In Chapter 5, a quasi-experimental method —matching— allowed us to construct 
a credible counterfactual outcome to assess impact. In other words, an estimate of 
what the environmental outcomes for certified entities would have been had they not 
been certified, in order to measure the impact of the organic certification program.
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This last chapter discusses the lessons learned and policy recommendations from 
individual chapters; then, results are reframed in a thesis-wide perspective and, 
finally, it presents general conclusions drawn from the research work as a whole.
6.2 Eliciting risk attitudes in the field
In Chapter 2, we evaluated a survey-based method for estimating risk attitudes— a 
method that can be more easily implemented in the field in comparison to traditional 
risk experiments. We find no domain-general component across willingness to 
take risks in specific contexts. A context-free survey estimate of risk preferences 
predicts risk-taking behavior in the risk experiment. Higher willingness to take risk 
is associated with the implementation of agricultural practices that required more 
farm investment, but farmers that report less willingness to take risks are more 
likely to spend more on fertilizer use.
We learned that when using survey-based instruments, it is necessary to elicit risk 
attitudes for the specific context of interest, and that estimates can be related to 
real-life behavior in different ways. Farmers balance the advantages of reducing 
exposure to uncertainty in agriculture with the increased exposure to financial 
risk. Hence, it is not strange that practices that required more farm investment, 
such as investment in new varieties, are associated with a higher willingness to 
take risks. On the other hand, coffee farmers in Costa Rica have good access to 
information regarding input use from cooperative organizations and extension 
agents. Information and training add certainty to the use of inputs like fertilizer, 
which is perceived as a risk-reducing technology. As a result, farmers who are less 
willing to take risks apply more fertilizer. 
Understanding how risk preferences relate to real life-choices is a complex matter. 
Research has found that the capacity of risk preferences estimates to address farm-
level decision-making varies according to method (Charness and Viceisza 2013; 
Verschoor et al. 2016), the context in the risk question is framed (this thesis), and 
the type of technology under assessment (Verschoor et al. 2016, and this thesis). 
Furthermore, risk preferences vary significantly across countries (Vieider et al. 
2015) and subject pools (Vieider, Beyene, Bluffstone, Dissanayake, Gebreegziabher, 
Martinsson, et al. 2018).  Differences can be explained by the mind discernment 
between decisions made taking into account many aspects of life (broadly bracketed) 
and decisions made in isolation from all others (narrowly bracketed) (Barseghyan et 
al. 2018; Verschoor et al. 2016). Future research should take into account whether 
estimates of risk preferences are biased by incorrect assumptions about bracketing 
(Barseghyan et al. 2018, 558), which can be crop and location specific.  
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Our focus on the agricultural context has important policy implications. Not only 
is it important to take into account risk preferences when assessing the impact 
of agricultural and development programs promoting technology adoption, but it 
is also essential to make sure that preferences are elicited in the specific context 
targeted by the prospective policy instrument. If the policy instrument targets a 
particular adoption, say fertilizer or implementation of improved seeds varieties, 
survey risk preferences should be elicited in that particular context. However, for 
a detailed insight into risk preferences parameters, context-free risk experiments 
become most likely necessary.
6.3 Testing conditional cooperation
In Chapter 3, we looked at social preferences and focused on the typology of conditional 
cooperation. We tested if the characterization of conditional cooperation is internally 
consistent and whether it carries through real-life cooperation decisions. We found 
that conditional cooperators believe they contribute to the public good by matching 
the contribution of others in the experiment. However, we see no evidence that those 
classified as conditional cooperators in the experiment also behave this way when it 
comes to bringing coffee to the local cooperative in real life.
We learned that the typology of conditional cooperation is internally consistent with-
in a public goods game experiment, but we did not find evidence to support that the 
typology of conditional cooperators carries on from the lab to reality. Our results are 
in line with other social preferences measured in the lab that do not relate to prosocial 
behavior measured in real-life  (Laury and Taylor 2008; Voors et al. 2011; Voors et 
al. 2012).
The lack of external validation suggests that social preferences may be specific to a 
particular context or setting (Voors et al. 2012). Thus, we may relate our results to 
those found in Chapter 2, where only context-specific estimates of risk preferences 
relate to real-life choices. Hence, one should be careful to extrapolate the typology 
of conditional cooperation measured in the lab to other real-life contexts. Future 
research should consider studying conditional cooperation in different contexts. 
Using agricultural cooperatives to test external validity highlighted a few potential 
policy implications. Agricultural cooperatives seek that farmers cooperate, e.g., bring 
coffee to the cooperative. The existence of free riding, e.g., not bringing coffee to 
the cooperative, not only lowers the total product processed by the cooperative but 
can also bring down the contributions of conditional cooperators in the community. 
Our results show that the majority of farmers in rural Costa Rica are conditional 
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cooperators, an important group that can enhance cooperation, but also weakens the 
cooperative structure if farmers hesitate to bring their coffee to the local cooperative. 
Farmer socio-economic characteristics showed that older, more experienced farmers, 
are the ones who by tradition bring coffee to the local cooperative. Hence, agricultural 
cooperative organizations should implement and enhance policies that encourage 
young coffee farmers’ active involvement in the cooperative organization.
6.4 Credit, insurance and farmers’ liability 
In Chapter 4, we deviated from individual preferences and examined the effect of 
farmers’ liability on the uptake of credit with and without mandatory insurance. We 
found that the uptake of loans bundled with insurance is significantly higher than 
the uptake of loans without insurance, both when farmers are sure to be liable for 
their debt and, interestingly, when there is uncertainty about their liability, as well. 
When farmers are not liable for their debt, i.e., under limited liability, the uptake of 
credit is high irrespective of whether the loans are insured or not.
We learned that to increase the uptake of insurance as a strategy to increase private 
investment and reduce the vulnerability of farmers weather events which may lead 
to serious crop failure, it is important that farmers are liable with at least some 
probability. Governments in developing countries have accustomed farmers to 
enjoy limited liability when in reality there is always uncertainty about the level 
of governmental resources. We show that communicating this level of uncertainty 
clearly and credibly can result in increased uptake of insured credit and hence in 
farmers being better covered against risk. 
Regarding policy implications, our results show that limited liability does not 
have to be eliminated in order to generate an increase in the uptake of insured 
credit. Authorities are typically reluctant to make farmers fully liable for their debt, 
because of public pressure and concerns for the well-being of farmers in rural areas. 
However, sometimes governments lose the capacity to support farmers because of 
excessive rains, droughts or pests. According to our results, introducing uncertainty 
on the promise of limited liability is enough to increase insured investment, thereby 
reducing the vulnerability of farmers to weather events which may lead to serious 
crop failure. Moreover, providing limited liability only in probabilistic terms should 
ease the burden on the authorities should there be a systemic shock to farmers.
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6.5 Does Eco-Certification have environmental benefits? 
In Chapter 5, we examined the environmental impacts of organic coffee certification, 
a farm-level decision to differentiate the output, gain higher premiums and manage 
risks in an environmentally friendly way. The findings showed that, in the area 
and period studied, certification significantly reduced the use of all three chemical 
inputs: pesticides, fertilizers, and herbicides; and increased adoption of at least one 
of the four environmentally friendly management practices, organic fertilizer. 
We learned that organic coffee certification has environmental impacts by reducing 
chemical inputs and fostering the adoption of environmentally friendly practices. 
However, our findings suggest that to have a significant impact on changing farming 
practices, commodity certification schemes must require adherence to well-defined 
stringent standards; enforcement at the individual farm-level by independent third-
party monitors, and implementation in areas where producers do not already adhere 
to these standards.
Such certification requirements have significant policy implications, since 
certification schemes meeting these criteria may bring forth a substantial 
disadvantage— they are likely to entail significant costs for producers. Furthermore, 
without significant premiums or other benefits from certification, these costs will 
discourage certification. The relatively small number of certified organic producers 
in our sample reflect these conditions. 
6.6 General conclusions 
Daniel Kahneman’s explanation on how the mind makes decisions in two systems: 
the automatic and impulsive vs. the conscious, aware and considerate; and how the 
two systems do not alternate or work together is a reminder that understanding how 
people act and behave is challenging to analyze (Kahneman 2011). Furthermore, 
preferences are endogenous to the local environment and institutions in place, and 
at the same time, the local environment and institutions are reshaped continuously 
from those individual choices and preferences (Bowles et al. 2003; Cecchi 2015; 
Williamson 2000).
The overarching aim of this thesis was to enhance the understanding of farm-level 
decision making to manage risks. It assessed how individual preferences shaped 
these decisions and explored individual decision-making in interaction with the 
institutions and government policies that can influence these decisions. Finally, it 
endeavored to show how, through understanding farmers’ choices, research can 
contribute to policy design in agriculture.  
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Preferences are addressed directly or indirectly throughout several chapters. We 
assessed individual risk preferences from a methodological point of view and 
questioned what we are measuring when eliciting risk preferences in the field and 
how estimates can vary when evaluating real-life choices (Chapter 2). We showed 
in a model that when comparing insured and uninsured credit, farmers’ liability 
and risk aversion can determine which type of loan is preferred (Chapter 4). 
Also, the decision to certify or not the coffee as organic could, on the one hand, 
increase vulnerability to pests and diseases, and on the other hand, could reduce the 
dependence on costly inputs and include premiums (Chapter 5), and in both cases, 
risk preferences play a role. Thus, further research should insist on including the 
study of risk preferences in the adoption of risk management strategies, including 
voluntary certification schemes.
Furthermore, we inquired the external validity of preferences and compared farmers’ 
pro-social behavior within the experiment and outside the laboratory. We learned 
about the importance of context to study not only risk preferences but for social 
preferences, as well. On the one hand, only when risk preferences are elicited in a 
particular context, estimates relate to real-life agricultural choices (Chapter 2). On 
the other hand, the lack of external validation for conditional cooperation suggests 
that social preferences can also vary among settings (Chapter 3). The external 
validity of context-free experiments is a relevant discussion topic, and researchers 
should be careful when context-free experiments are conducted to inform policy. 
Future research should focus on the external validity of risk and social preferences 
in different contexts to address specific policies.
A lab-in-the-field experiment framed in the context of credit for farm investment, 
helped us control the decision environment and isolate the treatment effects of 
studying farmer choices for credit (Chapter 4). Even so, it used a simple and easy 
to explain index insurance that does not consider basis risks. Which again question 
its real-life applicability. Further research must contemplate the behavioral 
consequences of basis risk on the design of index insurance.
An effective risk management policy should be based on how farmers are exposed 
to risk and which are their preferences, and policies in place should not constrain 
farmers’ strategies. The role of policy is to ensure that farmers receive the information 
and tools necessary to manage their risks, with emphasis on the dissemination of 
relevant information, training, and education (OECD 2011). 
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Summary
This thesis contributes to the understanding of individual preferences and farm-level 
decision making, in interaction with the institutions and government policies that 
can influence these decisions. Decisions on investments and input used, decisions on 
whether or not to support local agricultural cooperatives, decisions the demand of 
credit with or without insurance, and decisions of voluntary certification schemes 
that have an impact on the livelihood of small farmers in developing countries. I 
used standard econometric methods to analyze the survey and data collected from 
three lab-in-the-field experiments, and a one quasi-experiment all implemented 
with real subjects: coffee farmers in rural Costa Rica. 
Chapter 1 starts with an overview of the main topics: individual preferences and 
farm-level decisions. It introduces the concept of risk preferences, social preferences, 
formal market-based strategies and certification schemes, that can be adopted 
by farmers to manage risks. More specifically, it presents the research questions, 
methodology, empirical strategy the study area and explains how the data was 
collected for the subsequent main chapters of the thesis. 
In Chapter 2, we evaluate a survey-based method to other methods that elicit 
farmers’ risk attitudes.  For both researchers and practitioners, surveys can be 
easier to implement than field experiments in developing countries. We first assess 
correlations between a context-free survey estimate of risk-taking and context-
specific risk preferences. Then, we test whether survey data predicts risk-taking 
behavior in an incentivized experiment. Finally, we show how the different 
estimates of survey risk preferences relate to real-life farming choices in a population 
of coffee farmers in Costa Rica. Our results indicate that one should be careful 
when extrapolating risk attitudes across contexts. Context-neutral and context-
specific survey questions elicit different risk preferences. While the context-free 
survey estimate of risk preferences predicts risk-taking behavior in a context-free 
risk experiment, and context-specific estimates are associated with risk-taking in 
the same agricultural real-life context , the context-free survey estimate of risk-
taking is not associated with actual risk-taking behavior in the agricultural setting. 
Connecting these methods to farm practices, we find that higher willingness to take 
risk is associated with the implementation of agricultural practices that require 
more farm investment. In contrast, farmers who report less willingness to take risks 
are more likely to have higher expenditures on fertilizer use. Researchers interested 
in using risk preferences as inputs into the design of policy instruments should make 
sure that preferences are elicited in the specific context targeted by the potential 
policy instrument.
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Chapter 3 tests the internal and external validity of the typology of a conditional 
cooperator classified by using a public goods game together with the strategy 
method. Individuals categorized as conditional cooperators adapt their behavior 
to the group to which they belong. In Costa Rica, coffee farmers are traditionally 
organized in agricultural cooperatives, a setting very similar to the scenario presented 
to an individual facing the strategy method in a public goods game: how much to 
cooperate, given what others do. Our results show that conditional cooperators 
believe they contribute to the public good by matching the contribution of others in 
the experiment. However, we find no evidence that those classified as conditional 
cooperators in the experiment also behave this way when it comes to bringing coffee 
to the local cooperative in real life. We show supporting evidence to conclude that 
the typology of a conditional cooperator is internally consistent, but do not find 
evidence that the typology of conditional cooperators is externally valid. Our paper 
is a contribution to the external validity of context-free experiments and helps in 
understanding cooperative behavior relevant to the sustainability of agricultural 
cooperatives in the developing world.
In Chapter 4, we examine the effect of farmers’ liability on demand for credit with 
and without insurance. We test predictions of a theoretical model in a lab in the 
field experiment with coffee farmers in Costa Rica. Farmers choose how much to 
invest in six different settings, described on the one hand by whether the loan is 
insured or not, and on the other by their liability. Our results show that the uptake 
of loans bundled with insurance is significantly higher than uptake of loans without 
insurance, both when farmers are liable for sure for their debt, and interestingly 
when there is uncertainty about their liability. When farmers are not liable for 
their debt, i.e. under limited liability, the uptake of credit is high irrespective of 
whether the loans are insured or not. Our results suggest that in order to increase 
the uptake of insurance as a strategy to increase private investment and reduce the 
vulnerability of farmers to weather events which may lead to serious crop failure, 
it is important that farmers are liable with at least some probability. In terms of 
policy design, our results show that the “principle” of limited liability does not have 
be abandoned altogether in order to generate an increase in the uptake of insured 
credit.
Chapter 5 evaluates the environmental impacts of organic coffee certification. 
Eco-certification of coffee, timber and other high-value agricultural commodities 
is increasingly widespread. In principle, it can improve commodity producers’ 
environmental performance, even in countries where state regulation is weak. But 
eco-certification will have limited environmental benefits if, as one would expect, 
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it disproportionately selects for producers already meeting certification standards. 
Rigorous evaluations of the environmental effects of eco-certification in developing 
countries that control for selection bias are virtually nonexistent. To help fill this 
gap, we use detailed farm-level data to analyze the environmental impacts of 
organic coffee certification in central Costa Rica. We use propensity score matching 
to control for selection bias. We find that organic certification improves coffee 
growers’ environmental performance. It significantly reduces chemical input use 
and increases adoption of some environmentally friendly management practices.
To conclude, Chapter 6 presents a synthesis and the previous core chapters. 
Conclusions, lessons learned and policy recommendations of individual chapters 
are reconsidered. Subsequently, results are placed in a thesis-wide perspective and 
finally, general conclusions made.

Acknowledgements
145 
Acknowledgements
Several people and institutions have been instrumental in the accomplishment of 
this thesis and I would like to take the opportunity to thank them. My most sincere 
acknowledgement to the Development Economics Group of Wageningen University, 
my promotor Prof. dr. Erwin Bulte and my thesis supervisor dr. Janneke Pieters. 
Your dedication and attention to detail gives this thesis the outcome that it has. 
Thank you for your patience and advice especially for all the times I knocked on 
your doors without an appointment.  I would also like to thank Marrit van den Berg 
and Rob Schipper for their supervision during the first stages of my research; and to 
the administration team: Betty, Karen, and especially Dineke for all their logistical 
support.
Research of this sort would have been very difficult without local support in Costa 
Rica. I found mentorship, inspiration, and friendship while working with the 
Environment for Development Initiative (EfD) in Costa Rica. My sincere thanks to 
Francisco Alpízar, Peter Martinsson, Gunnar Köhlin, and Thomas Sterner. The EfD 
has been like family to me. You have made me grown professionally more than I 
could ever imagine. To my dear friends, Anna, Lau, Mila, Eu, the EfD brought us 
together, and you became like sisters to me. At CATIE, special thanks go to Alberto, 
Liz, Andre, Bar, German, Eduardo and my team of enumerators that offered fantastic 
work and support during my fieldwork.
In addition, there are a number of people who enriched my work in various ways 
during the last years living in Costa Rica as well as in the Netherlands. In Turri, 
Marco, Bar, Llu, Gabi you became the extended family that coddled me with good 
bread, ceviche, and beach escapes. My friends for life who, despite the distance 
kept sending Pura Vida vibes; Nina, Quique, Lau Barahona, Maria Amalia, Marijó, 
Pame, Onik, Mari, Carmen. At Wageningen I would like to express my gratitude to 
Joost, Christina, Matthijs, Coen, Lucie, Dani, the GTs, thank you for reminding me 
there is more to life than scientific papers, deadlines and meetings, and for making 
Wageningen the place I now call home.
Cheers to my colleagues at DEC: Francesco, Jan, Koen, Landry, Zihan, Prossy, Aisha, 
Margaret, Fausta, Diana, Ian, Fan, Maarten, and the new generations Claris, Chen, 
Minjie, Marcos, Betelhem, Banawe, Paul, Marc, Mandy, and the rest of my fellow 
PhD colleagues. I am thankful for your technical support, inspiration during coffee 
breaks, dinners, drinks, and supportive hugs.
Acknowledgements
146
My last words and most importantly so, are for my family. My dad Jaime Florindo, 
who always has the right words of comfort, my mother Ana Cecilia, my brother 
Felipe, Sofi, Amelia; family that in the past years became extended to the Netherlands; 
Henry, Aartje, Wouter, and above all to my best friend and husband Joost. I am 
grateful for your love, encouragement, patience, sacrifices, and support during this 
life-changing adventure. You are the cosmic energy that enlightens my heart!
Completed Training and Supervision Plan 
147 
Completed Training and Supervision Plan 
Wageningen School of Social Sciences (WASS)
Name of the learning activity Department/Institute Year ECTS*
A) Project related competences
Advanced Econometrics, AEP 60306 WUR 2013 6
Advanced Microeconomics, ECH 32306 WUR 2013 6
Advanced Macroeconomics, ENR 30806 WUR 2013 6
Behavioral and Experimental Economics, ECH 51306 WUR 2015 2
Experimental Development Economics Lab in the Field 
Workshop
University of East Anglia 2015 1
Summer school in Development Economics IDEAS, University of 
Verona
2016 1
B) General research related competences
WASS Introduction Course WASS 2012 1
Scientific Publishing WGS 2013 0.3
Research Methodology: From topic to proposal WASS 2013 4
Systematic Literature Review WASS 2013 2
Techniques for Writing and Presenting a Scientific Paper WGS 2016 1.2
Research Proposal WUR 2013 6
C) Career related competences
‘Credit, insurance and farmers’ liability: evidence from a Lab in the 
field experiment with coffee farmers in Costa Rica’
EAERE, Athens, Greece 2017 1
‘Risk elicitation in the field: Evidence from coffee farmers in Costa 
Rica’
SEEDEC, Wageningen 
University, The 
Netherlands
2018 1
Total 38.5
*One credit according to ECTS is on average equivalent to 28 hours of study
The research described in this thesis was financially supported by Formas through 
the COMMONS program and The World Bank through the Environment for 
Development Initiative (EfD) and the Netherlands Fellowship Program, Nuffic.
Financial support from the Development Economics Group of Wageningen 
University for printing this thesis is gratefully acknowledged.
Cover and layout design: Iliana Boshoven-Gkini | www.AgileColor.com 
Photo credits: © EfD Initiative - Daniela Linares 
Printed by: GVO drukkers & vormgevers B.V. | www.gvo.nl

